FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958

DOUZIÈME LÉGISLATURE

Second meeting of the parliamentary presidents of the G8 countries.

9 sept. 2003

 

SUMMARY

LISTE OF PARTICIPANTS 4

REPORT OF THE DEBATES 6

FIRST TOPIC : ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY 8

SECOND TOPIC : FUNDING OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 30

BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS ON TOPICS 50

FIRST TOPIC : ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY 52

Report from Mr. Peter MILLIKEN 54

Report from Mr. Jean-Louis DEBRÉ 57

Report from Mr. Wolfgang THIERSE 67

Report from Mr. Pier Ferdinando CASINI 72

Report from Mr. Tamisuke WATANUKI 79

Report from Sir Alan HASELHURST 83

Report from Mr. Dennis HASTERT 89

SECOND TOPIC : FUNDING OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 90

Report from Mr. Peter MILLIKEN 92

Report from Mr. Jean-Louis DEBRÉ 97

Report from Mr. Wolfgang THIERSE 104

Report from Mr. Pier Ferdinando CASINI 109

Report from Mr. Tamisuke WATANUKI 115

Report from Sir Alan HASELHURST 122

Report from Mr. Dennis HASTERT 127

LISTE OF PARTICIPANTS

· Canada : M. Peter Milliken, Speaker of the House of Commons

· France : Mr. Jean-Louis Debré, Président of the National Assembly

· Germany : Mr. Wolfgang Thierse, Président of the Bundestag

· Italie : Mr. Pier Ferdinando Casini, President of the Chamber of Deputies

· Japan : Mr. Tamisuke Watanuki, Speaker of the House of Representatives

· United Kingdom : Sir Alan Haselhurst, Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons

· United States of America : Mr. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives

REPORT OF THE DEBATES

FIRST TOPIC :
ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : I am pleased to welcome you to Paris for this second meeting of the parliamentary presidents of the G8 countries. We all fondly remember the warm and friendly welcome extended to us by our friend Speaker Milliken last year in Kingston. Our debates then concerned an unfortunately topical subject, difficult to address-`democracy and terrorism'. That most interesting work showed that the legitimacy of our democracies had to be strengthened to combat terrorism. This year, building on that first experience, and convinced that we all stand to win much from these exchanges, we have selected two topics which are also at the heart of parliamentary democracy and to which we have different approaches which can mutually enrich us.

This morning we will address the means of parliamentary scrutiny, a topic of concern to us all. Whatever the form of the regime
- parliamentary or presidential-the scrutiny exercised by the people's representatives over the administration or the government should be as efficient as possible. This afternoon we will tackle a topic that is equally important in many countries, the funding of political activities. First though, hello to : Wolfgang Thierse, President of the Bundestag ; Peter Milliken, Speaker of the House of Commons of Canada ; Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States ; our Italian neighbour and friend, Pier Ferdinando Casini ; our colleague Tamisuke Watanuki from Japan ; Sir Alan Haselhurst, Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons ; and Vladimir Loukine, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma.

I will give the floor first to Mr Casini who accepted to introduce the first topic, concerning the means of parliamentary scrutiny.

Mr Pier Ferdinando CASINI : Thank your, dear President, for your hospitality.

Parliamentary scrutiny is a major challenge for parliaments in the twenty-first century. May I first present a few preliminary ideas, before addressing the actual content of this scrutiny ?

Governmental responsibility to parliament, whatever the constitutional organisation of the country, has always been one of the pillars of democratic life. Exercised between two elections, this scrutiny on behalf of the electorate does not only concern the balance of powers. It also ensures alternation between the majority and the opposition. Lastly it is one of the means of ensuring transparency in the relations between the State and citizens.

Today, this function seems more difficult to exercise, whereas it is more decisive than ever. In effect, the capacity of direct intervention by parliamentary assemblies has clearly diminished, given the complexity and technological level of contemporary society, and the size of the market. The most difficult matter now is to access information, choose it and assess it. Public activities are growing in number and becoming international. Yet, it is necessary to be informed in order to deliberate, and also to exercise scrutiny. In the present context of the redistribution of powers, between the legislative and the executive, and also between different levels of territorial administration, a more affirmed scrutiny function would strengthen the role of parliaments and, in the last analysis, would form a factor safeguarding parliamentary democracy.

But to give its essential scrutiny role back to parliament, a misunderstanding needs to be dispelled and certain platitudes cast aside. The misunderstanding would be to make investigating the essential parliamentary duty. In that case, parliament would encroach on the role of other powers, at the risk of sacrificing a certain political autonomy. As for the platitudes, it is above all necessary to avoid retreating into a logic of conflict between parliament and government, one's strength necessarily meaning the other's weakness. At a time when policies must rise to the challenge of globalisation, government and parliament must work in unison. One should ensure efficacy, the other consensus. In the second place, while parliamentary scrutiny is essential to uphold the rights of the opposition, this function concerns parliament as a whole and parliamentarians from the majority should be attentive to this but without calling into question their solidarity with the government. Let us not confuse the relations between the majority and the opposition, and relations between government and parliament, as is often the case in Italy.

Also the various roles of parliament should not be over dissociated. The legislative role and the scrutiny role are in fact linked. Today there is an excessive trend to liken parliamentary scrutiny with a checking of the results of the implementation of legislative texts.

As for the means of parliamentary scrutiny, there are many : interpellations in a public sitting ; standing committees which hold hearings, produce reports, and issue opinions ; parliamentary inquiries ; specialised bodies which supervise, follow up and assess specific issues.

Questions and interpellations, owing to their very frequency, have a limited impact. But their usefulness is real, for they force governments to respond, sometimes in a given timeframe. For instance in Japan, the government must respond within one week. Rather, the aim would be to make this means of action more dynamic. To do so, a certain number of countries have drawn inspiration from the British question time, which is broadcast live on television. This is also the case in Italy. Admittedly the results are sometimes debatable and not always positive. An analysis is underway to give these sittings more strength. Obviously, the prime minister must be present. It also appears essential to be able to raise questions which have not been the subject of prior agreement so as to give rise to a political confrontation interesting for citizens. In Canada therefore it is always the head of the opposition who raises the first question. In Italy the questions are known in advance, which transforms the exercise into a kind of bureaucratic ritual.

However, all parliaments acknowledge that it is in standing committees that work is done most efficiently. In effect it is in this framework that parliamentarians use their skills best and we are the closest to the legislative role. For scrutiny to be effective, the committees must be suitably informed. It is therefore essential to promote contacts with the administration, universities, independent bodies, and experts. In this respect, the French National Assembly has developed an interesting model-information assignments. Parliamentarians are entrusted with the task of going deeper into specific issues which are not necessarily related to the legislative procedure. They must then draw up a report highlighting the possible responsibility of the government. I feel the French model is suited to removing the risk incurred in concentrating all the scrutiny activity in committees, which would be likely to enclose it there, to the detriment of external scrutiny. The results of the assignment are disclosed.

The parliamentary inquiry is perhaps the most incisive scrutiny instrument. Ad hoc committees have powers of the same order as the judicial authorities. Thanks to this instrument, parliamentary scrutiny acquires a very broad perspective. We are therefore far beyond parliament's scrutiny role over the executive. Admittedly the proposal to create a parliamentary inquiry committee generally fits into the logic of relations between the majority and the opposition and, generally speaking, it is the opposition which demands parliamentary inquiries. In Germany, the Bundestag's power to create an inquiry committee is easy to implement for the opposition - only a quarter of the Members need to demand its creation. The power parliaments therefore have, which affects the judiciary, requires reserving this instrument for public policy issues and all the political forces should reach a consensus in this respect.

That's why, in Italy, I would like us to act in a balanced and prudent manner because it should not be forgotten that these inquires are and remain political in nature. On that condition, any risk of constitutional imbalance can be averted. During recent years, an increasing number of specialised bodies have been created. Parliament follows up a certain number of particularly delicate questions : information and security, communication media, etc. It is absolutely essential for there to be a transversal competence. This is the case for Community affairs in the national parliaments of European Union countries. Also, some parliaments have created citizen-initiated scrutiny instruments. I am thinking in particular of the ombudsman, the parliamentary mediator who goes deeper into various issues and presents a report to parliament. This model has been transposed to Russia with respect to the protection of human rights. It is a field where modern technologies could promote dialogue between citizens and institutions.

I'll now speak of the content of this scrutiny role. The major issue is the relation between quality and quantity. While it is impossible for parliaments to exercise scrutiny over all governmental acts, this scrutiny should be as effective as possible with concrete results that can be used in exercising the other parliamentary roles
- legislating and providing policy guidance. In particular I feel a certain number of transversal fields are essential for the correct operation of the institutional circuit from parliament to government. I am especially thinking of public expenditure scrutiny. The reference in this field is often the US Congress where the General Accounting Office and the Budget Office play a major role. In effect in the field of public expenditure, outlining expenditure and revenue does not suffice and neither does subsequent evaluation. It is advisable to systematically monitor financial flows and, above all, to assess the efficacy of expenditure in terms of the aims laid down. This does not therefore involve an accounting approach but highly political action. When it comes to monitoring legislation, our Chamber of Deputies has worked to achieve rationalisation and has created a legislative committee composed jointly of Members from the opposition and the majority. That committee considers all bills and expresses opinions on their quality. For instance, are they understandable to the citizen ? Lastly, in my view, parliamentary scrutiny over foreign and defence policy should be strengthened. This is particularly true for countries which are members of a supranational organisation, like the European Union, to which an ever greater share of national sovereignty is delegated. Parliamentary scrutiny over national security and defence policy should be strengthened, especially as regards international military interventions which are increasingly frequent. In some countries, it is governments that take decisions. But it is unthinkable for parliaments not to participate in these choices which have such major political, economic and human consequences.

Lastly I would like to emphasise the crucial importance of cooperation between parliaments in strengthening parliamentary scrutiny. For example, I am thinking of exchanges of experiences raising awareness of certain international issues and also of the promotion of the parliamentary dimension of international organisations which have an important role to play. Each parliament should build a network allowing it to integrate the contributions of civil society, in the interest of efficiency. That way we will be able to adapt the parliamentary representation function to the complexity of our day and age and preserve parliament's democratic role.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : Thank you for your interesting introduction, a source of lessons for the French parliament. You firstly addressed the principles of parliamentary scrutiny, warning of the danger there would be of entering into a logic of conflict with the executive : in fact the quest for efficiency, a governmental obligation, and the quest for consensus, a parliamentary task, are complementary and the scrutiny exercised by the parliamentary majority cannot be regarded as an infringement of the "majority pact".

You then recalled the instruments we use - standing committees and ad hoc committees, interpellations and questions to the government -, mentioning in this respect the Canadian practice which consists in reserving the first question for the opposition.

Lastly, referring to the content of scrutiny, you emphasised that it cannot concern everything. However, while it is not infinite, it does have favourite subject matters, foremost among which public expenditure. You mentioned the American experience in this field and emphasised that, to be efficient, scrutiny should address more than just the accounting aspects : the approach to expenditure must also be political.

You related the Italian experience of the legislation committee composed jointly of members of the majority and members of the opposition and which gives its opinion not on the opportunity but on the quality of bills. If such a committee existed in France, it would be up to its neck in work !

Lastly, you raised the most delicate question of scrutiny over international policy and defence policy : is there a place for parliamentary diplomacy or else must everything remain under the government's responsibility ? I feel, in any case, that our parliaments would become more efficient if they were to resolutely adopt the interparliamentary cooperation approach.

The floor is now yours Mr Thierse, to present us the German experience.

Mr Wolfgang THIERSE : I would firstly like to thank Mr Casini for the excellent way he introduced our debate. Parliamentary scrutiny is no easy exercise, given the complexity of our societies, the interweaving of issues and also the relations between States and globalisation-all factors limiting the decisional autonomy of governments and therefore our intervention capacities.

To these difficulties is added another, specific to today's Germany and which I did not mention in my written contribution : the multiplication of extra-parliamentary committees. The government, for instance, recently created some to study the reform of the Bundeswehr, immigration issues, bioethics issues, and to prepare the reform of pensions, and some are wondering whether this proliferation is not likely to lead to a weakening of parliament. First of all, I feel that these committees allow us to gather the opinion of experts and of civil society representatives on complex issues and, in this respect, they help parliament and government in their decisions. They also contribute to bringing about a society debate, all the more useful since the present government has only a narrow majority and can therefore hope to impose its reform projects only by basing itself on as broad a consensus as possible.

In any case, as I point out to those who question me in this respect, these committees merely submit proposals and it is parliament which decides.

To exercise its scrutiny, the German parliament has, alongside the traditional instruments, another power which is perhaps not found in this form in all other parliaments : I am thinking of our inquiry committees to which Mr Casini has moreover already referred. These committees have almost judicial powers and, above all, very broad rights are accorded to the opposition in this framework. Such or such a parliamentary minority can therefore demand investigations on what it feels is a management error, on the effects of a decision it considers ill-advised, or on an embezzlement affair. For instance, one of these committees was created last year to examine the allegedly untrue statements made by the government, at the time of the electoral campaign, on the state of public expenditure. In short, it is a Damocles' sword which can be hung any time over the government but it is also a significant safeguard for the rights of the opposition and therefore of parliament as a whole.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : The increasing recourse to extra-parliamentary committees, also mentioned by Mr Casini, raises a problem in France too... But it appears in effect that Germany has introduced quite original parliamentary scrutiny means. On reading your written contribution, I therefore see that the presence of a member of government can be demanded by a group or by at least 5 % of Members and that the creation of an inquiry committee is mandatory whenever demanded by a quarter of the members of the Bundestag. These are provisions we could think about in our parliament. On the contrary, if I were to propose, just like your budget committee, that our finance committee could be chaired by a deputy from the opposition, I think that my group would soon question itself about my membership of the majority !

Lastly, you have taken steps to exercise scrutiny over the intelligence services, and we have started to do the same... We feel that the deputies tasked with this role should have a keen understanding of the meaning of the State and should be most discreet.

Sir Alan Haselhurst is now going to present the English system to us and I would particularly appreciate if he would enlighten us on Question Time. Many of our colleagues speak of it, and refer to it as a model to follow, but I am not very sure that they do so with full knowledge of the facts. If Sir Alan could clarify the matter for us, I could at least retort to them that I do know what it is about ! What therefore is the number of questions per sitting ? Is question time limited or not ? Do the ministers know about the questions in advance ? Do the groups filter the questions ? Is it true, as is said, that ministers can refrain from answering if they feel a question is indiscreet or outside parliament's competence, or can they answer merely yes or no ? I admit that, if French ministers were allowed to answer questions in only two words, our questions sittings would become far more lively and interesting !

Sir Alan HASELHURST : I'll be very happy to answer all these questions, but I above all wish to thank you for organising this conference and for your hospitality. It is very pleasant to be back together with old friends for new debates which I hope will be as fruitful as the previous ones. I personally cannot speak on behalf of parliament as a whole owing to the political nature of my post, but I will try to supply a maximum of useful information.

Our parliamentary models obviously differ even if, everywhere, the two major issues consist in reconciling the separation and the cooperation of the executive and the legislative branches. The British system differs by the way it takes conflict into consideration. The very way we are arranged in our hall - the opposition facing the majority -encourages debate, if not confrontation ! Some young deputies have started to challenge this tradition. We have therefore experimented with what we call somewhat incorrectly Westminster Hall sittings where there is no voting and the semi-circle seating of the hall favours more attentive hearing of reports - especially those of select committees - and consensual discussion. These meetings also offer additional opportunities to hear ministers.

In Great Britain, we have always felt that parliament represented a nuisance for the government, which has constantly sought to bypass it. For instance, some ministers reserve the announcement of their decisions for the media, behaving as if they refused parliamentary debate ! Our Speaker receives many complaints in this respect and we must therefore react. Also, the policies of a majority with a comfortable margin are rarely challenged. The present majority is broad, so parliamentary scrutiny is all the more difficult. The issue is particularly important for the efficiency of public expenditure, as emphasised by Mr Casini. While we have a public accounts committee tasked with this financial monitoring, it should be realised that, for want of timely information, we often cannot address difficulties until months after they have appeared.

Scrutiny of the budget by parliament is also hindered by MPs lacking expertise. For many reasons, our MPs have less knowledge than their predecessors in this field : fewer and fewer persons with a professional background, academics, or barristers, are elected, and more and more militants above all experienced in canvassing and political meetings. Also, if I may refer to my own career, a young deputy interested in aeronautics, like me, could no longer visit Boeing, McDouglas or Lockheed. Parliament's budget no longer allows such fact-finding missions. The House of Commons is here again losing much efficiency for want of being outward-looking.

The same applies to the House of Lords. I know all about your curiosity for this institution which we have been relentlessly endeavouring to reform for more than a hundred years, without any really convincing results : all the proposals made by the present government have been rejected. We therefore continue to have a second chamber where the majority of members are appointed. We could prefer them to be elected or, at the very least, to move towards a mixed system... Nevertheless this chamber boasts former primer ministers, former trade unionists, and representatives of the arts and of the business world, so the quality of the debates is very high there
- which would probably no longer be the case if these members were elected - and it provides parliament with skills no longer to be found in the Commons.

Question Time is currently the subject of heated debates. Previously, questions had to be submitted a fortnight in advance. That has been reduced to make debates livelier and, while the content of questions continues to be communicated to the government, MPs can now ask an additional question which the questioned minister does not necessarily know about. Of course, and above all if the author of the question is a member of the majority, this minister will have tried to know what it is about. If the prime minister is concerned, Downing Street will have called you to try and convince you that by giving this information you will obtain a clearer answer. It's up to you to know how to react... However ministers obviously prepare themselves by trying to guess what additional questions the opposition may ask ! The prime minister in particular engages in this exercise, to prepare incisive answers to embarrass his interlocutor.

An effective question is short and direct. Unfortunately, today's MPs no longer know how to surprise the government and they embrace too broad a field, which means that the minister can choose to answer the easiest points to deal with, forgetting the rest. Too bad for parliamentary scrutiny !

The length of answers is also tending to grow, which can be a good thing in certain respects, but this means that out of the thirty or so questions on the agenda, only 14 or 15 can receive an answer, on average, during a one hour sitting, despite all the Speaker's exhortations for concision.

Also e-mail is being increasingly used : a hundred or so MPs already use it.

The political groups do not filter questions but sometimes study groups urge their colleagues to ask questions on the topic of interest to them, to increase their chances of obtaining an answer.

Having answered Mr Debré, I wish in turn to question the audience : first, according to you, who is the more efficient ? A member elected in a constituency and who has to devote himself to his electors, or a member elected by proportional representation and therefore having weaker ties to a given territory ? I feel that, as they are concerned about their re-election, our colleagues spend more and more time in their constituency, which diverts them from their scrutiny task.

Also with globalisation and the new distribution of powers brought about by the growing influence of the European Union, decisions are taken that affect our constituencies without us having our word to say. Does that mean governments should be left to address matters among themselves and we should resign ourselves to parliaments being ousted ?

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : Thank you for your clarifications on Question Time, but I also refer our colleagues to your written contribution where they will find useful ideas to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny. For my part, I have seen that since 1979 each British ministry has been monitored by a select committee examining its operation and expenditure. These committees are composed equally by members of the majority and members of the opposition, and the chairs are shared the same way. Further, at the beginning of their work, these committees publish a press notice asking all holders of useful information to send it to them in writing : France is still far from such a practice... Lastly, the ministers must give an answer to the report by these committees within two months.

Other committees participate in this scrutiny : public accounts committee, public administration committee, environmental audit committee, and the human rights committee composed of members of both houses. I would now like to ask Mr Hastert to speak in turn about select committees by presenting us the American system which we all greatly admire without always knowing much about it. Who can decide the creation of these committees : the majority alone, or the opposition also, on its own initiative ? How long are these committees set up for ? Can they hold public hearings ? Also, the means available to them leaves us all wishful-thinking, but could you be more precise about them ? Are there subjects or topics banned to them ? Lastly, can a select committee be set up when parallel judicial proceedings are taking place ?

Mr Dennis HASTERT : Thank you for your invitation and your hospitality.

The American Constitution has enshrined the separation of powers as an absolute principle. Remember, we have only two parties and the party in government may not have a majority in parliament. As for the 435 members of the House of Representatives, they are elected from single-seat constituencies, each by 630 000 electors on average, and as a rule they are answerable to the latter for their votes. What are the powers of Congress ? It allocates funds. It makes laws - the initiative does not belong to the government in the United States -drafts them and promulgates them. Lastly, it monitors the assignment of funds and the application of laws, in other words it checks that, on these two points, the "bureaucrats" - these officials often remain in place for many years - have indeed followed our will to the letter.

Our chamber has nineteen standing committees concerning for example the budget, appropriations, health, energy... Each has its own tasks and it is not easy to set up an ad hoc committee without encroaching on the reserved field of any given one. It is even more difficult to reorganise their powers, which we tried to do for the first time in the history of Congress after 11  September by creating a national security committee tasked with ensuring security at ports and airports and dealing with the necessary accreditations. In the process we had to cut into the prerogatives of other committees - and sometimes even entice away their chairman !

Referring to appropriations alone, we have some fourteen competent committees or subcommittees, each in a specific field. It is of course the President who presents a draft budget, but it is Congress which decides where funds will be allocated ; if the executive wishes to give a specific orientation to the budget, the President must come before us to defend this line.

Holding the purse strings, Congress controls a good share of the policies applied in the United States. But officials or ministries sometimes do not follow our will in applying the Acts we have passed. We then have the possibility of summoning them before us - and the President himself can find himself in the hot seat ! The procedure is frequently used, especially when the parliamentary majority does not coincide with the governmental majority. This was precisely the case during my first political mandate. I was then a member of the committee monitoring the ministry of agriculture and I remember that, to organise day after day the government hearing, we had to explain to our colleagues that it was no use passing Acts and a budget if we did not monitor governmental action afterwards. Of course this situation is less frequent in Europe where the party in power generally controls parliament, but each Representative, in the United States, is empowered to propose legislation. In addition, we can set up special committees when, for instance, `affairs' occur which are not a matter for any standing committee. These committees, with their own budget and personnel, are set up on the basis of legislation which is also specific, which is promulgated by Congress for a limited period and a clearly stated purpose. This Act must be signed by the President, so that there is a balance between the two powers, in accordance with the system of checks and balances, but, pursuant to our power of subpoena, the persons we summon are obliged to appear, whether they are ministers or ordinary citizens, and they must give evidence under oath. Naturally, of course, the threat is so powerful that it is neither necessary nor opportune to brandish it all the time.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : I'll now give the floor to Mr Watanuki who, in his written contribution, has supplied us with excellent examples of the scrutiny parliament should exercise over the administration.

Mr Tamisuke WATANUKI : In office since 2000, I am the only one of us, I think, to have participated in the preparatory meetings to the Kingston meeting. As the most senior member of the Conference I welcome the success of our joint undertaking.

The administrative investigation work of our Diet consists in gathering information and analyses and checking the correct operation of administrations. This scrutiny, which answers the desire for transparency on the part of citizens, allows us to deal with subjects that cannot be addressed during ordinary legislative activity : delegated legislation and decrees, diplomatic activity not leading to the signature of treaties, development aid... it therefore brings us directly face to face with the effects of globalisation !

This investigation is conducted by means of questions and answers sittings, the hearing of ministers by committees, summons of witnesses... We can also ask the government to produce documents or send fact-finding missions, including abroad.

Frequently, important inquiries take place at the same time as the discussion of key projects, and sometimes the majority and the opposition quarrel over the work schedule. Often, the participation of a minister in a committee tasked with an administrative investigation mission or the appearance in court of a witness become negotiation elements. When the budget committee meets, it is customary to debate all the subjects concerning the national administration and, quite often during this important discussion, subjects as secondary as a financial scandal involving such or such a parliamentarian, are addressed for political tactical reasons, despite the existence of a political ethics committee. The majority and the government want the budgetary discussion to advance ; the opposition, for its part, intends to ask the executive for explanations and this confrontation disturbs the debates as a whole.

However, the Diet has undertaken reforms. In 1997 the House of Representatives set up a Committee on Audit and Oversight of Administration and the House of Councillors a Committee on Oversight of Administration. We now gather complaints by citizens and launch inquiries. We have set up a Committee on Fundamental National Policies and introduced an English style Question Time which means that, for all State affairs, the prime minister and the heads of the opposition can dialogue directly.

The Japanese parliamentary system previously imitated the British system with an upper house whose members were appointed. Today, representatives and councillors are elected. And not only are they elected the same way but their deliberations are also sometimes repeated. In response, we decided on a new distribution of roles : the lower house, the House of Representatives, votes on the budget whereas the upper house monitors the budget and its settlement. The House of Councillors consequently strives to improve its scrutiny over a whole range of issues such as development aid. That way our two houses walk in step while affirming their specific characteristics.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : The Canadian parliament does not lack original features ! From Mr Milliken's written contribution I have for instance learnt that high officials are tasked there with providing advice and analyses independent from those of the government. I discovered that the public accounts committee - chaired by an MP from the opposition ! - has to examine the report by a character unheard of in France but who nevertheless appears to play a considerable role in parliamentary scrutiny : the auditor general. The Canadian parliament also has a privacy commissioner, a director general of elections and a commissioner of official languages ! We are eager to hear more about these functions and bodies...

Mr Peter MILLIKEN : I wish to thank you on behalf of the Canadian delegation and, I am convinced, on behalf of all the others, for organising this conference and for your splendid hospitality.

The general auditor is indeed an important person for our parliament and for our government. His task is to audit the accounts of all the ministries, parliamentary rapporteurs basing themselves on his work. He has his own budget and personnel. Each quarter he hands over a report which is transmitted to the House of Commons by its Speaker, in other words me. An MP immediately reports to the standing public accounts committee, which can summon the auditor before it as well as those whose accounts it has examined, in order to elucidate possible breaches. The auditor regularly updates his reports, examining in particular the improvements made in response to his remarks. All of this is then discussed again in committee or in plenary session.

The budget committee can tell the auditor which matters are to be examined more closely and can summon ministry officials to ask them to explain their fund allocation method.

As the years have elapsed - because his post was created a while ago - the auditor has managed to instil in the administration the meaning of a responsible use of public monies. Previously our governments were sometimes accused of squandering money, of not allocating funds in accordance with the will of parliament or of unfairly organising invitations to tender. Thanks to the auditor, these gross misuses have disappeared and everything leads to believe that funds are now allocated in accordance with the laws and regulations.

The other officials you mentioned, Mr President, and particularly the privacy commissioner, are appointed by the prime minister, generally after consultation with opposition leaders.

The elections commissioner is independent : he is answerable only to our procedural committee. As for the privacy commissioner, the last one had to resign : he was accused in some quarters of being excessively zealous, and then of having spent badly. An interim commissioner is therefore in post today and is striving to clean the Augean stables... As for this official's remit, it is to ensure that the government has respected the law when collecting information on private individuals and has kept it confidential. He then reports to the competent committee.

The officials whose remit I have just mentioned are very independent from Parliament : they can conduct the inquiries they want in the sectors of their choice. They have their own funds for this, separate from those of the committees. These parliamentary officials are very important in our system in that they give independent opinions to parliament and can suggest improvements for its operation. They also provide precious help to MPs. I am not the best informed to speak of their exact powers, but generally speaking, these powers are quite broad and moreover enshrined in the Standing Orders.

I agree with what Mr Haselhurst said about oral questions : if questions are too long, the minister can evade the main point and focus on ancillary aspects. We have therefore limited the length of questions to thirty-five seconds and no prior notice is necessary to ask any. If after thirty-five seconds the question has not been asked, I cut off the mike. And the same applies for answers. These rules, which we adopted six years ago, give us extremely lively sittings, during which far more questions than before are of course asked : there are often forty or so. For more important questions, I prolong the speaking time. Yet only once have I allowed a question raiser to take more than a minute to ask his question. Applause is authorised but if it comes from the party of the speaker raising the question, I deduct it from his speaking time. In any case, if the speaker really has something to say, he continues to speak during applause.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : Listening to you, I caught myself dreaming. If I've understood well, after thirty-five seconds you interrupt the speaker asking a question. In France, thirty-five seconds is already the time it takes for the deputy to get up and move to his mike ! And when I interrupt him after two and a half minutes, what a fuss ! As you said, the shorter and more incisive the question, the less the minister can evade it. As it gets longer with digressions, the more time the minister has to think about the right answer... or how not to answer ! As I have been both a minister and a deputy, I know of experience.

I have been striving, for the time being in vain, to explain this to my deputy colleagues, both from the majority and the opposition. Many of them see in the government questions sittings an opportunity to set forth their opinion on a given topic rather than question the government. What should be questions become speeches. I am going to strive, at our next sitting, to obtain shorter answers and if, when I interrupt a speaker, that creates too much of an uproar in the hemicycle, I'll explain that it was you who advised me to do so ! Can Deputy Chairman Loukine give us his viewpoint on the scrutiny which parliament should exercise over government ?

Mr LOUKINE : I am the last to speak but that's not abnormal, Russia being the youngest democracy here. We still have a lot to learn, even if we have already learnt a lot. I send you the greetings of the Chairman of the State Duma who asks you to excuse his absence. He could not free himself as our parliamentary session begins precisely today.

When I chair the Duma, I always ask my colleagues to ensure that their questions really are questions... in other words that they have an interrogative form ! We already have some experience of parliamentary scrutiny whose rules are laid down by the Constitution. Unfortunately, the latter does not define clearly enough their framework. Article 101 on scrutiny over the federal budget by the two chambers, sets forth that this scrutiny shall be exercised by the Accounts Chamber.

Article 114 for its part addresses the role of the government, as well as of federal constitutional law. Article 102 states that the Federation Council shall approve presidential decrees adopted in exceptional circumstances, as well as the use of the armed forces. The Federation Council also appoints the Prosecutor-General and chooses the deputy chairman of the Accounts Chamber, whose chairman is appointed by the Duma. Article 103 lays down that the two chambers shall meet jointly to hear the addresses of the President of the Federation. Ratifying the appointment of the President of the Federation comes within the State's powers. If the Duma refuses three times the President's proposals, the latter can dissolve it and new elections take place. As can be seen, the balance leans rather towards the executive. The Duma can initiate a vote of confidence provided 90 members make such a request. The Duma also appoints the chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, the chairman of the accounts chamber and half its auditors-the vice-chairman and the other half are appointed by the Federation Council. It also appoints the human rights commissioner who exercises his activity in accordance with the federal constitutional law.

The Duma is also alone in being authorised to declare amnesties or initiate impeachment procedures against the President of the Russian Federation with a view to his removal from office. Such procedures were implemented against President Eltsine but did not succeed.

Such are the scrutiny powers of parliament over the government. The point at issue is that candidatures are put forward by the President. Similarly the chairman of parliament may or may not present his programme. In my opinion it would be more judicious for the government to present its programme and, on the basis of the latter, for parliament to ensure effective scrutiny over governmental activity. Scrutiny is most effective and practical with respect to the budget. The accounts chamber was created by a special federal Act of 1995, according to which parliament exercises scrutiny over expenditure by the executive. Scrutiny can be exercised if a fifth of the members demand it. The accounts chamber monitors use of the sums budgeted and of extra-budgetary expenditure. It also assesses their efficacy. Last year, 419 budget controls were made, following which the State budget was reallocated a billion roubles. The accounts chamber is chaired by Mr Stepachine, the former prime minister whose authority is unquestionable in Russia.

Temporary ad hoc committees set up on the basis of Article, 101 of the Constitution also exercise scrutiny, which is highly variable.

As you can see, Russia has a highly presidential form of rule. In actual fact our system draws inspiration from both the European and American systems. Undeniably there is a problem of independence between the various branches of power. Scrutiny is developing but remains insufficient in my opinion. The majority is hostile to any change in our Constitution, feeling that this first democratic Constitution in Russia should be allowed time to prove itself before thinking of amending it.

Our strong point in the field of parliamentary scrutiny is the budget ; our weak point is foreign policy and the maintenance of order. In fact the law enforcement authorities are against their activity being monitored.

For all these reasons, your long experience is very precious to us. I will finish by making a wish. The group we form is not yet known enough to the media in general. We should make general recommendations because the problems we meet, such as those concerning the relations between the executive and the legislative, appear in all countries. Why not define certain rules, which would be flexible of course, then publish them ? Generally speaking, it would be to the advantage of our work if it were better known and its results more widely disseminated.

Mr Jean-Louis Debré : Before interrupting our work, I would like to ask you two questions.

For parliaments to be able to exercise their scrutiny over governments they must have the necessary material and human resources. Are your assemblies independent in their recruitment of personnel ? Can they from an autonomous parliamentary administration, independent of the State administration. Similarly, are they financially autonomous or not ? Are they free to allocate their funds as they desire ? How are these funds determined ? Is their amount decided after consultation with the government ?

Second question : who, in your parliaments, lays down the agenda of the debates. Can the opposition have certain questions placed on the agenda ? In Great Britain it has twenty days a year, I believe, when it can ask for subjects of interest to it to be debated.

Mr Dennis HASTERT : We determine our own budget ourselves ; in theory the funds are unlimited but we must be wary of public opinion. Regarding the personnel, we have high funds allowing us to recruit the best, often from the private sector.

Lastly, our parliament has a mainly legislative activity and grants little time to general debates.

Mr Pier Ferdinando CASINI : The budgets of the Chamber and of the Senate are determined at the time of the annual approval of the finance law. The Chamber of Deputies, which has 630 parliamentarians, receives 900 million euros per year. Parliament recruits its personnel itself. As for the agenda, it is a matter for the conference of group chairpersons. The rules of procedure set forth that a quarter of the time shall be devoted to questions and instruments by the opposition.

Sir Alan HASELHURST : You're right, the opposition has twenty days during which it determines the agenda itself. The House of Commons committee, where the government is in the minority, determines the budget under the sole scrutiny of public opinion as in the United States. We too are entirely free in choosing the personnel on that committee. This year, for electoral reasons, far more money has been spent in constituencies than on budgetary scrutiny. Yet we are always circumspect on expenditure.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : Public money should always be put to good use. It is important to be independent in using funds.

Mr Wolfgang THIERSE : In Germany, the separation is very clear between parliament and government ; while the government can ask us to make savings, it does not have any control over our budget. We too are independent in recruiting personnel, whether working for Members, or parliament in general. As for the agenda, it is a matter for consultation between parliamentary group chairmen and, in case of disagreement, the council of elders. Our rules of procedure are very precise and take into account the rights of the opposition. The Chancellor and members of government can intervene any time in parliament, but the opposition then has the right to answer them.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : What is the role and the composition of the council of elders ?

Mr Wolfgang THIERSE : The council of elders is composed of the president and vice-president of parliament, group whips and a member of the budget committee. It meets each Thursday afternoon to address the week's litigious affairs, best not aired in public. It also determines the agenda for the following session, and deals with all the important issues related to the operation of the federal parliament, such as its budget. I play the role of a moderator so that a consensus can be found.

Mr Vladimir LOUKINE : The operation of the Duma is ensured, for two-thirds, by a central administration, and for the rest, by the Duma itself. The Duma has six political parties and three party associations which share posts in the committees. Committee chairmen play a key role in choosing personnel, for which the Duma has a free hand. The Duma is also independent in establishing its budget.

As for the agenda, it is determined by a majority vote by a board grouping leaders of the various parties meeting twice a week. The chairman of parliament attends sittings but does not have the right to participate in voting. All Duma members can, at the beginning of the sitting, add a question to the agenda.

Mr Peter MILLIKEN : The budget of the House of Commons is decided by the board of internal economy, which I chair and which is composed of every party in the House, as well as two ministers. The budget is then submitted to parliament and voted on as such. As for the rights of the opposition, part of question time is set aside for it ; it also has, as in Great Britain, 21 days during which it can decide the agenda.

Mr Tamisuke WATANUKI : An investigation bureau, composed of 250 persons, can carry out public inquiries, particularly within the budget committee.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : Dear colleagues, thank you. A report of our work will be sent to you, so these very interesting exchanges of views will contribute to our respective analyses and those of our parliamentarians.

*

* *

SECOND TOPIC :
FUNDING OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : We are going to resume our work but, beforehand, I'm going to give the floor to Mr Dennis Hastert who has a message for us.

Mr Dennis HASTERT : I am very pleased to invite you next year to the United States. I know it will be difficult to offer the same level of marvellous hospitality as that of our French hosts and, last year, of our Canadian hosts. I'll contact each of you to fix a date, but the beginning of September would certainly be the most appropriate. The meeting will perhaps not be held in Washington : I would indeed like to show you my own constituency, Chicago. The detailed agenda has not yet been fixed, so I invite you to contact us if you have specific subjects of interest. We can perhaps address technology and its influence on our work. Parliaments enjoy use of the latest technologies, so how do these impact our work and relations between parliamentarians ? In the meanwhile we are very impatient to organise that meeting and see you in September 2004.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : Thank you for your invitation, which we particularly appreciate. Many subjects can be of interest to us. Perhaps we should question ourselves, for instance, in future years, about the place of national parliaments within the framework of globalisation. I think this issue calls for a contribution by the parliamentary presidents of the G8 countries. We all have to face globalisation. Do national parliaments have a role to play and which ? Does the growing number of international parliamentary assemblies lead us to refocus the work of our national parliaments ? The corollary of this matter is the issue of the legitimacy of our elected representatives. How, supported by our election by universal suffrage, can we influence globalisation ? I hope this topic will meet with your approval for one of our future debates.

I showed you earlier on a tapestry representing the School of Athens by Raphaël, a school where philosophers asked themselves about the meaning of life. Admittedly we are not at the School of Athens, but the question is nevertheless existential : what are national parliaments going to become ? Do they still even have a future ? I am asking the question in a somewhat provocative way, but I feel the leaders of our countries stand to gain from analysing this matter.

This afternoon we will address the issue of the funding of political activities, which has given rise to heated discussions in France. The great author Anatole France has taught us that happy are those who have only one truth, but happier and greater and stronger are those who have realised there are several truths and that man must build on this diversity. What we are going to hear now will therefore allow us to analyse matters and, perhaps, question our consciences as elected representatives, in the same way that when we came back from our meeting last year in Canada we tasked working groups with analysing the experiences presented to us. I give the floor to Mr Peter Milliken.

Mr Peter MILLIKEN : It's a pleasure to be here and to have the opportunity to discuss such matters. In order to enliven my presentation of the funding rules of political parties in Canada, I'll continue my speech in Canada's two official languages, French and English.

In any democracy it is important to take an interest in fundraising, ceilings on electoral expenditure, and therefore political party resources. In Canada, in each constituency, national political parties and candidates raise funds and incur expenditure for election campaigns. The funding of elections and of political parties has been at the centre of debates in recent months. The federal government has decided to ban most contributions made previously by corporations and unions, limit donations by private individuals, and offer public subsidies to registered political parties. It is the biggest reform on the matter since 1974.

Election campaigns, which depend a lot on television and radio, have become very costly. In the 1950s, the concern arose that small parties might be disadvantaged, which would represent a risk for democracy and would challenge the capacity of politics to reflect the diversity of opinion. The 1974 Act introduced a framework for the funding of parties. It laid down the reimbursement of a certain number of costs and an expenditure scrutiny mechanism. It thereby aimed at introducing a certain fairness between candidates and improving public confidence in the electoral process. It appeared important that there should be public funding, which should however be only partial. Changes were then introduced to make the political process fairer.

At the federal level these changes have been minor. Questions of undue influences and of the cost of elections continue to give rise to many debates, and discussions are still continuing on the validity of limiting political contributions, the need to restrict electoral expenditure and the appropriate level of public funding. At the provincial level, since 1977 Quebec has banned donations by corporations and unions, and Manitoba also adopted the ban in 2000.

On 29 January 2003, the federal government introduced legislation (Bill C-24) which has just been approved and will enter into force in January 2004. The head of the majority party called it a patchwork. This Act bans political donations by corporations and unions and lays down the registration of political party associations at the level of electoral districts as well as regulations on nomination contests within parties themselves.

Whereas the 1974 legislation focussed on ceilings, the new Act is mainly concerned with contributions. It also contains provisions on public funding and on the regulation of activities both of party associations and of their leadership. A ceiling of 5 000 dollars is placed on individual contributions, except regarding nomination contests. Candidates' own contributions are not counted for this limit : they can therefore fund their campaign with their personal money. Unions and associations are not authorised to make donations, except very small sums. Nor can public corporations make political contributions.

The new Act is aimed at preventing the parties concerned from circumventing the limits and hiding sources of contributions. It also wishes to avoid corporations and unions handing funds to their leaders or their employees for them to contribute to a party. Indirect contributions are also banned except, to a limited extent, those made through fundraising bodies.

To date, candidates and parties were not registered separately and were not obliged to make direct reports. Bill C-24 sets forth that electoral district associations, considered as electoral associations, can register. They shall then communicate information and draft a report every year. At present, only registered candidates and political parties are subject to expenditure ceilings, and only in the electoral period. The ceiling depends, for candidates, on the number of voters in their electoral district and, for parties, on the number of the voters in the electoral districts where they present candidates.

The new Act also introduces expenditure limits for nomination contestants. In effect, even if nomination contests are generally not very costly, there are examples of highly mediatised and expensive campaigns. Nomination campaigns are an integral part of the electoral process and can influence the ensuing election. The introduction of expenditure and resource limits is aimed at making the rules of the game uniform and helping traditionally disadvantaged candidates, such as women and members of minorities. The fact that political party leadership contests are not regulated had been considered a shortcoming for a long time. A report to parliament emphasises that the choice of a leader can be an extremely important political event, which sometimes makes it necessary to spend considerable sums. Various proposals have been made to ensure transparent funding. The new Act retains in particular the establishment of a report on contributions and expenditure.

The new Act contains important public funding measures aimed at compensating parties for the loss of contributions from corporations and unions most often made to parties rather than to candidates or electoral district associations. Political parties form the heart of any modern political regime and are therefore essential for the democratic system to be dynamic. Knowing if that involves public funding and the level of the latter is therefore an important political and philosophical debate.

The new Act appears to be particularly aimed at improving fairness and transparency. It has been partly justified by perceptions of undue influence and by allegations of scandal, but some of its provisions had been demanded for a long time by observers of our regime. This text aims at reestablishing public confidence in the electoral regime and the democratic process. Whether it will allow these aims to be reached will no doubt be the subject of many discussions.

In conclusion, while it is undeniable that this system is democratic, some doubt its fairness : a lot of money is necessary to be successful in politics, and access to funding for some parties or candidates represents a major asset. It is both essential for candidates to be able to raise the funds they need and for limits to be imposed. In 1974, Canada introduced a mixed system, comprising direct and indirect subsidies, which aimed at limiting the disparities between candidates and compensating for a certain number of fundraising abuses, while ensuring that parties have the necessary funds for their activity. Criticisms concerned its lack of fairness and the fact that raising money is becoming more important than knowing how to convince. It was therefore necessary to find an acceptable political and practical comprise. Manitoba has, for instance, banned donations by unions, in exchange for a very favourable financial and tax regime. The new Act (C-24) tries to attain more transparency and fairness and wants to prevent too powerful donors from exercising their influence. The ongoing changes are considerable and it will be enthralling to follow their actual application. On the other hand it will be essential to reduce the cynicism of public opinion for this process.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : Therefore, for the past thirty years, the Canadian legislator has sought to limit expenditure and monitor party publicity expenses during elections, in exchange for a public funding system. The Act which should enter into force on 1 January 2004 bans corporations and trade unions from making contributions during elections and limits individual contributions. In exchange it improves public funding. Lastly, there is a tax credit for individual contributions.

This legislation, close to the French legislation, seeks a form of balance. The limitation on private funding is compensated by State intervention. The legislation in force in the United States, which I studied when I went there to follow the latest presidential elections, is very different. Candidates can choose between private funding or public subsidies with a ceiling. The Speaker of the House of Representatives is going to explain how this system works.

Mr Dennis HASTERT : Thank you. In the United States we have done exactly the opposite to what has been done in Canada. The reform is moreover being examined at present by the Supreme Court because we wonder whether the new legislation is constitutional. Freedom of expression should be respected. If you support a candidate, you should be able to give him money. There is no public funding in our country. While the government devotes money to organising election campaigns, it cannot fund individual campaigns.

Personally, I opposed the funding reform of election campaigns. I consider everyone was satisfied with the existing legislation. There were no problems, except for reactions in the columns of the New York Times, the Washington Post or the Los Angeles Times... In the United States, newspapers wish to exercise political influence. I'm not being sarcastic : we really have seen a brawl between the press, free moreover, and the freedom of expression during elections. Newspapers wanted to increase their power to the detriment of political parties. The old legislation authorised private individuals to fund election campaigns. It was desired that they cease to support political parties. It's the opposite to what the Founding Fathers wanted.

Nowadays a campaign can cost more than two or three million dollars. Who provides this money ? Someone who wishes to defend a specific position, for instance for or against abortion. Instead of having a wide range of proposals, our candidates are increasingly tending to defend only one opinion, owing to their funding.

A ceiling of 2 000 dollars per candidate and per election is placed on donations from private individuals. The ceiling is 10 000 dollars for a State party committee, 25 000 dollars for a national party committee and 95 000 dollars for all these organisations over two years. That's what we call `hard money'. As for `soft money', it's money contributed by companies, but since November these contributions have been banned and can lead to five years' imprisonment.

If `hard money' is spoken of it's because it's hard to find. To be elected Speaker of the House of Representatives, I had to run in an election. I spent twenty days on the roads to meet my colleagues. That's a lot of nights at hotels, a lot of speeches. It's hard work.

The new legislation infringes the Constitution in my opinion and that's why the Supreme Court is examining it.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : This morning everyone agreed on parliamentary scrutiny. We all had common goals. This afternoon, in contrast, we are seeing radically different approaches. The Speaker's role is difficult when consensus is impossible !

The United Kingdom's experience is also interesting. There is no direct funding by the State : our British friends do not wish to take part in the funding of parties of which they are not members. However, public funding is granted to the opposition parties for their parliamentary activity, travel and the running costs of the leader of the opposition's office. A subsidy is also granted to draft the programme. In France, a lot of money would be necessary for whatever opposition to be in a position to draft a programme !

Sir Alan HASELHURST : I thought you was going to tell us everything ! You neatly summarised the situation. Funding is not proportional to the importance of the party. As an MP I would be concerned if some electors had contributed significantly to my campaign. You need a strong will to deal in the same way with a person who has given you 5 000 pounds and a person who has given just one pound.

I respect the fundamental principles of the American system, but if MPs take an interest only in those who support them, democracy is in danger. What is necessary is to determine how the country as a whole should be governed. I am also worried by the fact that more and more people are losing interest in politics. Couldn't money fund activities rekindling their interest for the commonweal ?

During the local elections there were debates on television and one channel went to see a students' union. The attitude observed there was of the type `I don't agree with the government on such or such a point which means politicians therefore don't listen to us.' In fact they listen but they can have a different opinion from those to whom they listen. An education in politics is necessary. In Great Britain, during an election campaign, people often reproach us for meeting them only when we seek their votes. But if I announce that people can see me at the town hall on Fridays, I consider myself lucky if six come along. People don't come and so there can't be any dialogue.

It is therefore no surprise that the press is gaining in importance : questionnaires are distributed to know what people think of given issues and public opinion polls are becoming a political fact. Today, for instance, I received a message saying that 59 % of people think this or that and asking me what I personally think. But have these people really analysed the issue in depth ? Evidently not ; yet public opinion polls are becoming increasingly important - far too important in my view.

I really hope we manage to introduce a genuine democracy, but I sometimes have the sad impression that, to do so, public money must be spent, not to fund such or such a candidate but to raise public awareness of the importance of politics. I express here a personal vision because in actual fact we have a quite puritan approach to the funding of political activities. Most people don't give to their union, unless they expect something in return, but neither would they want higher funding to be granted to political parties.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : I have always been fascinated by the Italian genius. Our Italian friends always know how to find balanced, shrewd and intelligent solutions. In Italy, if I understand well, there is a State contribution to the reimbursement of elections costs and funding is made by private individuals. Public and private funding therefore coexist. There is also a mechanism aimed at promoting the participation of women in politics. It is an interesting system which we have somewhat adopted in France. I of course know that, between women and men, there should be no question of money, but if subsidies can promote the intervention of women in politics ! Mr Casini is going to speak to us about the Italian system.

Mr Pier Ferdinando CASINI : I am sorry to have to disappoint you, Mr President, but in this case I don't think I can cite my country as a model. In effect I must say that I am personally quite pessimistic about this funding issue. We are closer to the Canadian choice than that of the United States but, in my view, there is no ideal solution. We decided that political parties should be reimbursed in proportion to the votes they obtain. Also everyone can make a financial contribution to a political party, which must be declared to the tax department, both by the donor and the recipient, as well as to the Chamber of Deputies.

When elections were by proportional representation, there was no ceiling on election expenditure. When we switched to the single- seat constituency system, we imposed a ceiling on the expenditure of each candidate for his campaign, the aim being to moralise political activities. I don't know if this aim has been reached, nor do I know who could cast the first stone.

Receiving a contribution is a threshold in itself from the ethical viewpoint, at the boundary between what is legal and what is illegal, raising a question of appreciation which is each and everyone's responsibility and cannot be settled by a rule. It is up to each politician to decide if he or she accepts a gift from a given source. In theory parties are obliged to invest 5 % of sums received to promote the participation of women in politics. Yet Italy has only 9 % of women in parliament, which is the lowest rate. Moreover some women are demanding an Act on parity. Personally I am against because, while some men are stupid and others intelligent, the same applies to women. There is therefore no reason to create a preferential channel for women or to impose quotas. Such an interventionist policy would go against liberal democracy : voters must be free to make their choice, including between a man and a woman. Nonetheless the situation is not satisfactory regarding the number of women Members in parliament. But as I have already said, stupidity is a transversal phenomenon affecting both men and women and what is important is for parliament to be composed of intelligent persons, whether men or women.

We have a funding scrutiny system entrusted to the Chamber of Deputies, more specifically to a body of auditors. We have also laid down sanctions. I'll stop here because if there is one thing I don't want to say, it's whether this legislation is respected by all or not. How do you know if a parliamentarian has franked a thousand or two thousand letters ?

We have a plethora of regulations in this field, but regulations do not suffice. You must also be able to count on everyone's conscience.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : The Japanese system is highly specific, it appears to me, owing to the composition of the Diet which comprises 180 Members elected by proportional representation and 300 from single-seat constituencies. For elections in single-seat constituencies, the expenditure incurred by candidates is subject to a ceiling and funded by the personal contribution of candidates and by donations collected by parties. In contrast, for proportional representation elections, where the campaign is conducted foremost by parties, there is no ceiling on expenditure and parties can spend as much as they want. Is that right, Mr Watanuki, and can you give us more details on your legislation ?

As President Casini rightly said, the aim is not only to have rules on the funding of political activities but also to know who is going to monitor their application and how. Is it really possible to monitor what is sometimes hidden ?

Mr Tamisuke WATANUKI : In our country, contributions to private individuals and to parties coexist. A ceiling is placed on the former and they are disclosed. No ceiling is placed on the latter and they can then be transferred to private individuals. In the case of single-seat constituencies, there are two bank accounts : one for the candidate and the other for the party. Within the proportional representation framework, a same candidate can receive contributions as a private individual and also from a party. Public aid spread between the parties amounts to 250 yens per inhabitant, in other words approximately 2 dollars. There are therefore various channels of public funding. Fundraising receptions are organised. Tickets are sold to fund parties, but here too there is a ceiling since a same person cannot buy more than 200 000 yens worth of tickets. This source of income, quite pivotal because such receptions are organised practically every day, is of course disclosed.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : In Germany foundations have been set up which play a very important role on the political scene, particularly for the training of candidates. Do they also intervene in funding the major parties ?

Mr Wolfgang THIERSE : Straightaway I wish to say that foundations should not fund parties.

Mr Haselhurst is right in emphasising that there is practically no political subject which lends itself so much to populism and prejudices than that of the funding of political activities. The public thinks that politicians receive too much money anyway. This popular prejudice is fed by some newspapers.

As for the funding of parties, two aspects should be distinguished. First, the funding of parliamentary work. In Germany there is a financial appropriation for parliamentary groups, the opposition enjoying a bonus because it is supposed to have less easy access to public funds than the majority parties. Expenditure incurred by Members is reimbursed as a lump sum. We wondered whether the reimbursement should not be made on an individual basis but this option was dismissed in the name of parliamentary independence, which should not be hampered by the scrutiny of a governmental official. We have therefore kept this lump-sum indemnity while being aware that it contributes to public mistrust.

In addition there are party foundations, whose budget is almost entirely covered by the State. These are tasked with training and political communication, in Germany, and also abroad : the Friedrich-Ebert foundation and the Konrad Adenauer foundation for instance carry out important training in politics in Asia, Africa and South America. They must not work for political parties strictly speaking. I'll now refer to the second aspect. According to the German constitution, parties contribute to the training of the political will of citizens : apart from election campaigns, permanent political work must be funded. The constitution also stipulates that parties must disclose the origin of their resources and their expenditure. The legislation on parties defines the details of this obligation and you will not be surprised to learn that it has often been amended. As the President of the Bundestag is tasked with monitoring its application, he is led to issue sanctions, which means he is not held in high esteem by the parties concerned. I have had to take many decisions of this type last year and it's a rather thankless role, but you have to put up with it ! If we opted for this system it's because all the proposals to get party funding scrutinised by an administrative authority met with their refusal, in the name of party freedom.

We have a mixed funding system, combining public aid and own resources : members dues (they represent most of the budget of my own party and it's the case of other Germany parties), donations, and revenue generated by various activities. Public funding is calculated on the basis of own resources from donations and dues, and also on the results obtained at elections ; State support has merely a complementary role and must not represent more than 30 % of resources. The basic idea is that a party must remain independent from the State and big donors.

There is no ceiling on donations, nor any restrictions on the legal status of donors. But when the aggregate donations of a legal or a natural person exceed 10 000 euros per year or 50 % of the budget of a party, they must be published in the financial report ; for donations exceeding 50 000 euros per year, immediate publication is mandatory. This transparency allows citizens to know from whom each party or candidate derives their resources and this democratic scrutiny appears to us to be more effective than a ban or a ceiling on donations, which can always be circumvented.

Tax deductions for donations to parties are limited : 3000 euros per year for private individuals, a bit more for corporations.

In the event of a breach of transparency, the sanction is heavy : the party must pay a fine equal to twice or three times the illegal or undisclosed donation and these offences are recorded.

The legislation on parties has often been amended and is constantly being added to. I am responsible for monitoring its application, but as I am not a professional jurist, we have decided to submit party accounts to sworn experts, while ensuring we change them quite often to avoid possible collusion.

In short, transparency and financial sanctions are the main means of exercising scrutiny over the funding of parties in Germany.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : Thank you. Can our friend Chairman Loukine now tell us how things take place in the State Duma and in the Russian Federation ?

Mr Vladimir LOUKINE : The funding of political activities is a very important topic of debate in Russia today. It is the fifth time I have participated in elections and the system has greatly evolved.

During the first elections in 1990 there were practically no rich persons in Russia and the communists in power no longer controlled the situation. Those elections therefore took place practically without any funds and were really free. There were eloquent and virulent speakers and voters took their pick. Then reforms were made. A market economy system without a social safety net was introduced, on the lines of the American model, and some people accumulated wealth. Expenditure ceilings were set for the elections but, as they were low, they were no longer respected. We now have a mixed member proportional system, as in Germany : half of the Members are elected from single-seat constituencies and half from lists. Own resource ceilings have been greatly raised and now stand at 8 million dollars per party and 200 000 dollars per individual candidate. But as few candidates are in a position to collect such sums, the richest have a clear advantage. Personally, I enjoy a certain fame in my constituency, but it's very difficult for new candidates to make a name for themselves.

We are therefore witnessing the creation of a political oligarchy rooted in financial circles, which is not in keeping with democratic principles. This legislation has therefore given rise to much debate. The nouveaux riches want a raising of the ceilings, whereas other people defend public funding. At present the State makes only a very low contribution, of around 1 or 2 %. Also the legislation does not ban funding by lobbies : measures on this matter have often been discussed but never adopted. The party to which I belong intends to present new proposals. The federal administration also has the power to influence results by promoting or not any given investment programme.

Another problem is caused by the fact that much money circulates as cash, which distorts all scrutiny.

Our funding system of political activities is therefore in great need of being improved. I think it would be better for funding to be granted by the State, with strict and transparent rules and scrutiny combined with strict sanctions. Corruption at the highest level is indeed a serious problem. I feel the Canadian system would be the most appropriate.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : Thank you. While each of you has emphasised the importance of the funding of political activities, some also showed that it could lead to reactions of antiparliamentarism or populism. Bans on funding by private corporations, funding by the State, ceilings on expenditure... all the formulas are to be found. But the issue of effective scrutiny over legislative provisions is often the snag.

A lack of public interest for politics, for political events and for our work is also seen in all our countries. In France, until the recent past or the fairly recent past, quite a few journalists were keen on documenting parliamentary life and devoted a lengthy column to them... Today our journalist friends are less and less interested in the life of our parliaments, except for topical matters. For their part, parliamentarians appear to be more interested in their local rather than national actions, which means absenteeism is developing, despite the ever greater financial resources allocated to parliamentary groups and to parties. I would therefore like to question you about the means you implement to bring to public attention the work by your respective parliaments. I would particularly like to know if you have set up parliamentary television or radio channels for this purpose, funded by parliaments. Do you have media informing the public of the importance of debates-often of very high quality-taking place in parliaments ? My question is related to that of funding because the aim of political funding is not only to moralise political activities but also to make them more dynamic. The life of our parliaments must therefore be at the heart of the political debate. But for that to be the case, we must manage to convince our citizens that parliamentary debates really do reflect the issues of the future. If you have such channels, who manages them and what audience do they have ? I know that in Germany, dear Wolfgang Thierse, you have an interesting experience of a parliamentary channel.

Mr Wolfgang THIERSE : We indeed have our own television channel, Phoenix, but it is part of the public system since it is managed by TARD, our second public channel. The debates are also broadcast on other channels. Also the federal parliament has the necessary personnel and technical means to broadcast its own images or to sell them-at a very modest price-to private television channels. We don't have own radio station but we can send images and sound from the hemicycle.

We also publish a fortnightly periodical called The Parliament which gives an account of the most important debates and what takes place in the länder. This periodical is an essential tool to train public opinion. At the same time we circulate `Survey of Parliament' which relates most of the committee debates.

In my opinion, it is in committees that the most important part of our work takes place. It is particularly there that Members are most assiduous. However the public is totally unaware of committee work because it is not broadcast by television. Journalists should no doubt be invited there. We have already tried to broadcast summary analyses of committee work but that wasn't successful because the public found them too boring !

In Germany, it is deplored that important political debates are not broadcast on the parliamentary channel but in talk shows and other entertainment programmes. The danger of such a situation is known, but what can be done to remedy this state of affairs ? As a parliamentarian, I cannot ban my colleagues from participating in television programmes. Nor can I prevent certain subjects of major interest being insufficiently addressed on television. Discussion of the most controversial subjects always occupies us for at least two weeks. On television, everything is much faster ! And anyway, parliamentary work will never be as interesting as television programmes ! When I personally want to enjoy myself, I don't go to the Bundestag but to the cinema... or elsewhere ! Our citizens legitimately feel the same need for entertainment. It is often said `Ach ! Parliament is so boring !' But, more than just entertaining, our debates must be understandable to the greatest number. Suspense or amusement must not be sought in parliament. It is indeed in parliament and not on television that the most important decisions for the country are taken. Although I would like to here a few more brilliant speeches in the hemicycle, it is not our purpose to entertain as much as TV compères ! Yet that does not dispense us from always trying to improve the quality of our debates.

Last year we had several major debates in the Bundestag. The most enthralling exchanges take place before political groups adopt their position : these are called conscience debates. For instance the debate on the status of the embryo has been particularly rich. As the parties did not adopt a position beforehand, the debate was of a very high level and its outcome remained entirely open. It is on this type of occasion that the public feels most concerned.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : In the United States the C-SPAN channel is quite remarkably dynamic...

Mr Dennis HASTERT : C-SPAN is indeed the cable television channel which covers the sessions of Congress, hearings, presidential debates and a number of other major political events. I often hear, `Ah, I saw you on C-SPAN at two o'clock in the morning !' It makes you wonder if some people have a private life ! Some of our citizens are really fanatical about politics. They adore it ! Others feel that our procedures are somewhat boring. They zap the starkest moments and come back for the most appealing debates ! In any case I wonder whether the debates are more or less interesting abroad !

The main point is for everything to be disclosed. Even committee debates must be disclosed to a certain extent. When I became Speaker, in the midst of the impeachment procedure, Congress was extremely exposed. For nearly one year, the country was able to follow all the procedure. At the end people began to tire of the Monika affair but Congress had to do its work.

Sometimes we try to make our work more attractive. But I am not sure that should be done every time. Our citizens expect us to do our work. It's no more complicated than that. Of course, people are fond of anecdotes but they above all expect us to do everything in our power to serve the interest of the country. The important thing is confidence ! The people wants to be able to check that the work has been done.

Referring to the funding of political activities, I have listened with the greatest attention to everything that has been said. In America, public funding of campaigns exists. Everyone can request that a part of the income tax they pay be devoted to the funding of political parties. But that's all ! And if someone gives more than two hundred dollars to a candidate, that will be disclosed. We feel transparency is the foremost value. The public must know who funds whom, for what purpose and with what effects.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : Is there a parliamentary channel in the United Kingdom and does it enjoy a large audience ?

Sir Alan HASELHURST : Yes we have a parliamentary channel. No, the number of viewers is not very high... The problem is that the channel is not easily accessible ! The parliamentary channel is broadcast by satellite using a quite restrictive standard since it is covered by digital terrestrial television, which is far from being accessible to all households. Nevertheless, there are however a certain number of viewers and we have tried to extend the broadcasting using the Internet ! Our debates are also broadcast on our website.

We also have a documentation centre and an educational unit. During recesses, school groups visit the institution and the legislative process is explained to them. On the occasion of these visits, it is customary for an MP to make a speech and try to make the young public aware of the very majesty of the setting. Moreover I am one of those who argues for the development of civic education in our country. But to do so it would be necessary to modify our school syllabuses, which is always very difficult. In contrast, it is always possible to develop specific educational programmes associating MPs. Why not imagine children directly questioning MPs during special sittings ? Contests could be organised, participants having to conduct a fake parliamentary debate. The winners would be invited to Westminster where they would receive a red carpet welcome ! We must open up more to youths and to the population as a whole.

A number of our citizens are totally unaware of our work. When they have the opportunity to visit the House of Commons they are extremely surprised by what takes place there ! I think politics should be made a bit more "sexy" - even if I don't like that word too much... It is our duty to make our citizens aware of the challenges of the political debate, even if it leads us to assume its sometimes rather boring character. Even when a citizen does not agree with the party in power, every effort must be made so that he does not ditch politics as a whole.

Mr Vladimir LOUKINE : In Russia, superficially at least, the situation is not so bad ! A programme called `Parliamentary hour' is broadcast each week and a press centre produces a whole series of programmes for the second channel. A page on the federal assembly is also available on the Internet. A parliamentary gazette is published as well as a Russian Federation magazine. The Duma even has a publishing house which publishes a certain number of works. At first sight all is therefore quite well.

But in reality, we have nothing that can be likened to C-SPAN. Our television system is even increasingly centralised and under state control. However, you are not unaware, television has become the prime source of information. We must therefore prevent any risk of a worsening. Two of our four television channels are fully controlled by the State ; in the other two the State has a majority holding. In practice the presidential power therefore has unlimited possibilities of interpreting the information broadcast to the Russian population and presenting it its own way. It's a serious problem.

Concerned about ratings criteria, journalists are above all interested in scandals. Our star politicians are those who are witty or a source of scandals ! One of my colleagues, Deputy Chairman of the Duma, shows an actor's talent highly appreciated by journalists. As a result he has almost unlimited air time !

For most Russians, parliament is a place of disputes where fighting is always about to break out. Its public image is therefore quite negative. Admittedly parliamentarism is at its beginnings in Russia. Our work also often suffers from a somewhat grotesque presentation, and that could have very regrettable consequences. What should be done ? I don't know ! Equal access to television should be ensured for all candidates in the election campaign which has just been launched. In practice the election campaign is very costly and has begun a long time before the opening of the official campaign. TV channels play a major role in the campaign because, apart from the dedicated timeslots, one of the parties, far more present than all the others, is obviously favoured. It is not easy to address these issues but we must think about them. I hope that, during a future meeting, we can work on the topic `Parliament, executive power and public opinion'. In this trio, parliament must in my opinion play a reference role. Unfortunately that is not always the case. Therefore the key questions are : how can parliament's role be dynamised ? How can the system's balance be reestablished ?

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : A short while ago we had a very interesting debate at the National Assembly. Suddenly a deputy, who had not previously distinguished himself during our work by his analyses or his speeches, rose and began to sing. The following day, it was of course this image that television broadcast in a loop and not our debates ! This deputy is now known throughout France because he merely sang in a sitting. What next ? Our British friend encourages us to make our debates more sexy... Let's hope we know how to stop before they become too sexy !

Mr Pier Ferdinando CASINI : Count on me having a little sing-song during the press conference ! During our meeting in Canada, we mentioned the possibility of getting the security officers of our parliaments to work on security issues within our parliaments. The general secretariat of the Italian Chamber of Deputies is organising a meeting on this subject for parliamentary security officers at the end of November or the beginning of December-the final date has not been decided yet-and your services are warmly invited to attend. I would be very pleased to welcome your representatives there.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : That meeting will therefore address the internal security of our parliamentary assemblies ?

Mr Pier Ferdinando CASINI : Yes. It will be a matter of the internal organisation of the parliaments, and of the methods and procedures in force to monitor accesses, movements, etc.

Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ : The National Assembly will be very pleased to accept your invitation because it is a subject of great concern to me. It is indeed necessary to make sure parliament remains an open place while ensuring maximum security for the parliamentarians and ministers. Over the past few weeks we have started to badge deputies and to better monitor movements, and this has been felt as something of a revolution ! We will be pleased to take advantage of your experience.

Thank you for participating in this meeting. We have had a high level work session today with quality speeches. I will send the report of our meeting to the various parliaments. By exchanging experiences and comparing our legislations we will manage to progress. Our common aim is to make democracy and parliamentary activities livelier and closer to the expectations of our citizens.

*

* *

BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS ON TOPICS

FIRST TOPIC :
ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY

Report from Mr. Peter MILLIKEN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

While the Canadian Parliament has no supervisory powers per se, it has several supervisory functions. These have evolved in the context of "responsible government." Because Cabinet Ministers, including the Prime Minister, are generally chosen from Parliament, and because they hold office subject to the confidence of the legislature, Members of Parliament have the ability to vote a government out of office. Thus, government is held "responsible" to Parliament. This fused system of Cabinet-Parliamentary government promotes scrutiny, especially in the instruments of Parliament's lower chamber, the elected House of Commons, where Cabinet Ministers usually reside.

Supervisory functions can be easily classified in four categories : (i) political supervisory powers, (ii) administrative supervisory powers, (iii) Officers of Parliament, and (iv) information gathering and support. Together these channels of scrutiny maintain the legitimacy of Parliamentary democracy.

POLITICAL SUPERVISORY POWERS : QUESTIONS, DEBATES AND COMMITTEES

Debates, Question Periods, and Committees force the Government to openly engage its Opposition. Debate occurs when the House is faced with a formal motion, be it from the government, the opposition, or a private member. Question Period is a set time on Parliament's daily calendar when oral questions are advanced to ministers, who must respond despite not having the benefit of prior notice. They must also address supplementary questions and perhaps even further written questions. The proceedings of Debates and Question Period are recorded in Hansard, the official report of the House of Commons. Hansard is quickly made publicly available

A Hansard-like publication also captures the proceedings of Committees. Committees are an extension of the House itself. In Committees, Members of Parliament examine specific subjects of importance, proposed legislation, the Estimates (spending plans of departments), Orders-in-Council appointments, and other matters referred to them. Committees have the authority to retain expert, professional, technical or clerical staff, subject to restrictions imposed by the Board of Internal Economy. All reports of government departments, Crown corporations and their subsidiaries, and other agencies brought to the House in accordance with an Act of Parliament are automatically referred to committees. Furthermore, the Standing Orders (rules of the House of Commons) allow committees to request a comprehensive response from the Government to their reports within 150 calendar days of their presentation. Committees even have the power to summon witnesses or to request documents. Committees are being used more fully by the House of Commons than they once were.

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISORY POWERS : OATHS, SUPPLY AND ESTIMATES, AND PROCEDURE

Order in the House is maintained by the Speaker, its presiding officer. The Speaker is also responsible for the internal management and operations of the House and its various branches. In addition to the Speaker, procedural elements of Parliament maintain control. These include symbolic practices such as swearing allegiance to the Queen of Canada, and more rigid rules such as those inscribed in the Standing Orders. Another important element is the legal concept of Parliamentary privilege, which guarantees Parliamentarians the right to operate freely.

Perhaps one of the most important supervisory functions of the House of Commons involves the granting of authority to tax and spend. While the Crown (government) is responsible for spending, it must first gain approval. Authority to make expenditures is called "supply." The matter of supply is dissected into manageable components and studied in various Standing Committees that have mandates related to specific departments, spending and programs. Reports on Plans and Priorities are tabled in the House of Commons in the spring of each year and Departmental Performance Reports (on the previous year's expenditures) are tabled in the autumn. A committee can only reduce or approve of the amount of a particular item or Vote (it cannot increase it). Supplementary Estimates are similarly cycled through the system two to four times per year.

One of the more important committees in the scrutiny of government and its work is the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts. The Committee, chaired by an opposition MP, is responsible for reviewing the report of the Auditor General (see below) as well as the Public Accounts and other financial reports. Other committees have their own areas of competence to review. The Joint Committee on the Scrutiny of Regulations (joint between the House of Commons and the Senate), for example, reviews subordinate legislation under the Statutory Instruments Act and the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates considers issues relating to governmental management and accountability.

OFFICERS OF PARLIAMENT

The Canadian system of accountability also includes Officers of Parliament. They report directly to the House of Commons instead of through a department and a minister. Their role is to provide objective, independent analysis and advice. The characteristics and reporting functions of each are different, although they must all appear before Parliamentary committees. The Auditor General verifies accounting methods and the accuracy of financial statements as well as conducting independent audits and studies. Her office also scrutinizes whether or not funds were well used according to their intended purposes. The Information Commissioner reviews complaints from people who claim to have been denied their rights afforded by the Access to Information Act and makes recommendations. The Privacy Commissioner ensures compliance with the Privacy Act. The Chief Electoral Officer and the Commissioner of Official Languages also ensure compliance and file reports. A proposed Ethics Commissioner will add another Officer of Parliament (currently, the Ethics Counsellor is a public servant, employed by Industry Canada).

INFORMATION GATHERING AND SUPPORT : LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT AND "NON-DEPARTMENTS"

The primary source of informational support to Parliament is the Library of Parliament which serves Parliamentarians and their staffs, Parliamentary committees, associations and delegations. The Library's Information and Documentation Branch provides documentation and other materials while the Parliamentary Research Branch provides research and analysis. Library research officers produce background documents, provide oral briefings and informal advice, prepare projects as requested, and write legislative summaries and other topical publications. Information is also made available in anticipation of need on the Parliamentary Intranet and through Quorum, a survey of topical news articles.

Parliament is further informed by "non-departments" (government agencies and Crown corporations) and by interactions with Canadians themselves. Responsibility for "non-departments" is given to ministers and their activities (including their Estimates) are reviewed by committees. But perhaps an even more powerful line of supervision comes from new technologies ; one area where Parliament seeks to excel is in becoming better "connected."

Report from Mr. Jean-Louis DEBRÉ

A) - PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY MECHANISMS

Traditionally, Parliament has always had a dual function : it passes laws and it scrutinises the actions of Government. Following the establishment, by the Constitution of 1958, of a rationalised Parliamentary system and with a majority in the National Assembly [Assemblée Nationale] since the early days of the Fifth Republic, the legislative function has tended to prevail over the scrutiny function in France.

This trend is in the process of being reversed. It was, moreover, in order to enable Parliament to exercise its scrutiny function in respect of the Government's actions on a continuous basis that in 1995 a single session of nine months replaced the previous two sessions of three months. At the same time various new scrutiny or assessment bodies were created, while the number of committees of enquiry or standing committee fact-finding missions grew.

The French Parliament has many scrutiny mechanisms at its disposal : the following text will describe in sequence the various questions procedures, the ways in which scrutiny functions are exercised by the various committees or specialist bodies and finally the mechanisms available to the Assembly itself.

1. Questions procedures

There is a whole series of questions procedures which enable Deputies1 to scrutinise and gain information about the activities of Government and the Administration or to obtain information of any kind. A distinction is traditionally drawn between written questions and oral questions ; what particularly distinguishes the latter is that they receive a reply in open session. Although these procedures are provided for by the Rules of Procedure of both Assemblies2, and even by the Constitution as far as oral questions are concerned, they have, however, evolved separately from these texts.

(a) Written questions

The written questions procedure, provided for by the Assemblies' Rules of Procedure, is an individual prerogative of members of Parliament. This means that each question can come from only one Deputy or Senator and is be addressed to only one Minister.

The procedure is extremely flexible. Members can ask written questions throughout the whole year, whether Parliament is sitting or not. The drafting constraints are very narrow : the Rules of Procedure stipulate that questions must be kept short and may include no imputation of a personal nature in respect of a third party referred to by name. Furthermore, the principle of separation of powers and immunity of the Head of State prohibits the author of a written question from challenging the acts of the President of the Republic.

In practice, written questions cover extremely diversified fields. They may be very precise legal, social or tax questions, since members of Parliament use the procedure to respond to requests from their constituents, local councillors or associations. Questions may also cover collective issues of local interest (e.g. the location of a school, the closure of a post office or tax office, company redundancies etc). On the other hand, it is quite rare for written questions to relate to general policy issues, which tend to be the subject of oral questions.

Questions, which are addressed by members of Parliament to the Speaker's Office of the Assembly to which they belong, are published each week in a special section of the Official Journal [Journal Officiel]. Answers are supposed to be published in the following month, a deadline which may be extended to two months at the request of the Minister in question. In practice, however, this deadline is not observed. It has to be said that dealing with written questions, the number of which has risen from 3,700 in 1959 to more than 17,000 today, is considerably time-consuming for Ministers and makes it difficult, if not impossible, to comply with the deadlines prescribed by the Rules of Procedure. During the last ordinary session, from October 2002 to April 2003, out of 17,427 written questions asked, only 11,919 replies were published.

This is why a special procedure has been established outside the Rules of Procedure. This procedure, the "flagged questions" procedure, enables political groups each week to choose from among the questions that have not been answered within two months a batch of questions which the Government undertakes to answer within 10 days, a deadline that has always been met ever since this procedure was introduced in 1994. At present, 18 questions are accorded this special treatment each week, divided into 10 for the UMP group, 4 for the Socialist group and 2 each for the UDF group and the Communist and Republican group.

(b) Oral questions or open session questions

The Constitution states that at least one sitting a week shall be set aside for questions from members of Parliament and answers from the Government.

In the beginning the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly set out the procedure for the tabling and discussion of questions, distinguishing between oral questions with or without a debate. However, the oral questions with or without a debate procedure has fallen into disuse - it has not be used since 1978 - while a new procedure, know as Government Questions, appeared outside the Rules of Procedure in 1974. It is now the responsibility of the Office to specify the terms and conditions governing the tabling and publication of questions and of the Conference of the Speakers to organise the discussion thereof.

- Traditional oral questions

To start with, a traditional oral questions procedure does still survive : one question time is allocated to each Tuesday morning, apart from the budget season and except once a month, when this time is set aside for another Order of the Day set by the Assembly. During the last session of Parliament 17 question times were devoted to this procedure, during the course of which 432 were answered.

Paradoxically, oral questions are first written and published in the Official Journal. They are not therefore spontaneous. Ministers, knowing what the questions are about, are thus able to have their answer prepared. It has to be said that the questions asked are more technical than political and often very precise and of local interest. It is not, unfortunately, always the Ministers responsible who answer, but often one of their colleagues, who reads out a reply prepared by their civil servants. As a result, the question time devoted to these traditional oral questions, which is in practice attended only by the originators of the questions, is not very lively.

This question time does however have its adherents, since it enables them to obtain from the Government a more rapid and detailed answer than could be provided in response to a written question on matters of real importance to members.

During each question time 25 questions may be asked, divided into 15 for the UMP group, 6 for the Socialist group and 2 each for the UDF group and the Communist and Republican group.

- Government questions

The Government questions procedure was introduced in 1974, at the instigation of President Giscard d'Estaing. It was an immediate success and has continued to remain so, since the procedure survives virtually unchanged, apart from the fact that the number of question times has increased from one to two a week.

This success is due to a number factors : the choice of timing : Tuesdays and Wednesdays from 3.00 p.m. to 4.00 p.m., which ensures that Deputies attend in large numbers ; the political will of the Government, very largely represented equally, almost systematically, by the Prime Minister in particular ; live TV broadcasting, which makes this question time not only a Parliamentary jousting session but also a weekly appointment that is much appreciated by a not inconsiderable proportion of the public.

Furthermore, unlike traditional oral questions, Government questions are in the main very political, and what is more, much more spontaneous. Ministers do not normally know what the questions are about in advance (apart from those from members of the Majority, which are often kinder), since all that the Government is told is the name of those asking questions one hour before the opening of question time. Exchanges between members of the Opposition and Ministers are often very animated and the briefness of the exchanges, which the Speaker constantly sees is observed, maintains interest.

Of the 60 minutes set aside for each question time, 40 are allocated to the Majority and 20 to the Opposition. Consequently, the UMP group has 35 minutes and may thus ask 7 questions, the Socialist group has 15 minutes for 3 questions and the UDF and Communist groups each have 5 minutes for 1 question. Questions are called in such a way that the various groups' speakers alternate.

During the last session of Parliament 771 Government questions were able to be asked during the 64 question times devoted to them.

It should also be said that, as an experiment, since the beginning of 2003 on the first Wednesday of each month the first four Government questions are devoted to a European topic.

2. Scrutiny functions exercised by Assembly committees and other bodies

Various Assembly bodies, whether permanent or temporary, play a part in exercising the scrutiny function : first among these are the committees of enquiry, but standing committees also play a role in this area ; finally, a number of offices or agencies have been created to fulfil a specific function.

(a) Committees of enquiry

A committee of enquiry may be created only on the decision of the Assembly in question at the end of a process which is similar to the ordinary legislative procedure, save that the other Assembly does not play a part. The process may be initiated by the Opposition, which in the Assembly does customarily have the right to have included in the Order of the Day, once a year, discussion of a draft resolution to set up a committee of enquiry. However, since the resolution requires the Assembly to vote on it, the decision is ultimately the Majority's.

Committees of enquiry are set up to gather information either on specific matters or on the management of public services or state-owned enterprises. Because of the separation of powers, no committee of enquiry may be created to look into facts giving rise to legal proceedings. However, this rule is interpreted flexibly : the existence of legal proceedings does not constitute a nullifying impediment provided that the committee of enquiry excludes from the scope of its investigation the specific facts giving rise to proceedings.

The members of committees of enquiry - the numbers of whom are limited to 30 in the National Assembly and 21 in the Senate - are appointed in such as way as to ensure a proportional representation of the groups. They elect their officers and their rapporteur. An amendment was recently added to the Rules of Procedure which provides that the office of chairman or rapporteur should automatically fall to a member of the group, which may also include an Opposition group, that took the initiative in creating the committee of enquiry.

Committees of enquiry are temporary bodies ; their task comes to an end as soon as they file a report and, at the latest, within six months of the date of their creation.

In the beginning, all of the work carried out by committees of enquiry was subject to the rule of secrecy. Now, though, public hearings are the norm : each committee is free to organise its work as it sees fit or to decide that secrecy should apply if it deems this appropriate in order to preserve the anonymity of witnesses.

Committees of enquiry have not inconsiderable powers. Firstly, they may summon any person whose evidence they think it would be worthwhile hearing ; and that person is obliged to comply with the summons served on him, if need be by a bailiff or a police officer, under pain of penal sanctions. Furthermore, rapporteurs of committees of enquiry may carry out investigations on documentary evidence and on-site. They must be provided with any and all information likely to facilitate their task. They are authorised to be given access to any official document, with the sole exception of those of a secret nature concerning national defence, foreign affairs, internal and external State security and subject to the principle of the autonomy of the judiciary. Finally, committees of enquiry may ask the Audit Court [Cour des Comptes] to conduct examinations of the management of the services or agencies that it is responsible for auditing.

Of the powers of investigation that they have, committees of enquiry make particular use of hearings ; the number of people heard by each committee can generally be counted in tens, and the number has risen to almost 200 for some committees. In the majority of cases, the minutes of these hearings (which are sometimes public) are published as annex to the report. In addition, committees may travel within France or even abroad. They often send detailed questionnaires to the various departments involved and may call on the assistance of expert witnesses.

Unless the National Assembly decides against so doing, committee of enquiry reports are published. Their conclusions do not constitute decisions as such. However, their suggestions, which are widely relayed by the press, are thus taken into consideration by the public and by government authorities. The Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly stipulate that the report may prompt a debate in open session ; little use is made of this provision, however. On the other hand, it has already happened that a committee of enquiry's reports inspires the tabling of a private member's bill or even a Government bill.

Since the start of the present Administration, four committees of enquiry have been created and have completed their work.

(b) The role of standing committees

The Rules of Procedure of the Assembly stipulate that standing committees shall ensure that the Assembly is provided with the information necessary to enable it to fulfil its Government policy scrutiny function. This task is carried out in various ways.

- Firstly, standing committees hold numerous hearings, not only from members of the Government but also from expert witnesses or representatives of socio-professional occupations. They also have the right to summon any person whose evidence they consider it essential to hear, except matters of a secret nature relating to defence, foreign affairs or security and subject to the autonomy of the judiciary.

These hearings are often held as part of the preparations for scrutinising the text of a bill. But they may equally well have only an information-gathering purpose. The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees, which engage in little legislative activity, still hold many hearings just for this purpose.

- Standing committees may also create fact-finding missions on any subject that falls within their remit. This type of structure offers the greatest flexibility, since the missions may be individual or joint. However, in the event that a number of Deputies are involved, the practice is to ensure that the Opposition is represented.

Fact-finding missions are numerous and may cover very diverse topics, for example, carrying out an appraisal of legislation currently in force in order to assess what amendments it would be advisable to make to it. By way of an example, 11 fact-finding missions completed their work during the last session of Parliament.

Fact-finding missions may be common to several committees. Since a recent amendment to the Rules of Procedure, they may also be set up by the Conference of Speakers on a proposal from the Speaker of the Assembly.

Setting up a fact-finding mission is often an alternative solution to setting up a committee of enquiry. The advantage of the former lies in its flexibility, both in the way it is set up and in the way it operates, especially the absence of any deadline for presenting its report. Furthermore, it may be granted the same powers of investigation by the Assembly ; however, these provisions have never been applied.

- Particular mention must be made of the budget scrutiny function. Special Finance Committee rapporteurs have the powers of investigation also accorded to the rapporteurs of committees of enquiry to monitor implementation of the Finance Act in each of the ministerial departments.

Alongside the traditional activities of the special rapporteurs, the Finance Committee decided in 1999 to create an Assessment and Audit Office Task-Force, inspired in particular by the UK Parliament's National Audit Office. Its role is to carry out an assessment each year of the results of the various public policies, without expressing an opinion on their soundness. Its conclusions, published at end-June, are meant to serve as basis for scrutinising the next Finance Bill. The Task-Force has two co-chairmen : the chairman of the Finance Committee and a member of the Opposition.

(c) Other specialist bodies

The number of specialised bodies involved in exercising Parliament's scrutiny powers has been increasing steadily for a number of years.

- The first of these bodies, created in 1983, is the Parliamentary Scientific and Technological Options Assessment Office [Office Parlementaire d'évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques], a joint agency of the two Assemblies, consisting of 18 Deputies and 18 Senators, appointed in such a way as to ensure proportional representation of the groups. The chairmanship alternates between a member of either assembly for a period of three years.

The Office's function is to keep Parliament abreast of the consequences of scientific and technological options in order to enlighten its decisions. It is assisted by a scientific advisory panel consisting of 24 persons appointed for their expertise in the fields of science and technology. It may be consulted by the Office or by an Assembly or Senate committee. The issues discussed are divided almost equally between energy, the environment, new technologies and life sciences.

When a matter is referred to it, the Office appoints a rapporteur, who initially carries out a feasibility study which, more often than not, proposes embarking upon a research programme resulting in a report being drawn up. It then moves on to the hearings stage. It may obtain the opinions of trades union organisations or protection of the environment or user protection associations. It has the powers of investigation accorded to Budget rapporteurs. It may hire independent experts and research establishments in order to conduct investigations.

When they have completed their research, the rapporteurs submit their draft reports and its conclusions, presented in such a way as to be directly usable for the purposes of work on legislation or budget discussions, to the Office, which decides whether they should be published or not. It will be noted that, more often than not, the Office's conclusions are unanimous.

- Without going into detail about their organisation and operation, mention should be made of existence of a number of other specialist bodies that are involved in Parliament's scrutiny function : the Evaluation of Legislation Office [Office d'évaluation de la législation], created in 1996 ; the Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities Agency [Délégation aux droits des femmes et à l'égalité des chances entre les hommes and les femmes] and the Regional Planning and Sustainable Development Agency [Délégation à l'aménagement et au développement durable du territoire], both created in 1999 ; and the Healthcare Policies Office [Office des politiques de santé], created in 2003.

3. Powers of scrutiny exercised by the Assembly in open session

In addition to the oral questions procedure referred to above, the Assembly exercises its scrutiny of the Government's activities directly, in open session, by way of a number of procedures provided for by the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure.

(a) Debates with no vote

The Rules of Procedure provide for a procedure which enables a debate on one aspect or another of Government policy to be organised.

In the beginning, only the Government could initiate this procedure, since there could be a debate only following a statement made to the Assembly. However, in 1995 a Constitutional amendment set aside one sitting a month for an Order of the Day set by the Assemblies. In this context, the Assembly, which may choose to include on the Order of the Day discussion of a private member's bill, may also provide for the organisation of a debate.

During the last session of Parliament four sittings were thus devoted to a debate on one aspect of Government policy, three at the instigation of the Majority, on hunting, controlling public expenditure and participating in development aid to Africa, and one at the request of the Socialist group, on ill-health insurance and healthcare policy.

The debate is organised by the Conference of Speakers. Each group has a minimum time, normally set at 30 minutes, any additional time usually being divided between groups on the basis of their numerical importance. The Government, which is not constitutionally obliged to, however, replies to the various speakers' contributions to the debate.

It must be emphasised that no vote can be taken at the end of any such debate : the Constitution has removed any procedure for questioning Ministers, reserving votes in the Assembly outside the legislative procedure solely to challenges to the Government's accountability.

(b) Challenges to the Government's accountability

The procedures for challenging the Government's authority were very strictly defined by Constitution of 1958 in order to bring to an end the government instability that had seriously affected previous regimes.

The Government may itself accept its accountability for its own programme or a statement of general policy or the vote on a piece of legislation. But these procedures are obviously not a matter for Parliamentary scrutiny.

On the other hand, it must be stressed that the National Assembly may take the initiative in challenging the accountability of the Government by tabling a censure motion.

The procedure is precisely defined : the motion must be signed by at lest one-tenth of the members of the Assembly and each Deputy may not sign more than three motions during the same session of Parliament ; the vote may not be taken within at least 48 hours of the motion being tabled, this period being intended to give Deputies time to reflect ; only those votes in favour of the motion are counted ; the motion must receive the votes of an absolute majority of the members of the Assembly to be passed.

Since 1958 only one censure motion has been passed ; that was in 1962, and it was immediately followed by the dissolution of the Assembly, the following elections bringing the Assembly a majority in favour of Government policy.

It is clear that in a political configuration in which there is a Parliamentary majority the censure motion is not a very effective weapon. In practice, however, the procedure is employed quite regularly by the Opposition to register its disagreement with Government policy. However, in this context, the only purpose it serves is to allow a formal debate to be organised, since it has no chance of leading to a vote of censure against the Government.

Report from Mr. Wolfgang THIERSE

A key feature of our parliamentary system of government is the intensive interaction between Parliament and government. This is characterized, inter alia, by the fact that the Government is subject to parliamentary control. This control is increasingly viewed not simply as a response to government action after the event, but as having a monitoring and guiding role. The exercise of parliamentary control over the Government is therefore one of the German Bundestag's central tasks, alongside the adoption of legislation and the responsibility for electing specific office-holders, notably the Federal Chancellor.

In this paper, I shall focus on the conventional instruments of parliamentary control, especially those which are important in the parliamentary routine. I will not discuss Parliament's most drastic right of control - the constructive vote of no confidence - or the instrument with which it is associated, namely the vote of confidence. These two mechanisms are rarely used, being deployed only when special circumstances arise.

1. Rights to put questions

The most frequently used instrument of parliamentary control is Parliament's right to put questions. This is enshrined as a general principle in the constitution and is fleshed out in the Rules of Procedure. The Rules of Procedure distinguish between major and minor interpellations, written and oral questions by individual Members of the Bundestag, and the questions put to the Federal Government. In each case, the question or interpellation must be signed by a specific minimum number of Members. For example, any individual Member of the Bundestag is entitled to address oral and written questions to the Government. Major and minor interpellations, on the other hand, require the support of at least five percent of Members or a parliamentary group. This quorum also applies to the demand to hold a debate on matters of topical interest. Statistics show that the right to put questions is being exercised to an increasing and intensive extent : during the last, i.e. the 14th electoral term, the Members of the Bundestag submitted around 11 800 written questions and some 3300 oral questions, and tabled more than 1800 minor and 100 major interpellations.

1.1. Questions put to the Federal Government

The right to put questions has taken on a specific form in the questions put to the Federal Government. This was introduced by the Bundestag to ensure that the Federal Government informed Parliament about the weekly cabinet meetings before they were made public by the Federal Press Association. The dialogue lasts for 30 minutes and regularly begins with a five-minute report by a minister on a topic from the Cabinet meeting, which is selected by the Government and notified to Parliament. After this report, questions are put by the Members of the Bundestag, firstly on the topic covered by the report, and then on other specified topics arising from the Cabinet meeting. The session concludes with "free" questions which may cover any area falling within the Government's competence. The Federal Government is not notified in advance of the names of the Members putting questions or of the questions themselves.

1.2. Debates on matters of topical interest

In addition to the rights to put questions, I would also like to mention the debates on matters of topical interest in this context. This specific form of debate was introduced in 1965 and enables Parliament to take up matters of topical interest promptly. The distinctive feature of the debates on matters of topical interest is that they consist of speeches not exceeding five minutes. They are held either on the basis of an inter-party agreement in the Council of Elders or at the demand of a parliamentary group. This demand may be made in connection with the Federal Government's answer to an oral question during Question Time, or it may be quite separate from Question Time. The Rules of Procedure state that only one debate on matters of topical interest may take place per sitting day. Debates on matters of topical interest attract a great deal of interest from Members and the media. Their topics are wide-ranging. A demand for a debate on matters of topical interest may be prompted by current events at home or abroad, political statements, or major policy decisions.

During the 14th electoral term, a total of 141 debates on matters of topical interest took place ; 115 of these were held in response to a demand by the opposition.

2. The right to summon

The right to summon must also be mentioned. The Bundestag may, upon the motion of a parliamentary group or at least five percent of the Members present, decide that a member of the Federal Government be summoned. This right to summon a member of the Federal Government is enshrined in the constitution and requires a majority of the Members of the House. In principle, only the minister responsible for the policy area being deliberated may be summoned. In practice, the right to summon is rarely used, and when this does occur, it is generally exercised by the opposition. If a motion summoning a member of the Government is successful, the plenary proceedings are usually interrupted until the government member summoned is present.

3. Committees of inquiry

The Bundestag has the right and, upon the motion of a quarter of its Members, the obligation to set up committees of inquiry. The right of inquiry, often described as "Parliament's sharpest sword and the most effective weapon of the opposition", is one of the most incisive instruments in the political armoury, especially in terms of its public impact. The procedure and rights of committees of inquiry were not regulated in a federal law until 2001. In thematic terms, the work of a committee of inquiry is restricted to the very specific terms of reference stated in the plenary's motion to set up the committee. The committees of inquiry generally meet in public session and collect the evidence required to fulfil their terms of reference. They have the right to summon and swear in witnesses and to demand the submission of evidence, such as Federal Government files (but must comply with document security). On average, the Bundestag has set up between one and two committees of inquiry in each electoral term since the 3rd electoral term in 1957. During the current, i.e. the 15th electoral term, one committee of inquiry has been appointed so far.

4. Study commissions

Since 1970, the Bundestag has had the option of setting up study commissions. As with committees of enquiry, the motion to set up a study commission must be signed by a specific minimum number of Members. Study commissions are intended to gather as much information as possible on a given subject and thus provide policy-makers with a basis for decision-making on complex and difficult issues. Examples are the Study Commission on Constitutional Reform, the Study Commission on Overcoming the Consequences of the SED Dictatorship, and the Study Commission on Demographic Change. Unlike committees of inquiry, the study commissions do not have the rights to collect evidence which are described above. The study commissions comprise Members of the Bundestag and independent academics, experts and practitioners. Members of the study commissions are nominated by the parliamentary groups in proportion to their relative strengths. The parliamentarians and external experts have equal rights. As with committees of inquiry, the study commissions conclude their work with a report to the plenary. These often very comprehensive reports are published as Bundestag printed papers.

5. Budget and financial control

The exercise of budget and financial control by Parliament is extremely important and has special status within the system of parliamentary control. Budget and financial control takes place in three stages :

- parliamentary approval of the Federal Government's draft budget ;

- the execution of the budget ;

- the granting of final discharge to the Federal Government.

The annual budget, which determines the level of federal revenue and sets the level of federal expenditure, is laid down in the Budget Act. The draft annual budget is prepared by the Federal Finance Minister on the basis of the draft budgets submitted by the individual ministries and, after approval by the Cabinet, is tabled in the Bundestag and referred to the Bundesrat at the same time. The budget debate in the plenary is the "opposition's finest hour", for it has the chance to highlight the weaknesses in government policy and put forward its own alternatives.

Between its first reading in the plenary in September and the second and third reading towards the end of the year, the budget is the subject of months of intensive debate by the Budget Committee. This committee, which is traditionally chaired by a member of the largest opposition party in the Bundestag, appoints rapporteurs for each departmental budget. The rapporteurs acquire an in-depth knowledge of "their" specialized ministry and its individual budget and hold intensive discussions with the ministries about the individual budget titles and items. If there is a fall in revenue or an increase in expenditure, the plenary must decide how the deficit is to be covered.

After the budget is laid down in the Budget Act, it is implemented by the Federal Government. This is known as the execution of the budget. Here too, Parliament - and particularly its Budget Committee - have rights of participation, which takes the form of parliamentary scrutiny and control. These rights range from simple rights to information to co-decision competences.

At the end of the budget year, the Federal Government's budget and economic management is audited. Alongside the Federal Audit Office, which is an independent body, the Public Accounts Committee - a subcommittee of the Bundestag's Budget Committee - plays a key role here. It assesses whether the execution of the budget has complied with policy objectives, and prepares the procedure for the granting of discharge by Parliament. The budget process concludes with the Bundestag's decision to grant discharge to the Federal Government.

6. Control of the intelligence services

Special requirements exist with regard to parliamentary control of the intelligence services. It is often inappropriate to subject intelligence activities to a public form of parliamentary control, and committee meetings or committees of inquiry which are held in public - and, indeed, the plenary sessions of the Bundestag - are generally unsuitable for these sensitive areas of activity. For this reason, the Bundestag has opted to establish a specific control body for this purpose and, in 1978, adopted an act establishing the Parliamentary Control Panel, which is responsible for scrutinizing the Federal Government's activities in the areas covered by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, military intelligence, and the Federal Intelligence Service. At the start of each electoral term, the Bundestag decides on the number of members, composition and working methods of the Panel and elects the members from its ranks. The Panel, which meets behind closed doors, currently has nine members.

I would like to conclude by mentioning two further control bodies. Oversight of the monitoring of correspondence, posts and telecommunications by the intelligence services is regulated in a separate law enacted pursuant to Article 10 of the Basic Law. The G 10 Commission is responsible for control in this area. To ensure parliamentary control over the suspension of the privacy of posts and telecommunications for the purposes of preventing crimes under the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the War Weapons Control Act, Section 41 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act provides for the appointment of a special body by the German Bundestag.

Report from Mr. Pier Ferdinando CASINI

Introduction

There are numerous ways, also governed by parliamentary rules, in which the oversight function is exercised.

Oversight is the function whereby Parliament scrutinises Government work and that of the civil service in general.

It is rather difficult to classify the various instruments and procedures used by Parliament when exercising its scrutiny and oversight function, and to draw a clear-cut distinction between them. For the expression "guideline-setting, oversight and scrutiny" is often used in the broad sense of the term to include all the activities and instruments that do not form part of the law-making function in the strict sense of the term. There is also the fact that guideline-setting powers are generally accompanied by other powers to monitor the implementation of the guidelines.

Furthermore, according to the literature, parliamentary procedures are such that they can also be used in relation to the exercise of all the other parliamentary functions (the principle of the multi-functional character of parliamentary procedures).

With this in mind, this paper will examine in greater detail the practices and instruments provided by the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies and that are traditionally grouped together under the heading of "oversight function", and account will be given of the procedures which, in their various different ways, have to do with the exercise of parliamentary oversight and scrutiny.

As far as guideline-setting is concerned, the Chamber of Deputies' Rules of Procedure offer a range of different instruments through which Parliament issues policy guidelines and instructions to the Government. In addition to the main procedure, whereby Parliament issues policy guidelines, namely the votes of confidence, and in addition to the instructions issued by Parliament when enacting legislation, the Chamber can also approve specific acts that issue instructions to the Government on a particular matter (through motions or resolutions or orders). A policy guideline can be issued by a Parliamentary Committee, on matters within its sphere of competence, the only proviso being that the policy guideline or instruction must not relate to any matter for which draft legislation is currently in the process of being adopted.

1. Parliamentary "questions" and "interpellations"

The "parliamentary interpellation" is a question asked to seek the rationale and thinking underlying the government's conduct on matters relating to specific aspects of government policy.

The "interpellation" is the specific instrument used to question the Government on issues relating to policies, including sectoral policies, and on the rationale of policies that have been adopted.

The "question" is used simply to ask whether a fact is true, whether the Government has been apprised of a particular item of information, whether it is accurate, whether the Government intends to submit documents or information to the Chamber, or has taken, or is about to take, a decision regarding a specific matter. The "question" is therefore more limited in scope, and is essentially designed to seek information regarding individual facts, acts or conduct.

The Rules of Procedure distinguish between three types of parliamentary questions, depending on whether the answer is to be oral, written, or given in Committee.

· questions for an oral answer in the Chamber can only relate to matters of such major political importance that justifies their being raised in the Chamber ;

· questions to be answered in Committee relate to sectoral matters falling directly within the remit of the Parliamentary Committee concerned ;

· questions for a written answer, lastly, relate mainly to local or technical issues that are of not direct general political interest or concern.

There are no limits on the number of questions and interpellations that each Deputy may submit in the life of a Parliament.

From the procedural point of view, when a "question" is put, the rules provide that after the Government's reply, the questioners may briefly respond in order to declare whether they are satisfied with the answer.

In the case of an "interpellation" the questioner must illustrate the issue involved. After the government's reply, the questioner is entitled to respond to declare whether or not the answer is satisfactory.

The linkage between the instruments for guideline-setting and oversight indicated in the introduction is confirmed by the fact that when questioners are not satisfied and wish to have a debate on the explanations given by the Government, they may table a motion.

There are also parliamentary questions which require an immediate answer, which is done at question time once a week in the Chamber, normally on Wednesdays. The Primer Minister or the Deputy Prime Minister or individual Ministers may reply. One Deputy for each group may ask a question of this kind through the Chairperson of the group to which they belong.

Parliamentary questions must consist of one single clearly and concisely worded question on an issue of general importance, which is of an urgent or particularly topical political nature.

The questioner has one minute to illustrate it. The Government has three minutes to reply, and the questioner may respond for not more than two minutes, or this may also be done by another representative of the same group.

The same procedure is also followed in Committee, where it takes place twice every month, with the intervention of the Ministers (or also the Under-secretaries of State).

A recent development has been the introduction of "urgent interpellations" into the proceedings. These are submitted by the Chairperson of a group or by thirty deputies by Tuesday each week, and are answered in the Chamber on the following Thursday.

Questions and interpellations are submitted to the President of the Chamber and, like every other parliamentary act, are declared admissible or not by the President. In particular, the President is responsible for ensuring that the substance of the act is consistent with the type of instrument submitted, and decides on the correct title of act, and notifies the presenter accordingly.

The President also decides on the admissibility of these acts in relation to the consistency between the different parts of the documents, the competence and accountability of the Government towards Parliament, and the protection of the personal privacy and the good repute of individuals and the prestige of the institutions. Any acts which contain unparliamentary language are not published.

2. Committees of Enquiry

A distinction is drawn between legislative enquiries, and political or oversight enquiries. The legislative enquiry is designed to gather information and data for the drafting of an adequate legislative instrument or to verify the implementation of existing legislation or the effects of that legislation.

Political or oversight inquiries tend to ascertain the responsibility and accountability of the Government, or the public administration or other parties independent of the Executive. In many cases enquiries are designed to perform both these functions.

Unlike other parliamentary systems there is no right for the opposition to stage a parliamentary enquiry.

Under Rule 116 of the Rules of Procedure, the Government cannot make the request for a parliamentary enquiry the subject of a vote of confidence.

The Chamber's power to conduct an enquiry is expressly provided by the Italian Constitution. Under the Constitution, each of the two Houses of Parliament may organise enquiries on issues of public interest. In this case a Committee is appointed, reflecting the proportion of the political groups within Parliament. The Committee of Enquiry carries out its investigations using the same powers, and subject to the same constraints, as a court of law.

Even though the Constitution refers to Committee of Enquiry instituted by only one Chamber, there is no doubt that Committees of Enquiry can also be bicameral in character, and be composed of an equal number of Deputies and Senators. In practice, the mono-cameral Committees of Enquiry are less frequent than the bicameral Committees of Enquiry, which are instituted under a specific Act of Parliament.

The resolution or Act of Parliament instituting a Committee of enquiry states the number of members of the Committee, the subject matter of the enquiry, the deadline by which the Committee must complete its work, the deadline for publishing its report and any interim progress reports required to be submitted to the House. It also indicates the powers and the remit of the Committee and the obligations on its members and officials.

As a rule, the names of the members nominated to sit on the Committees are submitted to the Presidents of the Houses, and sometimes the Chair of the Committee is chosen by the Presidents.

The work of the Committees of Enquiry ends with the publication of one or more reports, which can also be minority reports, which can then be debated on the Floor of the House.

It should also be noted that in addition to Committees of Enquiry other bicameral Committees can also be instituted by Act of Parliament for guideline-setting, oversight or scrutiny over specific sectors, such as broadcasting or the intelligence and security services.

3. Oversight in Committee

Parliamentary Committees can also request information and clarification from Ministers on administrative and policy matters falling within the remit of the Committee.

They may also hold hearings for senior civil servants, generally when it is necessary to gain more technical and administrative information regarding a particular matter. In this case, however, the Minister must authorise the officials to attend the hearings.

Specific provisions are made for fact-finding, in relation to European Union policies.

Committees can also invite members of the European Parliament or the European Commission to submit information on institutional matters relating to the European Union, or European Union policies, respectively.

Committees can also ask the Government to report to them, orally or in writing, on progress with the enforcement of laws and the implementation of policy guidelines approved by the Parliament or accepted by the Government.

In this connection, it should be recalled that many laws make provision for the Government to submit progress reports to Parliament at various stages on the implementation of legislation. These reports can be examined by the relevant Committees, and conclude with the adoption of a guideline-setting document.

Numerous laws provide that when the Government exercises law-making powers, before adopting any such regulatory acts it must seek the opinion of the competent Parliamentary Committees or a specially constituted bicameral Committee.

This has been done quite frequently in recent years, particularly when the Government has been empowered to reorganise important areas of the Italian legal system.

In particular, with the establishment of Committees set up specifically to monitor the major reforms under delegated legislative powers vested in the Government, the oversight functions with respect to the implementation of these reforms are enhanced.

When exercising this consultative function towards the Government, which always remains accountable for its acts, Parliament acting through the Committee ascertains first and foremost, whether the Government has exercised its law-making powers in compliance with the conditions set out in the relevant enabling legislation.

A specific Act of Parliament (Law N° 14 of 1978) provides for parliamentary control over government appointments of the presidents and vice-presidents of public entities and agencies, including economic entities.

The Government's request for an opinion must set out the procedures followed and the reasons justifying it.

Furthermore, any appointments, nominations or designations of other managers made by the Council of Ministers or by individual Ministers must be notified to both Houses of Parliament within fifteen days, setting out the reasons justifying their appointment, the procedures followed, and a biography of the persons concerned.

Even though the opinion is not legally binding, like all opinions on the Government's regulatory acts, the Government tends to comply with the opinions issued by the Committee concerned.

4. Other fact-finding instruments used by Parliament

The need to acquire as much information as possible on the needs and demands of the community, in addition to being the expression of the well-known principle of "find out the facts before deciding", is one of the priority needs of Parliament in order to be able to take the best decisions.

The most important procedure from this point of view is the fact-finding survey.

Every Committee may, by agreement with the President of the House, resolve to conduct fact-finding surveys into matters falling within their remit in order to gather news and information, and obtain documents of use to the House.

When conducting a fact-finding survey, the Committees may summon anyone they consider appropriate to give evidence before a hearing.

Individuals summoned by Committees cooperate voluntarily to provide the information requested, since they are under no obligation to reply or even to appear before the Committee.

At the end of the enquiry or investigation, the Committees adopt a final document on the results.

It should be recalled, lastly, that the Chamber of Deputies has one specific organ of its own : the Legislation Committee. This Committee has an equal number of members from the majority and the opposition, and its remit is to provide opinions to the Committees on the quality of draft legislation.

The Committee is required to examine the quality of Bills, judging them on the basis of objective criteria identified in advance and set out in the Rules of Procedure. In some respects, this activity could also be considered to be part of an oversight function of the House in a broad and evolutionary sense.

Report from Mr. Tamisuke WATANUKI

1. Information-gathering powers

1.1. Powers to investigate the government

The National Diet has powers to formulate and enact legislation, pass budget resolutions, etc., and in order to make effective and appropriate use of its constitutional functions based on the parliamentary cabinet system, it has wide-ranging powers of oversight over the executive branch (the administration).

Article 62 of Japan's Constitution provides that "Each House may conduct investigations in relation to government, and may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses, and the production of records." This makes the two Houses the principal entities for the exercise of the powers to investigate the government, and in practice the Houses entrust the parliamentary committees to exercise those powers.

Specific methods whereby the powers to investigate the government are exercised include the hearing of explanations from relevant ministers and others and their interpellation by committees, the dispatch of Diet members, the conduct of hearings to hear the opinions of informants, the demand of the presence and testimony of witnesses and the submission of testimony and documents, the requiring of the submission of reports and documents by the cabinet and by government and other public offices.

Of particular note is that as a result of the revision of the Diet Law, the Rules of the House of Representatives, and the Rules of the House of Councillors in 1997, in cases in which the cabinet or government and other public offices did not comply with demands for the submission of reports or documents, it became possible to require that the reasons be explained and justified. In addition, each House and committee was empowered to require the Board of Audit to conduct audits of designated matters and to report the results thereof.

The powers to investigate the government are being exercised vigorously by means of the hearing of the opinions of informants by committees, the submission of materials by the government, etc., and the interpellation of ministers, but there are not many cases in which witnesses are summoned with the backing of penal regulations relating to false testimony, etc.

1.2. Preliminary investigation

As a result of the revision of the Rules of the House of Representatives in 1997, House of Representatives committees became able to order the Director General of the Research Bureau of the House of Representatives Secretariat and the Director General of the Legislative Bureau of the House of Representatives to conduct preliminary investigation necessary for examinations and investigations by the committees, and to submit reports. In addition, if so requested by at least 40 Diet members, a committee may issue an order for a preliminary investigation. There are approximately five cases per year of preliminary investigations.

1.3. Written questions

A member of the Diet may draw up a "concise statement in written form" through which to pose questions on general government matters to the cabinet. More than 200 cases of the submission of written questions occur every year. The cabinet must reply to written questions within seven days of the date of their receipt. If it is not possible to reply within that period, the cabinet is required to state expressly the reasons and the time by which the replies will be able to be made. The cabinet's written replies are printed and distributed to all Diet members.

2. Establishment of Committee on Audit and Oversight of Administration, and oversight of the administration

2.1. Establishment of Committee on Audit and Oversight of Administration

In January 1998 the Committee on Audit and Oversight of Administration was established in the House of Representatives through the evolutionary reorganization of the Committee on Audit. House of Representatives committees had previously engaged in oversight of the administration concerning matters under their jurisdiction, and this change was made for the purpose of improving and strengthening those oversight functions. In the background to this was the fact that amid the demands for administrative reform that have been made in recent years, it was believed that for the Diet to oversee and supervise the administration effectively, it was necessary to study administration policies in a comprehensive manner, and discuss measures to deal with them, without being bound to the traditional demarcation of the jurisdiction of committees, which was vertically stratified according to field of administration.

2.2. Areas of jurisdiction

In addition to assuming the jurisdiction of the former Audit Committee, the Committee on Audit and Oversight of Administration has also been granted the use of analyses of audit reports by the Board of Audit, administrative inspection reports by the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, etc., the use of ombudsman-like functions for listening directly to the opinions of citizens, and the right to make recommendations to related government and other public offices concerning matters that are deemed to require improvement in relation to administrative problems that come to light during deliberations.

The purpose of the committee's establishment was to identify problem areas throughout the administration, to examine them comprehensively and expertly from a variety of angles, and to discuss measures to address them.

3. Information-gathering by parliament in the economic, science and technology, and other fields

3.1. Information-gathering methods

In Japan's parliamentary committee system there is no particular demarcation between committees for the deliberation of bills and committees for investigations of the government ; the examination and investigation of both of those are conducted by standing committees for each government ministry and agency.

The normal practice is for all government information, not confined to information in the economic and science and technology fields, to be gathered principally by the standing committees through requests to ministers and government officials for the submission of materials relating to questions, and by means of white papers and reports that the government is obliged by the relevant laws to provide. Committee members frequently conduct investigations by making site visits to interview the responsible officials and to inspect facilities.

In addition, to serve as information-gathering institutions to assist with investigation and legislation, within the House of Representatives Secretariat, Research Offices of the Standing Committees have been established by the standing committees, and Research Offices of the Special Committees have been established by the special committees (approx. 250 personnel in total) ; within the House of Councillors Secretariat there are the Research Offices of the Standing Committees and the Research Offices of the Special Committees (approx. 220 personnel in total) ; the National Diet Library's Research and Legislative Reference Bureau (approx. 150 personnel) ; and the Diet Legislative Bureaus (approx. 70 in the House of Representatives Legislative Bureau, and approx. 75 in the House of Councillors Legislative Bureau).

3.2. Information-gathering issues

Ordinary requests for materials to the cabinet, government, and other public offices made by the institutions to assist with investigation and legislation are simply requests for the submission of materials premised on the powers to investigate the government, and are not backed by powers of compulsion. In consequence, in some cases the administration withholds submissions of materials for such reasons as obligations to preserve confidentiality, personal privacy, and corporate management secrets.

Report from Sir Alan HASELHURST

The House of Commons supervises the work of the UK Government in many ways : the scrutiny of all legislation, regular question times with ministers, debates on government policy, etc. This note, however, concentrates on the role of select committees in scrutinising the executive. It provides details of their background, composition, role, powers, working method and resources.

Introduction : select committees

1. Select committees have long been used by the House of Commons to carry out specific tasks. It was not until the latter part of the 20th Century, however, that their use for the systematic supervision of the executive became institutionalised. Although the majority of committees, and those which generally enjoy the highest profile, are departmental select committees, examining the work of individual Government departments, there also a number of other, non-departmental select committees, which the House has developed to assist it in its scrutiny.

Departmental select committees

2. Since 1979, each government department has been scrutinised by a select committee, charged by the House with examining its "administration, expenditure and policy". The number and titles of committees have changed over time to reflect changes in the Government machinery, but at present there are 18 such committees shadowing the main Government Departments, including those for Defence, Education, Foreign Affairs and Treasury.

Characteristics

3. Although there are some differences between committees in their composition and in their work, they share many common characteristics :

(a) cross-party-select committees are made up of Members from the Government and Opposition parties. Most have eleven Members and their composition reflects the current party balance of the House, including representation of minority parties

(b) elect own chairman-committees are free to elect their chairman. There is usually an informal understanding, however, about the party from which the chairman should be chosen, in order to allow a party balance among committee chairman too.

(c) proceed by inquiry-see `working method' section below for further details.

(d) take evidence in public-generally committees will take oral evidence from witnesses in public (but deliberate in private).

Powers

4. In order to carry out their work effectively, the House has given select committees the power to :

· send for "persons, papers and records"-they have the power to order the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. Generally, though, witnesses are happy to give evidence and there is no need for committees to invoke their authority. No Member of Parliament may be ordered to attend. However, it is very rare for a Departmental minister not to accept a committee's invitation.

· meet away from Westminster-this allows committees to meet and take evidence anywhere in the UK, or indeed the world. Although their ability to travel is subject to the constraint imposed by the House on expenditure on travel overseas.

· appoint specialist advisers-either to supply information not readily available or to elucidate matters of complexity (see `resources' below).

· meet on days when the House is not sitting.

· appoint sub-committees-committees have power to appoint sub-committees, enabling a small group of Members to examine parts of the committee's remit in greater depth.

· hold joint meetings-any committee or sub-committee may hold joint meetings with another committee, allowing cross-departmental matters to be scrutinised effectively. For example, the Government's arms export control policy is regularly scrutinised by the Committees on Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade & Industry meeting jointly.

· communicate its evidence to any other select committee of the Commons or the Lords, the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales or the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Working method

5. Select committees generally proceed by inquiry, in the manner set out below. The timetable will depend upon the urgency of the inquiry.

Choice of inquiry

Members decide the particular area of administration, expenditure or policy into which they wish to inquire. Committees are wholly free to choose the subject of their inquiries, but last year the House agreed a number of `core tasks', which committees should take into consideration in deciding their work programme. These tasks cover the whole range of committee work, from examining major policy initiatives to monitoring departmental performance against targets.

Launch and request evidence

A press notice is issued setting out the details of the inquiry, its broad terms of reference and requesting written evidence from interested parties. The committee will usually write to those from whom it specifically wishes to receive memoranda (relevant interest groups, trade unions or employers' organisations, for example). Memoranda are then received and circulated to all Members.

Oral evidence

Evidence is taken in public from witnesses chosen by the committee, usually on the basis of the memoranda already submitted. Generally a committee will hear evidence from the appropriate Government minister at the last session. A full transcript of each session will be taken and published shortly afterwards on the internet.

Report

A draft report is drafted by the chairman and the committee staff based on the evidence received by the committee. It is then discussed and a final version agreed. This is published shortly afterwards, including a summary of the committee's conclusions and recommendations, together with the oral and some of the written evidence received.

Government Reply

By convention the responsible department will reply to the report within two months, setting out whether or not it accepts the committee's findings and why. There might also be an opportunity to debate the report and subsequent reply in the House.

6. The framework set out above is only an illustrative example of how an inquiry may be carried out. Various stages may be omitted (such as undertaking a visit) and a committee may decide just to take oral evidence on a particular matter and publish the transcript, without publishing a report.

Non-departmental select committees

7. In addition to the departmental select committees described above, there are several other committees concerned with the scrutiny of the executive. In general, these operate in a similar manner to departmental select committee (membership reflecting party balance, elect own chairmen, etc.) but significant differences are noted below :

· Public Accounts Committee-was set up in 1861 to examine "the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by Parliament to meet the public expenditure...". Most of the Committee's work consists in examining the value for money reports made by the National Audit Office in relation to Government expenditure.

· Committee on Public Administration-considers matters relating to the quality and standards of administration and public services and examines the Parliamentary Ombudsman's reports.

· Environmental Audit Committee-established in 1997, considers the extent to which the policies and programmes of Government departments and non-departmental public bodies contribute to environmental protection and sustainable development and their performance against the targets they have been set.

· Human Rights (Joint Committee)-has Members from Lords and Commons. It examines matters relating to human rights in the UK, including legislation before Parliament.

· European Scrutiny Committee-examines EU documents, and reports its opinion on the importance of each document to the House and recommends which should receive further consideration. It also monitors business in the Council of Ministers and takes evidence from UK ministers before and after selected Council meetings.

8. There are also several other select committees of the House including those concerned with the delegated legislation, and the administration and procedures of the House.

Resources

9. Committees have a number of resources to draw upon to ensure that they are as fully informed as possible in their subject areas.

· Committee staff : each select committee has around four to six full-time members of staff who provide the principal support for their scrutiny work. They are recruited and employed by the House, not the Government, and observe strict rules of impartiality. These staff work for the whole Committee and are not assigned to individual Members.

· Specialist advisers : as noted above, nearly all select committees have the power to appoint specialist advisers, who work for a daily fee. They are usually experts in their field-academics, scientists, economists, etc.-who provide advice on particular areas or more general assistance with an inquiry.

· The House of Commons Library : provides impartial information and research services for Members in connection with their parliamentary duties. However, it also regularly carries out work for select committees, such as initial scoping papers for an inquiry.

· The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology : established in 1987, provides impartial analysis of scientific and technological issues to Members of both Houses. It produces regular briefing papers for Members on current scientific issues, and regularly assists select committees with inquiries. Recent notes by the Office have included reports on Food Poisoning, Nuclear Fusion and Access to Energy in Developing Countries.

· The Scrutiny Unit : was set up in 2002, following a decision of the House, to provide specialist assistance to select committees conducting inquiries into either expenditure matters or draft bills (pre-legislative scrutiny). Individual committees commission work from the Unit to assist with specific inquiries. It staff includes lawyers, economists and statisticians.

· Commissioned research : committees may also draw on a limited research budget, which allows them commission new pieces research for an inquiry.

Since the present system of departmental select committees was fully established in 1979, the amount of work undertaken by committees, and their concurrent staff needs, have risen steadily. A full-scale staffing review of the needs of select committees was recently undertaken. It reported earlier this year and made a number of recommendations, including for a significant increase in the number of staff attached to each committee.

Report from Mr. Dennis HASTERT

Congressional oversight of policy implementation and administration, which has occurred throughout the U.S. government experience under the Constitution, takes a variety of forms and utilizes various techniques. These range from specialized investigations by select committees to annual appropriations hearings, and from informal communications between Members or congressional staff and executive personnel to the use of extra congressional mechanisms, such as offices of inspector general and study commissions.

Oversight, moreover, is supported by a variety of authorities - the Constitution, public law, and chamber and committee rules - and is an integral part of the system of checks and balances between the legislature and the executive.

Congressional oversight refers to the review, monitoring, and supervision of federal agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation. Congress exercises this power largely through its standing committee system. However, oversight, which dates to the earliest days of the Republic, also occurs in a wide variety of congressional activities and contexts. These include authorization, appropriations, investigative and legislative hearings by standing committees ; specialized investigations by select committees ; and reviews and studies by congressional support agencies and staff.

Congress's oversight authority derives from its "implied" powers in the Constitution, public laws, and House and Senate rules. It is an integral part of the American system of checks and balances.

*

* *

SECOND TOPIC :
FUNDING OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Report from Mr. Peter MILLIKEN

INTRODUCTION

Any discussion of the state of democracy and the health of an electoral system necessarily involves a consideration of the nature of fundraising, including the limits (if any) placed on the amount or sources of fundraising, and on election spending. The two issues are closely related : the amount of money that can be spent on an election campaign depends largely on the amount that can be raised by parties and candidates.

In Canada, where both the national political parties and individual candidates in each constituency (electoral district) independently raise and spend money for election campaigning purposes, the question of electoral and party financing has been at the forefront of debate for the last several months. This is due to a federal government initiative to ban most corporate and union donations, to impose limits on individual donations, and to introduce a public subsidy for registered political parties. These changes represent, arguably, the most significant reform of electoral finance laws since at least 1974, and their implications are expected to be wide-ranging.

BACKGROUND

No one would deny that electoral campaigns, reliant as they are on advertising and the use of television and radio, have become enormously expensive. In the 1950s in Canada, concerns were raised that unfair advantages accrued to those candidates with greater access to funding, and that this situation might pose a risk to the health of our democratic system. It was feared that escalated costs kept many worthy men and women out of public life, thus reducing the ability of the political system to reflect the plurality of values and beliefs held by Canadians.

The Election Expenses Act of 1974 established the basic framework of public funding for political parties and candidates now in place at the federal level in Canada. This framework consisted of an election expenses reimbursement scheme tied to spending limits, and a tax credit mechanism for those making donations to parties and candidates. The main purpose of this legislation was to control election spending. The Act introduced a degree of financial equivalency among different candidates and provided assistance to parties and candidates. In return, controls and requirements were imposed in order to enable public scrutiny and to encourage greater public confidence in the political and electoral process. Premised on the notion that the financing of elections should be open to public scrutiny, the Act :

· imposed spending limits ;

· provided for the disclosure of campaign expenses and contributions ;

· introduced a system of partial public financing ;

· regulated political broadcasting by parties and candidates ; and

· implemented various other changes designed to equalize the political process.

Since 1974, there have been minor changes to electoral financing laws at the federal level in Canada. The issues of undue influence and the costs of elections, however, continue to generate considerable debate. There have been ongoing discussions about whether to limit or prohibit political contributions, whether to further restrict spending in electoral periods and at other times, and what level of public funding of political parties and candidates is appropriate. At the provincial level, Quebec banned corporate and union donations in 1977, while Manitoba did so in 2000.

RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGE

On 29 January 2003, the federal government introduced Bill C-24, An Act To amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act (Political Financing). The bill received Royal Assent on 19 June 2003, and comes into force on 1 January 2004.

Bill C-24 represents the most significant reform to Canada's electoral and campaign finance laws since the 1974 Election Expenses Act established a regime for the financing of federal elections in Canada. Bill C-24 has several general components or themes :

· a ban (with minor exceptions) on political donations by corporations and unions ; a limitation on individual contributions ;

· the registration of political party constituency associations, with reporting requirements ;

· the extension of regulation to nomination and leadership campaigns within political parties ; and

· enhanced public financing of the political system, particularly at the level of political parties.

Whereas the 1974 legislation regarding electoral financing focused on spending limits, Bill C-24 is largely concerned with restrictions on contributions. The 1974 legislation introduced an element of public financing, while the latest bill enhances the public financing component of the system. Bill C-24 also significantly extends the regulation of financial activities undertaken by party constituency associations, as well as by party leadership and nomination contestants.

Contributions by individuals will be subject to an annual limit of $5,000 in total to each registered party and its electoral district associations, candidates and nomination contestants. This limit does not apply to leadership campaigns : during a leadership contest, individual contributions are subject to a separate contribution limit of $5,000 collectively to one or more leadership contestants of a registered party. Contributions by a contestant or candidate from his or her own funds to his or her campaign do not count towards these $5,000 limits.

The bill prohibits corporations, trade unions and associations from making contributions to any registered political party or to any leadership contestants, with the exception of small amounts : a maximum or total of $1,000 collectively may be contributed to a party's candidates, nomination contestants, electoral district associations, and to a candidate for an election who is not the candidate for a registered party. Corporations that do not carry on business in Canada, trade unions that do not hold bargaining rights for employees in Canada, Crown corporations, and corporations that receive more than 50 % of their funding from the Government of Canada are ineligible to make even this reduced contribution.

The bill contains prohibitions on circumventing the limits, and concealing the sources of contribution. This is designed to avert the possibility that corporations or unions could give money to their officers or employees to contribute to a party. Indirect contributions are also prohibited, with the exception of limited indirect contributions through fundraising entities. At present, political party constituency associations are not separately registered, nor are they required to provide financial or other reports directly to the Chief Electoral Officer - the official who is directly responsible to Parliament for administering elections and maintaining the integrity of the electoral system. Under Bill C-24, constituency associations - referred to as "electoral district associations" - will be required to register with Elections Canada. They will be required to provide certain information, and to report annually.

Currently, only candidates and registered political parties are subject to spending limits, and only during elections. For a candidate, the spending limit is based on the number of eligible voters in the constituency. For a registered party, the spending limit is based on the number of eligible voters in the constituencies in which the party has candidates. The bill extends spending limits to nomination contestants, setting the limit at 20 % of the amount to which the candidate in that constituency was subject during the last election period. Although it appears that many nominations are unopposed and that, even where there is more than one candidate, most campaigns are relatively inexpensive, there have been examples of high-profile and very costly nomination battles. Nomination campaigns are an integral part of the electoral process and can have an influence on the ensuing election. The imposition of spending limits and restriction of contributions is also intended to level the playing field and assist candidates, such as women and visible minorities, that traditionally have been considered disadvantaged.

Party leadership campaigns are also currently outside the ambit of the Canada Elections Act. This has long been identified as a gap in the system. Reports to Parliament of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada have pointed out that the selection of a leader can be an extremely important political event, and can involve the raising and expenditure of significant amounts of money, often financed in part by contributions for which tax receipts are issued. Various reforms to leadership campaigns have been suggested, most fundamentally transparency in financing by requiring reports regarding contributions and expenses. This concept is introduced in Bill C-24. The suggestion of imposing spending limits on leadership

candidates has not been adopted in Bill C-24 ; any such limits will remain the responsibility of the political party involved.

Bill C-24 contains significant public financing measures. The intention is to compensate parties for the removal of corporate and union donations, which are largely made at the party level rather than to individual candidates or constituency associations. Political parties are at the heart of a modern political and electoral system and, arguably, are essential to a vibrant and viable democratic system. Whether this should entail public funding - directly or indirectly - and, if so, what level is appropriate, is an important philosophical and policy debate. At present, registered political parties are publicly funded through the tax system (deductions for contributions) and through the partial reimbursement of election expenses. Candidates are also reimbursed for a proportion of their election expenses, while contributors can take advantage of the favourable tax treatment of political donations. Bill C-24 proposes to enhance and extend this regime. Registered parties can currently be reimbursed for 22.5 % of their election period expenses. The rate of reimbursement of electoral expenses for individual candidates is currently 50 %. Bill C-24 proposes to raise to 60 % the reimbursement rate for registered parties' election expenses. With respect to individual candidates, the bill proposes that the percentage of votes that a candidate must obtain in his or her constituency to qualify for reimbursement of electoral expenses be lowered to 10 % from the current 15 %.

The bill provides for an annual allowance to registered parties in the amount of $1.75 per vote received by the party in the previous general election, provided the party has received in the last election either 2 % of the valid votes cast nationally or 5 % of the votes in the constituencies where the party ran candidates. The bill initially proposed an amount of $1.50 per vote. This was amended by the House upwards to $1.75 and a provision included to adjust for inflation. This $1.75 per vote amount is apparently based on the calculations of potentially lost income to parties as a result of the changes in the eligibility of donors, and is designed to be revenue-neutral. It appears that several provinces in Canada provide allowances to registered parties based on their electoral results.

As an incentive to encourage contributions by individuals, the bill also introduces amendments to the Income Tax Act to double the amount of an individual's political donation that is eligible for a 75 % tax credit, from $200 to $400, and to increase accordingly each other bracket of the tax credit, to a maximum tax credit of $650 for political donations of $1,275 or more. The Income Tax Act amendments in the bill will apply to the 2003 tax year and beyond.

The bill appears to be primarily motivated by a desire to enhance fairness and transparency. Perceptions of undue influence and alleged scandals seem to have led to some of the changes, but it should be noted that a number of the measures embodied in the bill have been advocated by election observers in the past. The bill is an attempt to restore public confidence in the electoral system and the democratic process. Whether its provisions are required - and whether they will fulfil this objective - will no doubt be the subject of debate.

Report from Mr. Jean-Louis DEBRÉ

It was only quite recently that the funding of political activities became regulated by statute in France. Until 1988 there had been virtually no legislation at all in this field. However, the expansion of communications media, which were widely used by political parties, especially during election campaigns, gave rise to a sharp increase in spending by candidates and by parties. Consequently, traditional sources of funding, consisting mainly of contributions from party activists, came to be seen as inadequate. The custom of soliciting contributions from companies, whether officially or unofficially, then grew up ; at the same time the courts cast doubt on the legality of this source of funding, ruling that party donations were not compatible with the objects of the companies concerned.

Against this background, it seemed clear that some clarification was called for. So it was that, a few months before the Presidential election, Parliament, on a proposal from the government of M. Jacques Chirac, passed the laws of 11 March 1988, the first steps towards regulating the funding of political activities. This legislation, which has been amended on several occasions, and quite substantially in 1995, covers three main areas : the statements of assets and liabilities that elected officials, and now certain company directors or officers of public corporations, have to file ; the funding of election campaigns ; and the funding of political parties.

1 . Statements of assets and liabilities

Although a subject that may appear of marginal importance, the obligation imposed on certain elected officials and company directors or officers of public corporations to file a statement of assets and liabilities when they assume and when they leave office has been incorporated by Parliament into the legislation governing the funding of political activities. This is why it seems desirable to mention it here.

- This obligation applies, firstly, to the President of the Republic. All candidates, when filing their intention to stand as a candidate, have to submit to the Constitutional Council [Conseil constitutionnel] a statement of assets and liabilities and an undertaking to file another statement at the end of their term of office. For the candidate elected, these statement are published in the Official Journal [Journal officiel].

- In addition, members of the National Assembly [Assemblée Nationale], the Senate [Sénat] and the Government, members of regional and département councils, the mayors of municipalities [communes] with populations of more than 30,000, the chairmen of public inter-municipal cooperation institutions covering populations of more than 30,000 and the deputy mayors of municipalities with populations of more than 100,000 who have executive powers are also obliged to file a statement of assets and liabilities within two months of entering and leaving office. Failure to file such a statement renders the person concerned ineligible to hold office for one year.

- Since 1995 the same obligation has been imposed on the chairmen, managing directors and deputy managing directors of state-owned enterprises, stated-owned industrial and commercial public corporations and other public institutions or government-controlled companies, a list of which is set down by decree of the Council of State [Conseil d'Etat].

The statements are sent to the Commission for the Financial Transparency of Political Activities [Commission pour la transparence financière de la vie politique], which is made up of the Vice-President of the Council of State, the President of the Court of Cassation [Cour de cassation] and the President of the Audit Court [Cour des comptes]. They are not published and may not be passed on to any person other than the judicial authorities. The Commission's remit is to assess changes in assets and liabilities and to draw up, at least once every three years, a report for publication in the Official Journal.

Apart from the President of the Republic, it will be seen that the obligation imposed is not intended to ensure transparency regarding the assets and liabilities of elected officials or senior officers of public corporations, since the statements that they file are not published. The objective is to enable a commission whose independence and discretion are guaranteed to verify that holding elective or public office does not result in unjustifiable enrichment. It is, in fact, a mechanism designed to forestall all risk of corruption.

2 . The funding of election campaigns

In the case of election campaigns, French legislation aims at ensuring the greatest possible equality between candidates by preventing financial resources from creating excessively wide disparities between candidates. From this standpoint, both income and expenditure are regulated, while state assistance is granted to candidates, subject to their receiving a minimum number of votes.

(a) Scope of the regulations

To start with, in 1988, the regulations governing election campaigns covered only Presidential and Parliamentary elections. However, with effect from 1990 they were extended to cover all direct universal suffrage elections, the only exception being municipal and local elections in constituencies with populations of less than 9,000.

It will be noted that elections to the Senate are not included within the scope of the regulations. Since the Senate has an electoral college consisting of local councillors, campaigning obviously does not involve costs comparable to those incurred in direct universal suffrage elections.

(b) The regulations applying to income

The law imposes a ceiling of ¬ 4,600 on donations that private individuals may make to a candidate ; any donation in excess of ¬ 150 has to be paid by cheque. Such donations are deductible for income tax purposes under the terms applying to donations to general interest organisations, i.e. at the rate of 50 % of their amount, subject to a limit of 5 % of disposable income.

But the main thing is that since 1995 donations from all legal entities apart from political parties have been prohibited.

Apart from the donations that they may receive from private individuals under the terms of the law, candidates may fund their election campaigns out of their own pockets, assistance received from their parties, some trading income raised, for example, from the sale of objects during events or entry fees to meetings or discussion dinners and, finally, by way of state assistance, which will be discussed further on.

(c) The regulations applying to expenditure

First of all, it must be pointed out that the most expensive forms of electioneering - commercial advertising through the press or any audio-visual communications medium, toll-free telephone or Minitel3 numbers, advertising hoardings - are prohibited during the three weeks leading up to the election or even, in the case of advertising broadcasts of a political nature, permanently.

It is only on this understanding that the ceiling imposed on expenditure, which is quite strict, appears realistic. The actual amount will obviously vary from election to election.

- For presidential elections the ceiling is set at 13.7 million euros and is increased to 18.3 million euros for the candidates still left in the second round.

- For parliamentary elections it is ¬ 38,000 plus ¬ 0.15 for every person living in the constituency.

- For all other elections the ceiling is determined on the basis of the number of persons living in the constituency in accordance with a table annexed to the Electoral Code [Code électoral]. By way of an example, it ranges from ¬ 25,000 for the two rounds of a municipal election in a municipality with a population of 15,000 through ¬ 115,000 for regional elections in a region with a population of 500,000 to ¬ 1,115,000 per constituency for European elections.

(d) Campaign accounts

Candidates must appoint an agent, who may be an election funding association or a private individual. It is only through this agent that they may raise funds to finance their campaign in the year preceding the election. This is a substantial formality, non-compliance with which is liable to result in the campaign accounts being rejected.

For each candidate is obliged to keep accounts detailing all income and expenditure relating to the campaign. At the risk of being ruled ineligible, these accounts must be filed with the National Campaign Accounts and Political Funding Commission [Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques] within two months of the election.

Made up of three members of the Council of State, Audit Court and Court of Cassation, this Commission examines all of the campaign accounts and approves them, rejects them or re-drafts them. It may refer the matter to the election judge if the accounts have not been filed within the prescribed period, if they have been rejected or if they show that the authorised spending ceiling has been exceeded and, if appropriate, to the Public Prosecutor's Office if the accounts show certain irregularities.

Where the ceiling is exceeded, the Commission sets a sum equal to the amount of the excess, which the candidate is obliged to pay to the Treasury. In addition, reimbursement of campaign expenses by way of state assistance is also cancelled. Finally, where the excess spending is has been committed by the candidate who has been elected, the election judge may quash the election result and, if appropriate, declare the candidate ineligible to stand for office again for a period of one year.

(e) State assistance for candidates

State funding of election campaigns is the corollary of the obligations imposed on candidates. What the legislation seeks to achieve is to ensure that the fairness of the vote is not distorted by too great an inequality in candidates' income and expenditure.

From this standpoint state assistance for election campaigns was increased considerably in 1995.

- For presidential elections each candidate receives a refund equal to one-twentieth of the spending ceiling - i.e. ¬ 685,000 - which is raised to one half - i.e. ¬ 6.85 million euros - if he has won 5 % of the votes cast in the first round.

- For other elections the refund of campaign expenses is equal to one half of the spending ceiling, provided that the candidates have won 5 % of the votes cast.

3 . The funding of political parties

(a) The state funding of political parties

The principle of state funding of political parties appeared necessary in order to enable them to obtain financial resources capable of covering their needs in a transparent fashion, so that they would be dissuaded from resorting to the traditional practices that had prevailed for too long of undisclosed funding. This need became even more imperative with the prohibition in 1995 of all forms of donation from private-law legal entities.

However, beyond the principle, the methods of allocating the assistance have been rather difficult to implement and have been amended several times since state funding was first introduced in 1988.

The loans intended to fund parties are listed each year in the Finance Act on a joint proposal from both Assemblies. The total in 2002 was ¬ 80,264,408.

Initially, they were allocated only between the parties represented in the National Assembly and the Senate, in proportion to the number of members who declared themselves affiliated to them.

Then, in 1990, this system was amended to provide that the assistance should be divided into two equal parts, the first to be allocated on the basis of the votes won in the first round of parliamentary elections by parties that had put up candidates in at least seventy-five constituencies, and the second between the political groups represented in Parliament. In the original legislation the first part was reserved for parties that had won at least 5 % of the votes cast. But the Constitutional Council considered that this threshold was "likely to hinder the expression of new flows of ideas and opinions" and therefore quashed this provision.

In 1993 the minimum number of candidates required to share in the first half of the state assistance was lowered to fifty.

As is unfortunately often the case in France, these rules came to be abused : parties were thus created and candidates put up for the sole purpose of gaining a slice of the state assistance, since each vote won brings in an average of ¬ 1.66. The number of candidates standing for election therefore soared - rising three-fold between 1988 and 2002, from 2,828 to 8,444 for 577 constituencies - as did the number of parties. Following the last Parliamentary elections, 32 political groups in Metropolitan France (the Overseas Departments and Territories have their own special system) may claim a share of the first part of the state assistance, which obviously exceeds the number of parties engaged in any real political activity at the national level.

This is why the legislation was amended once again quite recently to reserve the first part of the state assistance for parties that have put up fifty candidates who have each won at least 1 % of the votes cast. This arrangement is meant to help prevent groups that put up "fantasy" candidates from benefiting unjustifiably from part of the state assistance.

It should also be noted that since the principle of equality was enshrined in the Constitution, the law makes it incumbent upon parties to put up an equal number of candidates of each sex in all constituencies. Non-compliance with this obligation results in a reduction in state assistance, which is cut by a percentage equal to half of the difference in terms of the total number of candidates.

(b) The regulations applying to private funding

In addition to state assistance, political parties mat receive donations from private individuals, subject to a ceiling of ¬ 7,500 per annum for each donor ; any donation in excess of ¬ 150 has to be paid by cheque. Donations to parties are deductible for tax purposes on the same terms as donations to candidates.

On the other hand, it must be stressed that political parties, like election candidates, may not receive assistance from private-law legal entities.

(c) Party accounts

Political parties and their local or specialist organisations collect funds through an agent, who may be either a funding association or a private individual. If the agent is a funding association, it must be authorised by the National Campaign Accounts and Political Funding Commission and the authorisation will be published in the Official Journal. If the agent is a private individual, the party must file a declaration with the local Prefect's Office.

Political parties that are granted state assistance or receive donations from private individuals are obliged to keep accounts. The accounts, certified by two external auditors, must be sent to the National Campaign Accounts and Political Funding Commission, which arranges for a summary version to be published in the Official Journal. If the Commission identifies any failure to comply with legal obligations, the party loses the right to receive state assistance for the following year.

(d) The funding of Parliamentary groups

Independently of the state funding of parties, and well before the system was introduced, the Assemblies instituted a scheme for funding Parliamentary groups. Under this scheme a contribution is made towards the secretarial costs of the groups, in order to enable them to pay their staff. Payable in proportion to the numbers of each group, the current amount for the National Assembly is ¬ 1,125 per member per month.

In addition, the Assembly also pays a contribution to the groups' IT costs.

Finally, members of the Assembly, who receive a credit of ¬ 8,469 a month to pay their personal staff, may pass on some of this money to their group, up to a maximum of one half of this credit.

Report from Mr. Wolfgang THIERSE

1. "Political funding" - as distinct from the funding of political parties

"Political funding" is a wide-ranging topic. I would therefore like to begin by distinguishing between this theme and the narrower concept of "party funding". In Germany, the term "political funding" is used to denote the funding of all persons and organizations directly involved in the forming of the political will. They include, first and foremost :

1.1. The Members of the German Bundestag and Land parliaments

In addition to being paid a taxable salary (remuneration), the Members of the Bundestag receive allowances and benefits in kind at the seat of Parliament and a tax-free allowance to cover the costs associated with the exercise of their parliamentary mandate, and are reimbursed proven expenses incurred through the appointment of parliamentary staff up to a specific threshold limit (for details of Members' remuneration, allowances and benefits, and the employment of staff, see www.bundestag.de/mdb_diaeten/index.html.)

1.2. The parliamentary groups

Germany's constitution, the Basic Law, states that the competences of the German Bundestag and the Land parliaments, as the legislatures, are unrestricted. The legislative power of the Government - the executive - to issue ordinances plays a subordinate role by comparison and is dependent on the authorization granted by the legislature concerned. This comprehensive and wide-ranging legislative competence requires the individual parliamentary groups to be equipped with a highly qualified administration. As part of the legislature, the parliamentary groups form part of the constitutional ("institutional") structures of the state, and are quite distinct from the work (and financing) of the political parties, which are organized as associations under civil law. The volume of funding for the parliamentary groups in the German Bundestag totals ¬ 58.5 million in the 2003 budget year.

1.3. The political foundations affiliated to the parties

The political foundations are a unique feature of German public life. These foundations are usually registered associations under civil law and participate in the forming of the political will in Germany and, not least, abroad. They are funded from the public purse. As non-government organizations (NGOs), they are more effective than a government organization could be in helping to implement and strengthen democratic systems abroad. At present, there are six of these political foundations, corresponding to the number of parties represented in the German Bundestag in the last legislative term. The total annual volume of public funding amounts to around ¬ 300 million.

1.4. The political parties

As independent socio-economic groups, the political parties do not form part of the state's institutional structures. The principle that the parties must be separate from the state means that they must continue to rely on the endorsement and support of citizens, not only politically but also in economic and organizational terms. Public funding may only be provided on an supplementary, i.e. a subsidiary basis.

The total volume of public funding for the parties at federal and Land level currently stands at around ¬ 133 million. According to their last statements of account for 2001, the parties which benefit from partial public funding also had own revenue amounting to around ¬ 285 million. The partial public funding thus amounted to approximately 31  % of their total income.

2. Funding the parties and their election campaigns

2.1. Bases

When it entered into force in 1949, Article 21 of the Basic Law already required parties to account publicly for their assets. This provision was fleshed out in separate legislation. The Law on Political Parties, which entered into force in 1968, not only set out the details of the accounting process but also defined the principles for the granting of partial public funding to the parties. It did not provide for general public funding of political parties - a principle which was reaffirmed by subsequent decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court - but merely for the "necessary reimbursement of the costs of an appropriate election campaign". This "reimbursement of campaign costs" was granted as a lump sum, in accordance with the decisions of the Constitutional Court. Initially, i.e. in 1968, the "campaign cost allowance" was calculated at around ¬ 1.30 per registered voter, whether or not all registered voters actually turned up to vote. After all, the purpose of the election campaign was to motivate potential non-voters to turn out. The distribution of the "campaign cost allowance" between the political parties took place after the election in proportion to the percentage of the vote obtained. Thus the "campaign cost allowance" was only paid out once after each election. In subsequent years, this also applied to the European elections and the Land parliament elections.

This system remained largely unchanged until 1994. After 1989, the "campaign cost allowance" increased to ¬ 2.56 (DM 5.00) per registered voter. The public funding thus granted to political parties was therefore equivalent to around ¬ 118 million per year at the three levels - European, Bundestag and Land parliament elections.

In 1992, the Federal Constitution Court - in light of the particular importance of the political parties in their continued role as social groupings - deemed that it was permissible to reimburse to the parties not only the necessary costs of an appropriate election campaign but also to grant them partial public funding for the general tasks assigned to them by the Basic Law and the Law on Political Parties. As a result, from 1994, the parties received general partial public funding which was no longer linked specifically to the financing of election campaigns. The maximum annual amount of public funding which could be granted to the parties could not exceed an "absolute limit", i.e. the amount that they were already receiving based on their current legal status, and, as before, it also could not exceed the party's own annual income ("relative limit").

The Law on Political Parties was last amended in 2002, after practical experience had shown that the existing rules could prove problematical when the law was applied in individual cases. Moreover, a number of scandals involving donations to political parties had made it clear that better precautions were required to prevent violations of the law in the procurement and administration of party funds, and that a definition of specific offences needed to be included in the Law on Political Parties. The legislators took the opportunity to introduce clearer rules on the penalties to be imposed by the authority administering the funds in the event of poor accounting. The revised law took account of proposals by the Independent Commission on Party Financing, which must be appointed by each Federal President for the duration of his or her term in office, as well as demands made by the first Committee of Inquiry into Party Donations, which was set up during the 14th electoral term.

2.2. The parties' own funds

In line with their role as social rather than public groupings under civil law, the parties are obliged to fund themselves primarily from private sources. Public funding is secondary and, as described above, may not exceed the party's own income ("relative limit").

The main sources of revenue are the subscriptions from party members and parliamentarians, and donations. For the six parties represented in the German Bundestag until 2002, subscriptions accounted for an average of 43 % of the total revenue set out in the 2001 accounts, while donations amounted to around 18 % and other own income to around 8 % of total revenue including public funding (around 31 %).

In principle, the parties may accept donations in unlimited amounts. In weighing the need for parties primarily to fund themselves against the risk that parties and their political work are exposed to inappropriate and undemocratic influences if the donations are too high, Germany's legislators have decided to ban the acceptance of donations outright in specific, legally defined cases when indirect party funding could enable the absolute limit to be circumvented or when democratic principles could be violated through the exertion of inappropriate influence on the parties. Otherwise, the level of donations is not restricted, and the risk of corruption is countered through maximum transparency. As part of this transparency, details of total donations exceeding ¬ 10 000 from one donor in a single accounting year must be published in the statement of account which appears as a Bundestag printed paper, along with the donor's name and address and the amount of the total donation. Donations exceeding ¬ 50 000 must be revealed immediately and without undue delay, so that they can be published promptly as a separate Bundestag printed paper.

With the introduction, on 1 January 2003, of an even more stringent obligation for the political parties to account publicly and in full for their revenue, expenditure and assets, a "middle way" seems to have been achieved which enables the parties to fund themselves to the greatest possible extent while allowing them to work in ways which conform with the law, democratic principles and transparency. Any legal provision can be taken as a pretext to circumvent the law, and this is impossible to prevent. If party officials are forced to recognize that they are not sacrosanct - especially in light of the criminal proceedings recently witnessed in Germany - the parties will, it is hoped, perform their role as the link between state and society and as key players in the forming of the public's political will without succumbing to the temptation to exploit the state and "help themselves" from the public purse.

2.3. Partial public funding

The partial public funding regulated by the Law on Political Parties is determined by the extent of public support enjoyed by the party. A party which has strong backing in society will receive more public funding than a party which is rejected by the public. The benchmarks against which this "public support" is measured are, firstly, the election results achieved by the parties in the three elections at national level (European elections, Bundestag elections and sixteen Land parliament elections) and, secondly, the general success enjoyed by the parties, i.e. their membership, number of parliamentary seats, and donations.

Overall, partial public funding is dependent on the submission of accounts which is prescribed by law. Since the last amendment of the Law on Political Parties, the issues associated with incorrect accounting have been regulated in law. For example, the parties are obliged to correct any errors in the statements of account already submitted to the President of the Bundestag as soon as they are discovered. Infringements of the accounting rules and other provisions of the Law on Political Parties result in the imposition of financial penalties amounting to two or three times the figure incorrectly stated. Furthermore, specific provisions have been introduced in criminal law so that criminal proceedings may be initiated against individual party members who circumvent the rules governing the public accounting of political parties and thus submit a false statement of account to the President of the German Bundestag.

(Details of the public funding of political parties can be accessed on the Internet : www.bundestag.de/datbk/finanz/finanz_02.pdf

Report from Mr. Pier Ferdinando CASINI

In Italy the party system has two sources of finance :

- government contributions to refund election expenses of parties and political movements ;

- private donations made to parties and political movements, in the statutory manner and within the statutory limits.

Public contributions are also available to official party information organs (newspapers and radio stations) together with tax benefits (tax reduction on private donations to political parties, and tax exemption on transfers to parties and on the cost of registering their Constitutions).

The refund of election expenses

The rules governing the public funding of election expenses are mainly set out in Law N° 157 of 1999 4, reforming the system of political party financing, recently modified by Law N° 156 of 2002 5 ;

The criteria for distributing the amounts to be allocated are set out in Law 515 of 1993 6 and Law 43 of 1995 7.

Setting contributions

The expenses incurred by political parties and movements that are eligible for refunds are those incurred in election campaigns to the following elective bodies :

· the Chamber of Deputies,

· the Senate,

· the European Parliament,

· the Regional councils.

For each of these four institutions, a fund of the same amount is created. The amount of each fund, for each year of a Parliament, is equal to one euro multiplied by the number of citizens of the Republic registered as voters for election of members to the Chamber of Deputies (Law 157/1999, section 1 (1) 8.

Refunds are not available for election campaigns to local government bodies (municipal and provincial councils), whereas there is a form of refund for election campaigns relating to referenda to abrogate legislation. For requests to hold a referendum declared to be admissible by the Constitutional Court, the promoting committees are entitled to a refund equivalent to euro 0.51 multiplied by the number of valid signatures collected, up to a maximum of euro 2.582 million in any one year. However, the refund is only payable if the quorum is reached for the referendum to be valid (50 % plus one of those entitled to vote). The same grant is also available for promoters of consultative referenda for which provision is made in Article 138 of the Constitution (Law 157/1999, Section 1 (4)).

The distribution of funds

The grants are distributed differently depending upon the elective body concerned.

The amount available for the Chamber of Deputies is distributed in proportion to the votes cast for each list in relation to the seats to be allocated on a proportional basis between the parties and movements obtaining at least 1 % of the validly cast votes 9.

Achieving the 1 % threshold is not required by law for parties and movements that have submitted their lists or candidates solely in constituencies belonging to regions whose Special Statute provides for a special protection for linguistic minorities (these are the Tentino-Alto Adige and the Valle d'Aoste regions). To calculate the refunds for which these parties and movements are eligible, an amount is granted for each candidate elected equivalent to the average refund paid per Deputy resulting from the general breakdown of the fund (Law 515/1993, Section 9 (3)).

The fund for the repayment of election campaign expenses for elections to the Senate of the Republic is calculated on a regional basis. First of all, the fund is divided between the regions in proportion to their population. The share for each region is divided between the groups of candidates standing for election in the region under the same symbol, and the candidates not linked to any specific group, in proportion to the votes obtained region-wide. Resources from this fund are also payable to groups of candidates who have at least one candidate elected in the region, or at least 5  % of the validly cast votes within the region. The funds are also available to candidates who are note linked to any specific group, but who have been elected to office or who have obtained at least 15 % of the validity cast votes in their constituency (Law 515/1993, Section 9 (2)).

As far as the fund for the European Parliamentary elections is concerned, the resources are divided between the parties and political movements returning at least one candidate in proportion to the votes that each one receives nationwide (Law 515/1993, Section 16).

For the regional elections, the fund is firstly distributed between the regions in proportion to the regional population. Within each region, the allocated amount is then spread proportionally to the votes obtained by the lists for which at least one candidate has been elected to the Regional Council of that particular region (Law 43/1995, Section 6 (2)).

Procedures for disbursing the refunds

The refunds are issued by a decree of the President of the Chamber of Deputies or the President of the Senate of the Republic, as the case may be. The President of the Chamber also orders the payment of contributions for the European and Regional elections and for the referenda.

The political movements or parties intending to apply for refunds are required to file a formal application to the President of the Chamber or the Senate, as the case may be, no later than ten days after the date on which the lists are submitted (Law 157/1999, Section 1 (2)), after which time no applications can be entertained.

Refunds are paid annually, by 31 July each year 10. If the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies are dissolved before their natural term, the proportional annual refunds cease. The political parties or movements are only entitled to receive yearly refunds during the life of the elective body to which their candidates belong (Law 157/1999, Section 1 (6)).

The participation of women in political life

Section 3 of Law 157/1999 introduced a specific provision to encourage women to play a more active part in political life. The parties are required to allocate at least 5 % of the total refunds of election expenses for this very purpose. To ensure compliance with this obligation, they are required to register as a separate item the amount thus allocated in the annual accounts provided by Law 2/1997.

Donations from private individuals

The law envisages two forms of private financing for political life : donations to political parties in general, and donations to individual candidates during the course of an election campaign.

Donations to political parties

Law 195 of 1974 11 capped the donations that private individuals are permitted to make to political parties, and introduced measures to guarantee transparency regarding sources of finance.

The law also provided that all private individuals, legal entities and corporations (associations, businesses, etc.) may donate funds to political parties, except :

· public administration entities

· local and central government agencies and authorities and public corporations

· business firms in which the State has more than a 20 %equity interest, or companies controlled by them.

This restriction not only relates to political parties as such, but also to their internal bodies, currents, factions, parliamentary groups and individual members 12.

In this case of financing above an annual ceiling of euro 6,614 13, the donor and the recipient are required to sign a joint declaration and submit it to the President of the Chamber of Deputies. In the case of donations towards defraying the cost of election campaigns, the declaration can be replaced by an affidavit signed by each individual candidate to this effect (Law 659/1981, Section 4).

This provision does not apply to moneys directly granted by banks or other credit institutions, on the terms and under the conditions provided by the interbank agreements.

Further obligations are imposed on business corporations : donations to political parties, whatever the amount, must be resolved by the appropriate corporate body, and must be recorded in the financial statements.

Donations by private individuals are eligible for tax reliefs, in the form of a tax deduction (Presidential Decree 917/1986, Section 13-bis and 91-bis ; Law 2/1997, Section 7).

Donations to candidates

A special set of rules governs the collection by individual candidates of donations for their election campaigns, in addition to the general provisions applying to the financing of political parties (dealt with above).

Parliamentary candidates may raise funds to finance their election campaign exclusively through an election agent (Law 515/1993, Section 7 (3)). Each candidate must notify the name of the election agent appointed to raise funds to the "Regional Guarantee Board" (Collegio regionale di garanzia) (which is instituted at the Court of Appeal).

No donation from any individual, association, or corporation may exceed a maximum of euro 13,000. Furthermore, within three months of being elected, successful candidates must notify the President of the House to which they belong, and the Regional Guarantee Board, of the cash donations and services they have received from private individuals together with their names in the case of donations over euro 6,500, and all donations received from all other sources. The declaration must be made to the Regional Guarantee Board also in the case of unsuccessful candidates within three months of the date of the last candidates to be proclaimed.

The law also provides that the expenditure of each candidate on the election campaign may not exceed the sum total of a fixed amount (euro 52,000) and a variable amount based on the number of voters in the constituency (Law 515/1993, Section 7 (1)).

The audit system

The legal representatives or the treasurers of the parties and political movements must submit their financial statements to the President of the Chamber of Deputies by no later than 31 July each year, together with a Report on the accounts and Supplementary Note. A board of five official auditors jointly appointed by the Presidents of both Houses at the beginning of every Parliament conducts the audit, to ensure that the Accounts, the Report on the accounts and the Supplementary Note are compliant with delegation. These documents are published by the Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies in the Official Gazette (Law 2/1997, Section 8).

Furthermore, the representatives of parties, movements, lists and groups of candidates standing for the Italian or the European Parliament must, within 45 days of taking their seats, submit to the Presidents of their respective Houses, a final set of accounts for the expenses of the election campaign, and the sources of funding. The Italian Court of Auditors is responsible for auditing these accounts, and the Presidents of the Houses are required to submit all the documentation to the Court of Auditors, through a Board of control of election expenses, comprising three magistrates chosen by lots from among the serving magistrates, set up specifically for the purpose. The Court of Auditors submits the audit report to the Houses (Law 515/1993, Section 12).

The Regional Guarantee Boards, set up at the Courts of Appeal (Law 515/1993, Section 14), verify the regularity of the work performed by the Election Agent in relation to donations to individual candidates received from private individuals.

The laws mentioned above also provide a system of penalties, criminal and administrative, in the event that any of the obligations provided therein are infringed. For the elected member of Parliament, these penalties can even include removal from parliamentary office.

Report from Mr. Tamisuke WATANUKI

1. Laws relating to elections and political funding

- Public Offices Election Law : Sets out provisions governing the electoral system and the methods and nature of election campaigns.

- Political Funds Control Law : Sets out provisions governing political funding.

- Political Party Subsidies Law : Sets out provisions governing the public subsidisation of political parties.

2. Outline of the system of election of Diet members

The National Diet is composed of two houses, the House of Representatives (lower house, with 480 members) and the House of Councillors (upper house, with 242 members). The members of both Houses are elected by means of direct elections.

2.1. The following is a description of the current election system for the House of Representatives.

(1) Of the total number of 480 members, 300 are elected through elections in single-seat constituencies, and 180 are elected on the basis of proportional representation.

- The period of office is four years, subject to termination upon earlier dissolution of the House by the cabinet. People may be candidates for both single-seat constituency elections and proportional representation elections.

(2) Single-seat constituency elections are conducted in 300 constituencies. The average population of a constituency is 423,064 people, with the number of voters averaging 339,622 (based on a 2000 survey).

- Election campaigns in single-seat constituencies are conducted by the candidates and their staff. In addition, political parties also conduct election campaigns for candidates they support.

- Statutory election expenditure varies according to the number of voters in a constituency, but the average is approx. ¥23.8 million (approx. 170,000 euro ; as of July 1, 2003 converted at ¥139/1 euro).

- Candidates in single-seat constituency elections cover their election-campaign expenditure by contributions from their political parties, political organizations, and private individuals, and out of their own pockets.

- After elections, candidates in single-member constituency elections must file income and expenditure reports to the election administration committees concerning their election-campaign spending, specifying the total amount of income, a breakdown of contributions, and how the funds were spent. These reports are made public.

(3) Proportional representation elections are conducted in 11 blocks covering the entire nation, each constituting an electoral district. The number of seats is distributed among these electoral districts according to the population of each, ranging from a maximum of 29 to a minimum of 6.

- Proportional representation elections are conducted according to a closed-list system.

- The election campaigns in proportional representation elections are conducted by political parties, and these are subject to a variety of legal restrictions with respect to such aspects as the nature of the campaigns and the methods used. In the proportional representation elections there are no restrictions on the funds able to be used in the election campaigns.

2.2. The following is a description of the current election system for the House of Councillors.

Of the total number of 242 members, 146 are elected through elections in electoral districts, and 96 are elected on the basis of proportional representation. Half of the seats are put up for reelection every three years. The electoral districts correspond with the country's 47 prefectures, for which the numbers of seats vary between 1 and 4. The elections for proportional-representation seats are conducted on a single nationwide electoral district.

3. Outline of the system of political funding

The Political Funds Control Law is the basic law governing political funding. This law sets out provisions governing such matters as contributions of political funds to political parties, political organizations, and candidates for public office, and the filing and public disclosure of income and expenditure reports relating to political funds.

3.1. Entities subject to regulation

[1] Political parties

A political party is a political organization to which any of the following apply.

(a) A political organization that has 5 or more Diet members.

(b) A political organization that obtained at least 2 % of the votes cast nationwide in the more recent general election (in the case of the House of Representatives) or the last two general elections (in the case of the House of Councillors).

[2] Political organizations

A political organization is defined as follows.

- An organization established with the objective of promoting, supporting, or opposing a political principle or policy.

- An organization established with the objective of recommending, supporting, or opposing a specific candidate for public office.

[3] Candidates for public office

Candidates for public office are persons who are candidates in national or local elections, who are seeking to become candidates, or who currently hold public office.

3.2. Filing of income and expenditure reports

Every year political parties and political organizations must file, by March 31 of the following year, an annual income and expenditure report detailing all income, expenditure, and assets during that year. With respect to contributions, this report must specify the names and other details of persons who have contributed more than ¥50,000 (approx. 360 euro) during the year, and the names and other details of persons who have purchased tickets for political fund-raising parties for more than ¥200,000 (approx. 1,400 euro).

The income and expenditure reports filed by political parties and political organizations are disclosed to the public.

3.3. Principal components of income

The principal components of the income of political parties include public funding from the government, party dues paid by individuals, contributions by individuals, contributions by companies and labor unions, income from political fund-raising parties, and income from the publication of periodicals, etc.

The principal components of the income of political organizations include membership dues paid by individuals, contributions by individuals, contributions by political parties and other political organizations, and income from political fund-raising parties.

3.4. Contributions subject to regulation

[1] Contributions by companies and labor unions

Companies and labor unions may not make contributions to individual politicians, but only to their political parties. The limit on the contributions permitted to be made within a one-year period is determined in accordance with the value of capital stock in the case of companies, and with the number of their members in the case of labor unions, the maximum amount being ¥100 million (approx. 700,000 euro).

[2] Contributions by private individuals

Private individuals may make contributions to political parties, political organizations, and individual politicians.

The limit on the contributions permitted to be made to political parties within a one-year period is ¥20 million (approx. 140,000 euro). Contributions up to a maximum of ¥10 million (approx. 70,000 euro) may be made to political organizations and individual politicians within a one-year period, but only up to a ¥1.5 million (approx. 11,000 euro) in the case of any single political organization or candidate for public office.

3.5. Other restrictions on contributions

- The contributions of companies or other juridical persons that receive capital inputs or subsidies from the national government or local governments are subject to restriction.

- Companies incurring a deficit for three successive years or more may not make contributions.

- Foreign nationals and foreign juridical persons may not make contributions.

- Anonymous contributions are prohibited.

3.6. Regulation relating to political fund-raising parties

Political parties and political organizations may hold political fund-raising parties and derive income from them, but the limit on the amount paid for tickets for any single political fund-raising party by any one individual is ¥1.5 million (approx. 11,000 euro).

3.7. Punishments for violations

The Political Funds Control Law includes provisions for the imposition of penalties for violating it, and persons who are subject to these penalties have their right to vote and right to stand for election suspended for a certain period.

4. Outline of the system of subsidisation of political parties

The Political Party Subsidies Law was enacted in 1994, and the subsidisation of political parties from public funds commenced in 1995.

4.1. Aggregate amount of public funding of political parties by the government in one year

The aggregate amount of public funding from the government is calculated by allowing ¥250 (approx. 1.8 euro) per citizen ; in 2003 the amount was ¥31,731,460,000 (approx. 225,000,000 euro).

4.2. Political parties eligible for public funds

The political parties that receive public funds are those that have 5 or more Diet members, or that have at least 1 Diet member and received at least 2 % of the votes cast nation-wide in the more recent general election (in the case of the House of Representatives) or the last two general elections (in the case of the House of Councillors).

In 2003, eight political parties are receiving these public funds.

4.3. Allocation method

Half of the aggregate amount of public funding for political parties is distributed in proportion to the number of Diet members that each party has, and the other half is distributed in proportion to the number of votes that each party received in the most recent general elections for the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.

4.4. Report how the funds are spent

No legal restrictions have been laid down with respect to how public funding for political parties is spent. The parties that receive the funds must file a report containing details of how the funds have been spent, by March 31 of the year following the reporting year. These reports are disclosed to the public.

Report from Sir Alan HASELHURST

Introduction

1. This paper summarises the rules and procedures for financing political parties and election campaigns in the United Kingdom ; the level of financing from public funds ; and the rules governing funding by private individuals and groups.

Financing of political parties

2. The funding of political parties the United Kingdom has always been a subject for debate. Despite several reviews of party finances over the years, there is no direct state or public funding for political parties to fight elections. It is clear from the election expenditure of the three main parties (£25 million in 2001) that donations are vital to the financial health of politics in the UK.

3. The Committee on Standards in Public Life, chaired at the time by Lord Neill of Bladen, examined the issue of funding of political parties in 1997, with terms of reference given by the Prime Minister. It examined the possibility of state funding, looking at arguments that it would `purify' the political process and free parties to perform essential functions. Arguments against included the public's objection to funding parties with which they fundamentally disagreed, the problems for new parties not yet in receipt of public funds and the loss of the social side of political fundraising. Following the Report of the Neill Committee, Parliament passed the Political Parties, Referendums and Elections Act 2000 (PPERA), which established the Electoral Commission, charged with monitoring and supervising the registration of party donations.

4. The principle of funding the activities of political parties using public or `state' monies has nonetheless long been established in relation to certain, largely parliamentary, activities. In this context, the overall level of annual direct state funding to political parties in the UK has been estimated by the Electoral Commission to amount to about £9.5 million. However, on top of such direct funding, parties also receive, at both the national and the local level, assistance in kind which is worth significantly more than this, particularly in election years.

Direct public funding

5. Public funding is provided in both Houses of Parliament to assist opposition parties. Funding for parties in the House of Commons is known as `Short money' and that in the House of Lords as `Cranborne money', after the Leaders of the respective Houses at the time it was first introduced. The amounts and purposes are regulated by Resolutions of the relevant House, and the sums payable are updated annually on 1 April by the percentage increase in the Retail Price Index in the year to March. Parties also receive benefit of free accommodation for some of their staff.

6. Short money, which totalled just over £5 million in 2002-03, is aimed at supporting opposition parties in three specific Parliamentary areas : general funding for carrying out their Parliamentary business ; travel on Parliamentary business and associated expenses ; and funding the running costs of the Leader of the Opposition's office.

7. The general funding, which constitutes the bulk of the assistance given, is calculated through a formula which takes into account both the number of seats won, and the total number of votes gained by the party. The allowance for travel is based on a fixed sum (about £125,000 in 2002-03) divided between the parties in proportion to the amount given to them by way of general funding. The sum made available for the running costs of the Leader of the Opposition's office in 2002-03 was about £530,000.

8. Cranborne money totalled just over £620,000 in 2002-03. Sums are allocated for the Official Opposition, for the second largest party, and collectively for the Cross-Bench Peers (who do not belong to any political party). This money must be spent exclusively on Parliamentary business.

9. There are also arrangements in place in the devolved assemblies, the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Assembly, to support parties' activities.

Policy Development

10. Policy-related research was identified by the Neill Committee as a particularly important area for opposition parties, as they lack the Civil Service resources available to the Government. The 2000 Act (PPERA) included provision for a scheme for paying policy development grants to parties to help them develop policies for inclusion in their manifestos for elections at local, national and European level.

11. The current scheme, which came into force in March 2002, provides for a total of £2 million per annum, to be split between parties with two or more sitting members of the House of Commons. At present, eight parties, seven of them opposition parties, meet this criterion, and so qualify to receive this assistance. It is administered by the Electoral Commission.

12. Allocations under the scheme are made up of two elements ; £1 million is divided between the parties on a flat rate basis, and the remainder is divided in a way that takes account of parties' shares of the vote in relevant elections, weighted by turnout. Sums received by parties in 2002/03 varied between nearly £440,000 for each of the three parties qualifying for the largest amount, and nearly £133,000 for each of the three qualifying for the smallest.

Indirect public funding

13. The BBC (by convention) and certain independent television and radio broadcasters (by statute) provide free airtime to qualifying parties at the time of elections and at other key events in the political calendar. Under current arrangements, for example, any party fielding candidates in one-sixth of the contested seats at an election qualifies for a party election broadcast. In the UK, the purchase of media airtime for political advertising is prohibited. Thus, parties' receipt of free air-time is, in effect, an indirect subsidy. The estimated total notional value to the parties of election broadcasts at a General Election is some £68 million, and the average value of non-election party political broadcasts is about £16 million a year.

14. Public monies are used to finance the distribution of candidates' election addresses at parliamentary elections and European parliamentary elections (but not local elections) free of charge to the parties. The Representation of the People Act 1983 allows free postage for one election communication to every address or elector within the relevant electoral area. The Home Office has estimated that the cost of this amounted to £17.6 million at the 2001 General Election. The free postage allowance is also available at elections to the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly

15. The State is also required by statute to provide (other than in Northern Ireland) for the free use of public buildings - schools or any other building maintained by public money - for public meetings during campaigns for parliamentary elections, local elections, European Parliament elections, and by-elections. This provision is also available for elections to the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales.

16. Electoral registration officers are required by statute to make available free of charge a copy of the electoral register for electoral purposes to elected representatives and candidates, registered political parties and local constituency parties. Their provision to others requires a sale for which specific fees are prescribed.

17. Political parties registered before PPERA came into force also received one-off financial assistance to facilitate registration and compliance with the Act's requirements. A total sum of £700,000 was made available to political parties under this scheme.

18. Following the enactment of PPERA, referendums also represent an area where the State could subsidise the activities of political parties if they were the `Designated Organisation' appointed by the Electoral Commission for one of the possible outcomes in a referendum campaign. These would be the lead campaign organisations on either side of the referendum debate. Designated Organisations qualify for grants of public money ; the cost of sending a referendum address free of charge to households throughout the referendum area ; free use of rooms for holding public meetings ; and free airtime for referendum broadcasts on certain television and radio services. This is increasingly important as referendums have played a larger role in political decision making.

Regulation of political donations

19. Following the enactment of PPERA, regulations governing political donations were introduced in February 2001. The aim of controlling donations was to ensure transparency in the funding of political parties in order to ensure the public and media know who is financing each political party ; diminish the possibility of secret influence over Ministers or policy ; and raise public confidence in the probity of the political process.

20. All political parties registered on the Great Britain register of parties, excluding parties registered only to contest parish and community elections, are legally required to abide by the new regulations on accepting and reporting donations. Parties on the Northern Ireland register are currently exempt from the donation controls until February 2005.

21. In addition to political parties, organisations that are registered with the Commission as `recognised third parties' (organisations that intend to campaign on behalf of a political party or category of candidates for the purposes of a General Election), and organisations whose membership is comprised wholly or mainly of members of a political party are also covered by the PPERA. The Act also controls donations made to individuals who hold elected office - for example, to members of registered parties, Members of Parliament, and councillors, and those standing for office in Great Britain.

22. Under the Act, donations of more than £200 in value made to a regulated organisation (or individual), or £50 for a candidate, can only be accepted if they are from a `permissible donor' as specified in the Act. All permissible donors must be operating in the United Kingdom, or registered there ; foreign donors are not allowed. Donations of more than £200 cannot be accepted if they are from an `impermissible donor', or if the identity of the donor is not known. Any party receiving donations from anonymous or impermissible sources must either return them, or surrender them to the Electoral Commission.

23. Individuals and organisations that receive donations are expected to maintain details of the donation and the donor for their own records. There is no cap on the amount that can be accepted as a donation by regulated organisations and individuals. However, donations above a certain threshold - currently £5000 to the central party or £1000 to a local party - must be reported to the Electoral Commission for publication on the Commission's registers of donations. It is a criminal offence for an organisation or individual to knowingly accept an impermissible donation, or to fail to submit an accurate donation report to the Commission.

Controls on expenditure on election campaigns

24. PPERA provides the statutory basis for limits, introduced in February 2001, on campaign expenditure by registered political parties at general elections to the United Kingdom and European Parliaments and devolved legislatures. The aim of the rules is to avoid escalating campaign spending by major parties. There is a ceiling on the amount of campaign expenditure that can be incurred during a `relevant period' which for a UK general election is 365 days and for all other elections is four months. Failure to comply with these limits is a criminal offence.

25. For parties contesting elections to the United Kingdom Parliament, the campaign expenditure limit is £810,000 in England, £120,000 in Scotland, and £60,000 in Wales, or £30,000 per seat contested, whichever produces the greater sum. A party that contested all 659 constituencies at a United Kingdom General Election would therefore be subject to a campaign expenditure limit of £19.77m (£19.23m in Great Britain ; £540,000 in Northern Ireland).

26. All registered parties that contested the 2001 General Election were comfortably within the overall national spending limits, the first election at which the new limits applied. Following an election to which these rules apply, parties that contested it must submit a return to the Electoral Commission detailing their campaign expenditure. It is a criminal offence to fail to submit a campaign expenditure return, or to submit one which is incorrect

Report from Mr. Dennis HASTERT

The financing of U.S. election campaigns reflects the pluralism that has long been an underpinning of American democracy, wherein competing interests and factions seek to influence public policy, both before and after elections.

The vast majority of money raised for American elections comes from private sources : individual citizens contributing directly to favored candidates and political parties ; interest groups, often organized through political action committees (PACs), through which citizens pool resources around common policy objectives ; political parties, contributing to their own candidates and spending on behalf of the entire party slate ; and candidates themselves, contributing from personal and family funds. A fifth source of funds is available in the presidential election and in some state and municipal elections : public funds, or government subsidies, for candidates who meet specified requirements and who typically agree to abide by "voluntary" spending limits.

Because the U.S. does not have a parliamentary form of government, the political parties do not play the paramount role they do in many other democracies in selecting candidates for the election ballot and financing their campaigns. Thus candidates at all levels generally have campaign organizations and funding needs separate from those of the political parties with which they are affiliated. However, while candidates may play the primary role in communicating their message to the electorate, the political parties and many interest groups also spend money to directly communicate with voters to promote or oppose particular candidates.

Because elections involve communicating the messages of competing candidates and parties, paid broadcast time has increasingly become a major component of campaign expenditures, broadcasting being the most efficient way to reach the large numbers of voters in a given jurisdiction. Unlike in many other democracies, American broadcast stations are typically privately-owned, thus leaving candidates, especially for higher offices, as customers seeking purchase of this costly means of communication. Campaign money is also spent on mailings, telephone contacts, opinion surveys, campaign consultants, and full-time staffing.

The U.S. Constitution leaves the responsibility for making the rules applicable to federal elections to Congress. Periodically, Congress has enacted laws to govern the financing of elections for federal office (the presidency and Congress), both to establish the broad policies and to respond to perceived problems in current practice.

The current law, the Federal Election Campaign Act, was enacted in 1971 and has been amended several times since, most recently by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. The primary principles engendered in federal law are the prohibition of union and corporate treasury money directly in federal elections, specified limits on contributions from the various sources of funds, and periodic disclosure of receipts and expenditures by candidates, parties, and PACs. Thus, Congress's primary means of overseeing the federal campaign finance system is to enact the laws that establish the statutory principles that govern the flow of money in those elections.

Responsibility for administering the federal campaign finance laws and drafting the detailed regulations that implement them is placed in an independent U.S. government agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The members of the FEC are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The system of checks and balances so much a part of the system of government in the U.S. is reflected here as well. Funding for the FEC is determined by congressional authorization and appropriation, and Congress may, as it has on rare occasions, overturn proposed FEC regulations implementing the law. Congressional committees can and do hold hearings and receive testimony from FEC officials. In 1998, Congress required by law that the General Accounting Office, an entity of the Congress, contract for an outside management review of the overall effectiveness of the FEC in meeting its statutory responsibilities.

*

* *

Deuxième réunion des présidents d'assemblée parlementaire des pays du G8 - 9 septembre 2003 (DIAN 18/2004)

1 Members of the lower House, or National Assembly.

2 The other Assembly being the upper House, or Senate.

3 Adomestic viewdata service run by France Télécom, with a basic monitor and keyboard being linked to the telephone line

4 Law 157 of 3 June 1999, enacting New rules governing the refunding of expenditure on elections and referenda, and the repeal of provisions governing voluntary contributions to political movements and parties.

5 Law 156 of 26 July 2002, enacting Provisions governing the refunding of election expenses

6 Law 515 of 10 December 1993, enacting Provisions governing election campaigns for the election to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic.

7 Law 43 of 23 February 1995, enacting New provisions regarding the election of Regional Councils in « ordinary Statute Regions ».

8 The amount of the fund has been updated by Law, 156/2002. The previous law set the amount of each fund, for the life of each Parliament, at 4,000 lire (approximately euro 2.00) for each person registered on the electoral roll.

9 The criterion for breaking down the fund for the Chamber of Deputies was reframed by Law 156/2002. Previously, political parties receiving at least 4 % of the validly cast votes were entitled to the contribution, as were those with at least one candidate elected in the first-past-the-post constituencies as well as at least 1 % of the validity cast votes nationwide.

10 Before the enactment of Law 156/2002, 40 % of the total refund was paid out in the first year, and 15 % in each of the following years.

11 Law 195 of 2 May 1974 on Government grants for the financing of political parties. This was the first general law regarding the financing of political parties. The part relating to state funding has since been repealed, while the provisions governing donations made to political parties by private individuals have been retained.

12 See, in this connection, Section 4 of Law 659/1981, which specified that the ban also related to Italian MPs and MEPs, regional, provincial and municipal councillors, candidates for these posts, internal party bodies and party officials.

13 This amount is regularly updated on the basis of National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) indices, and was most recently set by the Minister of Home Affairs on 23 February 2001.