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1. GDA-124 economic relationship with China, and climate-related financial risk. .

2. GDA-241 He was the West Wing's chief China hawk and trade czar and served as Director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy and Defense Production Act Policy Coordinator. .

3. GDA-242 His books include The Coming China Wars (2006); Death by China (2011); Crouching Tiger (2015); and his White House memoirs In Trump Time (2021) and Taking Back Trump's America (2022). .

4. GDA-394 PROMISE #1: RESTORE THE FAMILY AS THE CENTERPIECE OF AMERICAN LIFE AND PROTECT OUR CHILDREN. .

5. GDA-457 PROMISE #2: DISMANTLE THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND RETURN SELF-GOVERNANCE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. .

6. GDA-515 PROMISE #3: DEFEND OUR NATION'S SOVEREIGNTY, BORDERS, AND BOUNTY AGAINST GLOBAL THREATS. .

7. GDA-555 For 30 years, America's political, economic, and cultural leaders embraced and enriched Communist China and its genocidal Communist Party while hollowing out America's industrial base. .

8. GDA-557 Unfettered trade with China has been a catastrophe. .

9. GDA-559 For a generation, politicians of both parties promised that engagement with Beijing would grow our economy while injecting American values into China. .

10. GDA-564 And all along, the corporations profiting failed to export our values of human rights and freedom; rather, they imported China's anti-American values into their C-suites. .

11. GDA-565 Even before the rise of Big Tech, Wall Street ignored China's serial theft of American intellectual property. .

12. GDA-572 economy than it is a tool of China's government. .

13. GDA-585 A casual reader might take the last few pages as surveying a broad array of challenges facing the American people and the next conservative President: supranational policymaking, border security, globalization, engagement with China, manufacturing, Big Tech, and Beijing-compromised colleges. .

14. GDA-586 But these really are not many issues, but two: (1) that China is a totalitarian enemy of the United States, not a strategic partner or fair competitor, and (2) that America's elites have betrayed the American people. .

15. GDA-592 Economic engagement with China should be ended, not rethought. .

16. GDA-600 Full-spectrum strategic energy dominance would facilitate the reinvigoration of America's entire industrial and manufacturing sector as we disentangle our economy from China. .

17. GDA-601 Globally, it would rebalance power away from dangerous regimes in Russia and the Middle East. .

18. GDA-606 PROMISE #4 SECURE OUR GOD-GIVEN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO ENJOY "THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY."� The Declaration of Independence famously asserted the belief of America's Founders that "all men are created equal"� and endowed with God-given rights to "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."� It's the last --- "the pursuit of Happiness"� --- that is central to America's heroic experiment in self-government. .

19. GDA-667 In the past decade, though, the breakdown of the family, the rise of China, the Great Awokening, Big Tech's abuses, and the erosion of constitutional accountability in Washington have rendered these divisions not just inconvenient but politically suicidal. .

20. GDA-689 Section One TAKING THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT A merica's Bicentennial, which culminated on July 4, 1976, was a spirited and unifying celebration of our country, its Founding, and its ideals. .

21. GDA-994 While other chapters will cover specific policy goals for each department or agency, incoming policy councils will need to move rapidly to lead policy processes around cross-cutting agency topics, including countering China, enforcing immigration laws, reversing regulatory policies in order to promote energy production, combating the Left's aggressive attacks on life and religious liberty, and confronting "wokeism"� throughout the federal government. .

22. GDA-1277 The People's Republic of China's predatory trade practices have disrupted the open-market trading system that has provided mutual benefit to all participating countries --- including China --- for decades. .

23. GDA-1278 The failure of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to discipline China for abrogation of its trading commitments has seriously undermined its credibility and made it a largely ineffective institution. .

24. GDA-1317 These include the long-term sustainability of space activities in light of increasing orbital debris; creation of space situational awareness services for civil and commercial uses; management of mega-constellations; licensing of new commercial remote sensing capabilities; keeping up with licensing demands due to high launch rates; transitioning International Space Station operations to multiple, privately owned space platforms; and (most important) accelerating the acquisition and fielding of national security space capabilities in response to an increasingly aggressive China. .

25. GDA-1904 Section Two THE COMMON DEFENSE W hile the lives of Americans are affected in noteworthy ways, for better or worse, by each part of the executive branch, the inherent importance of national defense and foreign affairs makes the Departments of Defense and State first among equals. .

26. GDA-1912 "By far the most significant danger"� to America from abroad, Miller writes, "is China."� That communist regime "is undertaking a historic military buildup,"� which "could result in a nuclear force that matches or exceeds America's own nuclear arsenal."� Resisting Chinese expansionist aims "requires a denial defense"� whereby we make "the subordination of Taiwan or other U.S. .

27. GDA-1929 When it comes to China, Skinner writes that "a policy of 'compete where we must, but cooperate where we can'"�has demonstrably failed."� The People's Republic of China's (PRC) "aggressive behavior,"� she writes, "can only be curbed through external pressure."� Efforts to protect or excuse China must stop. .

28. GDA-1946 Our disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, our impossibly muddled China strategy, the growing involvement of senior military officers in the political arena, and deep confusion about the purpose of our military are clear signals of a disturbing decay and markers of a dangerous decline in our nation's capabilities and will. .

29. GDA-1966 DOD POLICY By far the most significant danger to Americans' security, freedoms, and prosperity is China. .

30. GDA-1967 China is by any measure the most powerful state in the world other than the United States itself. .

31. GDA-1973 China is undertaking a historic military buildup that includes increasing capability for power projection not only in its own region, but also far beyond as well as a dramatic expansion of its nuclear forces that could result in a nuclear force that matches or exceeds America's own nuclear arsenal. .

32. GDA-1974 The most severe immediate threat that Beijing's military poses, however, is to Taiwan and other U.S. .

33. GDA-1976 If China could subordinate Taiwan or allies like the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan, it could break apart any balancing coalition that is designed to prevent Beijing's hegemony over Asia. .

34. GDA-1977 Accordingly, the United States must ensure that China does not succeed. .

35. GDA-1978 This requires a denial defense: the ability to make the subordination of Taiwan or other U.S. .

36. GDA-1980 Critically, the United States must be able to do this at a level of cost and risk that Americans are willing to bear given the relative importance of Taiwan to China and to the U.S. .

37. GDA-1981 The United States and its allies also face real threats from Russia, as evidenced by Vladimir Putin's brutal war in Ukraine, as well as from Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorism at a time when decades of ill-advised military operations in the Greater Middle East, the atrophy of our defense industrial base, the impact of sequestration, and effective disarmament by many U.S. .

38. GDA-1988 defense strategy must identify China unequivocally as the top priority for U.S. .

39. GDA-1992 allies must also step up, with some joining the United States in taking on China in Asia while others take more of a lead in dealing with threats from Russia in Europe, Iran, the Middle East, and North Korea. .

40. GDA-1994 Needed Reforms l Prioritize a denial defense against China. .

41. GDA-1996 defense planning should focus on China and, in particular, the effective denial defense of Taiwan. .

42. GDA-1998 defense activities will deny China the first island chain. .

43. GDA-2000 defense efforts, from force planning to employment and posture, focus on ensuring the ability of American forces to prevail in the pacing scenario and deny China a fait accompli against Taiwan. .

44. GDA-2002 conventional force planning construct to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before allocating resources to other missions, such as simultaneously fighting another conflict. .

45. GDA-2007 allies must play their part not only in dealing with China, but also in dealing with threats from Russia, Iran, and North Korea. .

46. GDA-2010 2. Support greater spending and collaboration by Taiwan and allies in the Asia-Pacific like Japan and Australia to create a collective defense model. .

47. GDA-2011 3. Transform NATO so that U.S. .

48. GDA-2012 allies are capable of fielding the great majority of the conventional forces required to deter Russia while relying on the United States primarily for our nuclear deterrent, and select other capabilities while reducing the U.S. .

49. GDA-2018 Russia maintains and is actively brandishing a very large nuclear arsenal, but China is also undertaking a historic nuclear breakout. .

50. GDA-2020 nuclear force so that it has the size, sophistication, and tailoring to deter Russia and China simultaneously. .

51. GDA-2044 support to Ukraine. .

52. GDA-2085 3. Establish a pipeline of near-term, mid-term, and long-term technology that is aimed at great-power competition (China) and can be matured, prototyped, and evaluated to support major acquisitions (the ability to produce at scale) to break the cycle of schedule delays and cost overruns from underdeveloped and poorly understood technologies. .

53. GDA-2088 China has been relentless in stealing U.S. .

54. GDA-2172 2. Align collection and analysis with vital national interests (countering China and Russia). .

55. GDA-2192 In recent years, public trust in Defense Intelligence has been eroded by, for example, flawed assumptions leading up to our Afghanistan withdrawal, flawed Russia-Ukraine assessments, divergences in relations with key Gulf allies, and voids being filled by Russia and China around the world. .

56. GDA-2210 All of these challenges are set against the backdrop of a complex and dynamic global geopolitical environment that is exemplified and exacerbated by the triumph of our adversaries in Afghanistan after a 20-year struggle there as well as recent Russian outrages in the Ukraine and China's bellicosity both on its borders and in surrounding disputed regions. .

57. GDA-2250 Today, the People's Republic of China People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can challenge the USN's ability to accomplish its mission in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. .

58. GDA-2285 Air Force today lacks a force structure with the lethality, survivability, and capacity to fight a major conflict with a great power like China, deter nuclear threats, and meet its other operational requirements under the National Defense Strategy.29 For 30 years, the Air Force has received less annual funding (if pass-through funding, defined as money in the Air Force budget that does not go to the Air Force, is removed from the equation) than the Army and Navy have received. .

59. GDA-2313 5. Accelerate the development and production of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile to reduce the risk inherent in an aging Minuteman III force in light of China's nuclear modernization breakout. .

60. GDA-2314 6. Increase the number of EC-37B electronic warfare aircraft from 10 to 20 in order to achieve a minimum capacity to engage growing threats from China across the electromagnetic spectrum. .

61. GDA-2399 The preliminary evidence from the war in Ukraine suggests that existing cyber doctrine and certain capability and target assumptions may be incorrect or misplaced. .

62. GDA-2425 If we maintain irregular warfare's traditional focus on nonstate actors, we limit ourselves to addressing only the symptoms (nonstate actors), not the problems themselves (China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran). .

63. GDA-2429 Broadly redefining irregular warfare to address current state and nonstate actors is critical to countering irregular threats that range from the Chinese use of economic warfare to Russian disinformation and Islamist terrorism. .

64. GDA-2436 l Counter China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) globally. .

65. GDA-2437 DOD, in conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations, must work proactively to counter China's BRI around the globe. .

66. GDA-2439 2. Use regional and global information operations to highlight Chinese violations of Exclusive Economic Zones, violations of human rights, and coercion along Chinese fault lines in Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in addition to China's weaponization of sovereign debt. .

67. GDA-2456 l China is pursuing a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces, significantly shifting the nuclear balance and forcing the U.S. .

68. GDA-2457 to learn how to deter two nuclear peer competitors (China and Russia) simultaneously for the first time in its history. .

69. GDA-2458 l Russia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and using the threat of nuclear employment as a coercive tactic in its war on Ukraine. .

70. GDA-2476 l Account for China's nuclear expansion. .

71. GDA-2477 To ensure its ability to deter both Russia and the growing Chinese nuclear threat, the U.S. .

72. GDA-2504 l China and Russia, in addition to their vast and growing ballistic missile inventories, are deploying new hypersonic glide vehicles and investing in new ground-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles that uniquely challenge the United States in different domains. .

73. GDA-2512 missile defense is destabilizing because it threatens Russian and Chinese second- strike capabilities. .

74. GDA-2513 1. Reject claims made by the Left that missile defense is destabilizing while acknowledging that Russia and China are developing their own advanced missile defense systems. .

75. GDA-2514 2. Commit to keeping homeland missile defense off the table in any arms control negotiations with Russia and China.42 l Strengthen homeland ballistic missile defense. .

76. GDA-2519 As the Ukraine conflict amply demonstrates, U.S. .

77. GDA-2528 has chosen to rely solely on deterrence to address the Russian and Chinese ballistic missile threat to the homeland and to use homeland missile defense only against rogue nations. .

78. GDA-2529 1. Abandon the existing policy of not defending the homeland against Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles and focus on how to improve defense as the Russian and Chinese missile threats increase at an unprecedented rate.45 2. .

79. GDA-2604 25. "[T]he Army's internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. .

80. GDA-2856 l Management Directives and policies should realign to ensure that the workforce, while adaptable and able to handle the bulk of the USCIS mission, is not allowed to be pulled off mission work to focus on unlawful programs (DACA, mass parole for Afghans, Ukrainians, Venezuelans, etc.), which divert resources away from nuclear family and employment programs. .

81. GDA-3019 CISA began this work because of alleged Russian misinformation in the 2016 election, which in fact turned out to be a Clinton campaign "dirty trick."� The Intelligence Community, including the NSA or DOD, should counter foreign actors. .

82. GDA-3383 Political ambassadors with strong personal relationships with the President should be prioritized for key strategic posts such as Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). .

83. GDA-3420 The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or "China House."� This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. .

84. GDA-3421 government relations with China "and advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system."�7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. .

85. GDA-3422 government communication, consensus, and action on China policy --- given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests --- remains to be seen. .

86. GDA-3482 The five countries on which the next Administration should focus its attention and energy are China, Iran, Venezuela, Russia, and North Korea. .

87. GDA-3483 The People's Republic of China The designs of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party, which runs the PRC, are serious and dangerous.9 This tyrannical country with a population of more than 1 billion people has the vision, resources, and patience to achieve its objectives. .

88. GDA-3492 government needs an Article X for China,11 and it should be a presidential mandate. .

89. GDA-3493 Along with the National Security Council, the State Department should draft an Article X, which should be a deeply philosophical look at the China challenge. .

90. GDA-3494 Many foreign policy professionals and national leaders, both in government and the private sector, are reluctant to take decisive action regarding China. .

91. GDA-3504 As with all global struggles with Communist and other tyrannical regimes, the issue should never be with the Chinese people but with the Communist dictatorship that oppresses them and threatens the well-being of nations across the globe.12 That said, the nature of Chinese power today is the product of history, ideology, and the institutions that have governed China during the course of five millennia, inherited by the present Chinese leaders from the preceding generations of the CCP.13 In short, the PRC challenge is rooted in China's strategic culture and not just the Marxism-Leninism of the CCP, meaning that internal culture and civil society will never deliver a more normative nation. .

92. GDA-3526 Russia One issue today that starkly divides conservatives is the Russia-Ukraine conflict. .

93. GDA-3528 l One school of conservative thought holds that as Moscow's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine drags on, Russia presents major challenges to U.S. .

94. GDA-3531 involvement including military aid, economic aid, and the presence of NATO and U.S. .

95. GDA-3533 The end goal of the conflict must be the defeat of Russian President Vladimir Putin and a return to pre-invasion border lines. .

96. GDA-3535 Ukrainian support is in the national security interest of America at all. .

97. GDA-3536 Ukraine is not a member of the NATO alliance and is one of the most corrupt nations in the region. .

98. GDA-3537 European nations directly affected by the conflict should aid in the defense of Ukraine, but the U.S. .

99. GDA-3539 This viewpoint desires a swift end to the conflict through a negotiated settlement between Ukraine and Russia. .

100. GDA-3544 interests; be fiscally responsible; and protect American freedom, liberty, and sovereignty, all while recognizing Communist China as the greatest threat to U.S. .

101. GDA-3546 Thus, with respect to Ukraine, continued U.S. .

102. GDA-3547 involvement must be fully paid for; limited to military aid (while European allies address Ukraine's economic needs); and have a clearly defined national security strategy that does not risk American lives. .

103. GDA-3548 Regardless of viewpoints, all sides agree that Putin's invasion of Ukraine is unjust and that the Ukrainian people have a right to defend their homeland. .

104. GDA-3549 Furthermore, the conflict has severely weakened Putin's military strength and provided a boost to NATO unity and its importance to European nations. .

105. GDA-3550 The next conservative President has a generational opportunity to bring resolution to the foreign policy tensions within the movement and chart a new path forward that recognizes Communist China as the defining threat to U.S. .

106. GDA-3585 Yet Central and South America are moving rapidly into the sphere of anti-American, external state actors, including the PRC, Iran, and Russia. .

107. GDA-3601 A further key priority is keeping Türkiye in the Western fold and a NATO ally. .

108. GDA-3602 This includes a vigorous outreach to Türkiye to dissuade it from "hedging"� toward Russia or China, which is likely to require a rethinking of U.S. .

109. GDA-3606 must continue to support its allies and compete with its economic adversaries, including China. .

110. GDA-3612 In North Africa, security cooperation with European allies, especially France, will be vital to limit growing Islamist threats and the incursion of Russian influence through positionings of the Wagner Group. .

111. GDA-3622 African nations comprise major country-bloc elements that shield the PRC and Russia from international isolation for their human rights abuses --- and African nations staunchly support PRC foreign policy goals on issues such as Hong Kong occupation, South China Seas dispute arbitration, and Taiwan. .

112. GDA-3652 First, the Europe, Eurasia, and Russia region is made up of relatively wealthy and technologically advanced societies that should be expected to bear a fair share of both security needs and global security architecture: The United States cannot be expected to provide a defense umbrella for countries unwilling to contribute appropriately. .

113. GDA-3653 At stake after 2024 will be examining the status of the Wales Pledge of 2 percent of gross domestic product toward defense by NATO members. .

114. GDA-3656 national interest to amplify it, especially because this means weaning Europe of its dependence on China. .

115. GDA-3668 diplomacy must be more attentive to inner-EU developments, while also developing new allies inside the EU --- especially the Central European countries on the eastern flank of the EU, which are most vulnerable to Russian aggression. .

116. GDA-3696 For example, the region is estimated to contain 90 million barrels of oil and one-quarter of the world's undiscovered natural gas reserves.16 The Arctic is lightly populated: Only 4 million people in the world live above the Arctic Circle, with more than half of those living in Russia. .

117. GDA-3700 China has been open about its interest in the region, primarily as a highway for trade but also for its rich natural resources. .

118. GDA-3701 While the PRC's increasing intervention in Arctic affairs is a bit strained because it does not have an Arctic coastline, Russia does --- and Russia has made no secret of its view that the Arctic is vital for economic and military reasons. .

119. GDA-3702 Russia has invested heavily in new and refurbished Arctic bases and cold-weather equipment and capabilities. .

120. GDA-3705 The next Administration should embrace the view that NATO must acknowledge that it is, in part, an Arctic alliance. .

121. GDA-3706 With the likely accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, every Arctic nation except for Russia will be a NATO member state. .

122. GDA-3707 NATO has been slow to appreciate that the Arctic is a theater that it must defend, especially considering Russia's brazen aggression against Ukraine. .

123. GDA-3708 NATO must develop and implement an Arctic strategy that recognizes the importance of the region and ensures that Russian use of Arctic waters and resources does not exceed a reasonable footprint. .

124. GDA-3715 While this should be the next Administration's policy with respect to all countries that might seek to block free-flowing commercial traffic, the next Administration will clearly have to exert substantial attention toward Russia. .

125. GDA-3722 The People's Republic of China has declared itself a "near-Arctic state,"� which is an imaginary term non-existent in international discourse. .

126. GDA-3723 The United States should work with like-minded Arctic nations, including Russia, to raise legitimate concerns about the PRC's so-called Polar Silk-Road ambitions. .

127. GDA-3833 It is "an open, interoperable, secure, reliable, market-drive, domain that reflects democratic values and protects privacy."�25 Russia and China, meanwhile, are authoritarian regimes that use the Internet to limit public opposition and control information. .

128. GDA-3836 Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. .

129. GDA-3881 News release, "Secretary Blinken Launches the Office of China Coordination,"� U.S. .

130. GDA-3882 Department of State, December 16, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-launches-the-office-of-china-coordination/ (accessed March 9, 2023). .

131. GDA-3885 9. See Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace the United States as a Global Superpower (NY: St. .

132. GDA-3887 10. For additional context regarding how countering China fits in a more robust U.S. .

133. GDA-3890 11. The Article X for China would follow George Kennan's Article X for U.S.-Soviet competition. .

134. GDA-3892 Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct,"� Foreign Affairs, July 1947, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct (accessed March 22, 2023). .

135. GDA-3894 Response to China Over the Next Decades,"� Heritage Foundation Special Report No. .

136. GDA-3895 221, February 20, 2010, https://www.heritage.org/asia/ report/assessing-beijings-power-blueprint-the-us-response-china-over-the-next-decades. .

137. GDA-3897 Orts, "The Rule of Law in China,"� Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. .

138. GDA-3935 OVERVIEW The United States Intelligence Community (IC) is a vast, intricate bureaucracy spread throughout 18 independent and Cabinet subagencies.1 According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the IC's mission is "to collect, analyze, and deliver foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information to America's leaders so they can make sound decisions to protect our country."�2 An incoming conservative President needs to use these intelligence authorities aggressively to anticipate and thwart our adversaries, including Russia, Iran, North Korea, and especially China, while maintaining counterterrorism tools that have demonstrated their effectiveness. .

139. GDA-3970 Considerations like mismanagement of human resources, joint-duty assignments, and accelerated growth in senior personnel can cause a President to dictate to his incoming DNI a desire to slash redundant positions and expenditures while simultaneously giving the DNI the authority to drive necessary changes throughout the IC to deal with the nation's most compelling threats, including those emanating from China. .

140. GDA-3986 There is scant mention of cyber threats and the evolving national security challenges posed by China, Russia, and other U.S. .

141. GDA-4023 Information sharing and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the threat from China and thereby counter it more effectively. .

142. GDA-4094 In particular, the IC must restore confidence in its political neutrality to rectify the damage done by the actions of former IC leaders and personnel regarding the claims of Trump-Russia collusion following the 2016 election and the suppression of the Hunter Biden laptop investigation and media revelations of its existence during the 2020 election. .

143. GDA-4098 Brennan's role in the letter signed by 51 former intelligence officials before the 2020 election is unclear, but in dismissing the Hunter Biden laptop as "Russian disinformation,"� the CIA was discredited, and the shocking extent of politicization among some former IC officials was revealed. .

144. GDA-4139 CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term "whole of government"� is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. .

145. GDA-4140 CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. .

146. GDA-4142 A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC leaders will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. .

147. GDA-4145 That being said, however, a future conservative President should consider what resources and information-sharing relationships could be included in an ad hoc or quasi-formal intelligence expansion (for example, with the Quad) among nations trying to counter the threat from China. .

148. GDA-4146 Significant technology, language skills, and financial intelligence resources are needed to counter China's capabilities.29 The IC was caught flat-footed by the recent discovery of China's successful test of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile. .

149. GDA-4148 China's gains and intense focus on emerging technologies have taken it in some areas from being a near-peer competitor to probably being ahead of the United States. .

150. GDA-4149 China's centralized government allocates endless resources (sometimes inefficiently) to its strategic "Made in China 2025"� and military apparatuses, which combine government, military, and private-sector activities on quantum information sciences and technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, biotechnologies, and advanced robotics. .

151. GDA-4151 In addition, to combat China's economic espionage, authorities and loopholes in the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)30 will have to be examined and addressed in conjunction with the Attorney General. .

152. GDA-4153 Broader committee jurisdictions should receive additional intelligence from IC agencies as necessary to inform China's unique and more comprehensive threat across layers of the U.S. .

153. GDA-4155 Former DNI John Ratcliffe increased the intelligence budget as it related to China by 20 percent. .

154. GDA-4157 My perspective was, 'Whatever we're spending on countering China, it isn't enough.'"�31 From an intelligence standpoint, the need to understand Chinese motivations, capabilities, and intent will be of paramount importance to a future conservative President. .

155. GDA-4161 spy"� threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia's machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. .

156. GDA-4169 Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual property as well as the broader rules-based order --- all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. .

157. GDA-4194 By not allowing dissents or considering alternatives, the CIA exercised "undue influence on intelligence."�37 Subsequent exposure of China-linked online influence and the FBI's warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 midterms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. .

158. GDA-4197 To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across multifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC's capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymakers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. .

159. GDA-4200 Strategic planning --- informed by intelligence --- must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. .

160. GDA-4226 At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia's buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. .

161. GDA-4251 adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are conducted in the realms of technology and finance.40 This challenge requires new tools, authorities, and technological expertise across the U.S. .

162. GDA-4253 An incoming conservative President should task his DNI and Secretary of Commerce with increasing coordination, the resources needed for BIS and SCIF capacity, and proper and necessary intelligence sharing to counter the activities of multifaceted adversaries such as China. .

163. GDA-4260 In addition, ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) techniques being refined by technologies emanating from the regimes in China and Russia will continue to be highly challenging for intelligence officers. .

164. GDA-4273 Brussels has always arbitraged the difference between being a military ally against, for example, Russia and conducting a full-blown trade conflict with the United States. .

165. GDA-4276 intelligence collection hurt the Europeans themselves, especially as the United States shares unprecedented amounts of intelligence on Russia's invasion of Ukraine with Europeans.48 Europe is telling the United States to meet intelligence oversight standards that no European country meets. .

166. GDA-4277 At the same time, exports of data to China are unexamined and (so far) free from legal challenges. .

167. GDA-4297 The National Intelligence Council is the IC's premier analytic organization and includes more than a dozen National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), each of whom leads the IC's analysis within a regional (China, Russia, Iran, etc.) or functional (cyber, counterproliferation, economics, etc.) mission area. .

168. GDA-4318 In recent years, the IC has had a mandate from multiple Administrations to advance technology needs for intelligence --- needs that have seen massive changes as a result of such threats as China's advancements in technology and data infrastructure. .

169. GDA-4330 With China developing increasingly capable space and counterspace technologies and Russia taking more aggressive action in space, space has emerged as the latest warfighting domain. .

170. GDA-4340 To improve their ability to meet the threat posed by China and Russia, the IC and DOD should: 1. .

171. GDA-4369 4. Christopher Porter, "Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China,"� LinkedIn, March 14, 2023, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ seven-questions-next-president-need-intelligence-community-porter/?trackingId=Dl9RF5CnSwWnAO7r9ggHiQ%3D%3D (accessed March 18, 2023). .

172. GDA-4438 29. Porter, "Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China."� 30. .

173. GDA-4442 31. Kristina Wong, "Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,"� Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased- cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023). .

174. GDA-4468 40. Agathe Demarais, "How the U.S.-Chinese Technology War Is Changing the World,"� Foreign Policy, November 19, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war- semiconductors-export-controls-biden/ (accessed February 28, 2023). .

175. GDA-4484 Strobel, "Release of Ukraine Intelligence Represents New Front in U.S. .

176. GDA-4485 Information War with Russia,"� The Wall Street Journal, updated April 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/release-of-secrets-represents- new-front-in-u-s-information-war-with-russia-11649070001 (accessed February 24, 2023). .

177. GDA-4511 The MBN has correspondents throughout the Middle East and North Africa.8 l Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is a private, nonprofit, multimedia broadcasting corporation that serves as a surrogate media source in 27 languages and 23 countries, including Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine. .

178. GDA-4515 The recent addition of RFE/RL's Hungarian-language service, Szabad Európa, falls outside the intended scope of RFE/RL's charter by targeting a democratically elected, pro-American European and NATO ally. .

179. GDA-4597 at a perilous strategic disadvantage in the event of a major conflict, particularly with Russia or China. .

180. GDA-4601 Long-lasting power outages are also likely, such as those Ukraine experienced in the aftermath of Russia's 2022 invasion. .

181. GDA-4839 Countering China's Development Challenge. .

182. GDA-4840 Through its trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has directed billions of dollars in loans and investments to advance its geostrategic objective of displacing the United States as the premier global power. .

183. GDA-4841 The PRC leverages its transactions --- termed "debt traps"� by many critics --- to strengthen its global influence, extract natural resources, isolate Taiwan, win political support at international fora, and access ports and bases for its military. .

184. GDA-4844 In Africa, China has issued $160 billion in loans and dominates the continent's rare earth mining sector, which is critical to global energy development. .

185. GDA-4846 Chinese-funded projects are known for employing substandard labor and environmental practices, fueling corruption, promoting wasteful financial decisions by governments, advancing China's geostrategic interests, and creating an unequal trade relationship in which China secures raw materials from developing countries and sells those countries manufacturing products. .

186. GDA-4848 China's mercantilist penetration of the developing world and the negative consequences for developing countries' healthy economic growth have undercut U.S. .

187. GDA-4851 During the Trump Administration, USAID: l Inaugurated a robust counter-China response called Clear Choice3 that contrasted America's development approach based on liberty, sovereignty, and free markets with China's mercantilist authoritarianism that pursued predatory financing schemes and economic and political subordination to Beijing. .

188. GDA-4853 l Struck bilateral development relationships with Japan, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Taiwan to support projects in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. .

189. GDA-4854 l Established an office in Greenland to help counter China's claims of being "a near Arctic state"� and reoriented its programming across Asia --- including establishing a USAID Mission to Central Asia --- in line with America's Indo- Pacific strategy.5 l Joined with the U.S. .

190. GDA-4856 USAID built an organizational infrastructure to carry out its multiple lines of counter-China operations. .

191. GDA-4858 International Development Finance Corporation Working Group reviewed all proposed assistance programs and proposals through a counter-China lens. .

192. GDA-4859 A senior executive-level Clear Choice Coordinator, reporting to the Administrator, advised the agency's leadership on initiatives to counter China, supported by a fully dedicated six-person Secretariat. .

193. GDA-4860 The Biden Administration discontinued these programs and allowed USAID's counter-China architecture to waste away, subordinating our national security interests to progressive climate politics in which Communist China is viewed as a global partner. .

194. GDA-4861 The next conservative Administration should restore and build on the Trump Administration's counter-China infrastructure at USAID, end the climate policy fanaticism that advantages Beijing, and assess bilateral aid through the lens of U.S. .

195. GDA-4862 national security interests, rewarding those countries that resist China's debt diplomacy. .

196. GDA-4917 Biden also restored funding to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which supports and implements China's coercive abortion and sterilization regimen. .

197. GDA-4950 In rare instances, such as in Jordan and Ukraine, the agency provides direct budget support to finance the operations of host-country governments. .

198. GDA-5039 Every year sees financial demands grow in response to new conflicts, most recently Ukraine. .

199. GDA-5049 government has expended $14 billion in aid to Syria where the bloody regime of Bashar al-Assad --- a close ally of Iran and Russia --- skims nearly half of foreign aid through inflated official exchange rates, the diversion of food baskets to its military units, and procurement arrangements with compromised local contractors. .

200. GDA-5087 Launched in December 2019, DFC sought to unleash the power of America's private sector to advance our interests by providing emerging markets with blended financing opportunities to help end wretched poverty, create new markets for U.S.-made products, strengthen bilateral partnerships in strategic parts of the world, and offset China's predatory loans and investments. .

201. GDA-5088 The Trump Administration launched a USAID-DFC Working Group to maximize development outcomes and review individual investment projects through a counter-China lens and ensure a cohesive interagency development response. .

202. GDA-5098 This approach has negative foreign policy implications as China relentlessly promotes its own self-serving efforts to gain influence and resources. .

203. GDA-5102 The United States is in a struggle for influence with China, Russia, and other competitors, and American generosity must not go unacknowledged. .

204. GDA-5155 Asia is the most populous continent and ground zero in the battle against Communist China's efforts to exploit the development needs of poor countries for geopolitical gain. .

205. GDA-5160 So too should development cooperation with Taiwan, which boasts effective pandemic response capacity that should be shared with developing countries. .

206. GDA-5161 China's island-hopping efforts to capture vulnerable Pacific states is a direct strategic threat to U.S. .

207. GDA-5162 maritime supremacy and homeland security, and USAID and its allied donors should neutralize these efforts through the deployment of targeted assistance such as helping countries combat the effects of China's illegal fishing. .

208. GDA-5163 While China outpaces the ability of the democratic alliance to deploy state-backed financing to developing countries, it is unable to compete with our collective private-sector capacity to deploy trillions of dollars of capital. .

209. GDA-5167 foreign aid since 2010, yet it remains intensely anti-American and corrupt, has backed the Taliban continuously since 2001, jump-started North Korea's nuclear bomb program, brutalizes its religious minorities, and is a willing client of China while taking on unrepayable loans from the U.S. .

210. GDA-5197 Failure to generate wealth has provided opportunities for China to step in and become the continent's leader in trade, loans, and investment. .

211. GDA-5200 The Biden Administration's radical global climate policies have cut off billions in investment to develop clean fossil fuels, denying Africa's billion-plus people access to cheap energy to further their own development and finance their own social services in health, water, education, and agriculture, while increasing its dependence on China's renewables industry. .

212. GDA-5206 Critically, it must hold China accountable for its extractive investments that violate international labor, environmental, and anticorruption norms and practices; undercut business opportunities for U.S. .

213. GDA-5219 Japan has committed $30 billion in aid to Africa over three years to stem China's economic and political grip on the continent. .

214. GDA-5234 foreign assistance throughout the Western Hemisphere is designed to respond to national security threats that emanate from the region, such as illicit drug and arms trafficking; illegal immigration flows; terrorism; pandemics; and strategic threats from China, Russia, and Iran. .

215. GDA-5240 These regimes are hostile to American interests and private enterprise, breed corruption, implement radical policies that will further impoverish their people and threaten their democracies, and are more open to striking partnerships with Communist China. .

216. GDA-5272 It can build on a strong baseline of conservative reforms undertaken by the Trump Administration to counter Communist China's strategy of world domination. .

217. GDA-5325 Section Three THE GENERAL WELFARE When our Founders wrote in the Constitution that the federal government would "promote the general Welfare,"� they could not have fathomed a massive bureaucracy that would someday spend $3 trillion in a single year --- roughly the sum, combined, spent by the departments covered in this section in 2022. .

218. GDA-5349 Requiring the FBI to get its legal advice from the wider department "would serve as a crucial check on an agency that has recently pushed past legal boundary after legal boundary."� Indeed, Hamilton writes, "[t]he next conservative Administration should eliminate any offices within the FBI that it has the power to eliminate without any action from Congress."� Elsewhere, DOJ should target violent and career criminals, not parents; work to dismantle criminal organizations, partly by rigorously prosecuting interstate drug activity; and restart the Trump Administration's "China Initiative"� (to address Chinese espionage and theft of trade secrets), which the Biden Administration "terminated"� largely out of a concern for poor 'optics.'"� It should also enforce existing federal law that prohibits mailing abortifacients, rather than harassing pro-life demonstrators; respect the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of speech, rather than trying to police speech on the internet; and enforce federal immigration laws, rather than pretending there is no border. .

219. GDA-5554 This program has recently received attention, as agricultural groups rightfully seek to farm without penalty voluntarily idled land, in light of the consequences to food prices of Russia invading Ukraine.97 There is also a need to reform USDA's conservation easements. .

220. GDA-6445 received nearly $100 billion in gifts and grants from China-based sources between 2013 and 2020. .

221. GDA-6570 These ideologically driven policies are also directing huge amounts of money to favored interests and making America dependent on adversaries like China for energy. .

222. GDA-6576 At the same time, adversaries like China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and non-state actors are constantly engaged in cyberattacks against our energy infrastructure. .

223. GDA-6641 In addition, Congress should reform the Natural Gas Act8 to expand required approvals from merely nations with free trade agreements to all of our allies, such as NATO countries. .

224. GDA-6692 nuclear arsenal needs to be updated and reinvigorated if we are to be able to deal effectively with threats from China, Russia, and other adversaries. .

225. GDA-6750 Development of domestic critical material sources is important for national security, as the vast majority of critical materials are mined or processed (or both) in Russia and China.36 The processing of critical materials from fossil fuel waste products (primarily coal) has shown some potential and, in view of our vast domestic reserves of coal and abundant waste from coal mining and combustion, should be pursued. .

226. GDA-6761 3. Work with Congress to expand automatic approvals to include allies such as NATO as well as nations that have free trade agreements with the U.S. .

227. GDA-6925 AE should help to identify those interests, as well as threats posed by countries like Russia and China, and develop appropriate policy options for the President's consideration. .

228. GDA-6931 AE should also be the lead for DOE Antarctic operations as a counter to growing Russian and Chinese interest in Antarctic resources. .

229. GDA-6959 Because America's technological edge is a key national security asset, and in view of China's predatory thefts of intellectual property, OTT should: l Ensure that R&D funds are used for projects that protect and advance that edge. .

230. GDA-6971 SC is led by a Senate-confirmed Director at the Assistant Secretary level and has eight program offices.82 Needed Reforms The next conservative President should commit the United States to scientific dominance to support national and economic security, especially in light of similar efforts by China. .

231. GDA-6980 China and other adversaries have been stealing American science and technology for years and are now on the verge of dominating science --- a development that is fraught with negative strategic and economic implications for the United States. .

232. GDA-7044 New Policies The expansion of Chinese nuclear forces, the continued nuclear threat from Russia, and active nuclear programs in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere require NNSA's recommitment to the nuclear mission. .

233. GDA-7081 The threat of cyber and physical attacks on electric infrastructure by foreign actors like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well as terrorists, continues to grow. .

234. GDA-7163 LNG export facilities are important for delivering natural gas to markets around the world and have become an important policy tool in limiting the ability of Russia and Middle Eastern countries to use energy as a tool in foreign affairs. .

235. GDA-7354 6256, To Ensure That Goods Made with Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China Do Not Enter the United States Market, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. .

236. GDA-9171 l The President should issue an executive order making the HUD Secretary a member of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., which will gain broader oversight authorities to address foreign threats, particularly from China with oversight of foreign ownership of real estate in both rental and ownership markets of single-family and multifamily housing,26 with trillions worth of real estate secured across HUD's portfolio. .

237. GDA-9308 26. China and other foreign nations should not be able to disrupt our nation's housing markets, including by artificially driving up prices and reducing affordability and access to housing for Americans who are crowded out of the market by such market participation. .

238. GDA-9949 For example: l The Federal Bureau of Investigation, knowing that claims of collusion with Russia were false,5 collaborated with Democratic operatives to inject the story into the 2016 election through strategic media leaks, falsified Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant applications, and lied to Congress.6 l Personnel within the FBI engaged in a campaign to convince social media companies and the media generally that the story about the contents of Hunter Biden's laptop was the result of a Russian misinformation campaign --- while the FBI had possession of the laptop the entire time and could have clarified the authenticity of the source.7 l The DOJ engaged in conduct to chill the free speech rights of parents across the United States in response to supposed "threats"� against school boards,8 yet it failed to engage in any concerted campaign to protect the rights of Americans who actually were terrorized by acts of violence like those perpetrated against pregnancy care centers.9 l The FBI tasked agents with monitoring social media and flagging content they deemed to be "misinformation"� or "disinformation"� (not associated with any plausible criminal conspiracy to deprive anyone of any rights) for platforms to remove.10 l The FBI engaged in a domestic influence operation to pressure social media companies to report more "foreign influence"� than the FBI was actually seeing and stop the dissemination of and censor true information directly related to the 2020 presidential election.11 l The department has devoted unprecedented resources to prosecuting American citizens for misdemeanor trespassing offenses or violations of the FACE Act12 while dismissing prosecutions against radical agents of the Left like Antifa.13 l The department has consistently threatened that any conduct not aligning with the liberal agenda "could"� violate federal law --- without actually taking a position that the conduct in question is illegal --- using the prospect of protracted litigation and federal sanctions to chill disfavored behavior such as with state efforts to restrict abortion14 or prevent genital mutilation of children.15 l The department has sued multiple states regarding their efforts to enhance election integrity.16 l The department has failed to do its part to stop the flood of fentanyl and other deadly drugs that are flowing across our borders and decimating families and communities across the United States.17 l The department has abdicated its responsibility to assist in the enforcement of our immigration laws and has engaged in wholescale abandonment of its duty to adjudicate cases in the immigration court system. .

239. GDA-9969 A department that has twice engaged in covert domestic election interference and propaganda operations --- the Russian collusion hoax in 2016 and the Hunter Biden laptop suppression in 2020 --- is a threat to the Republic.24 l Restoring the department's focus on public safety and a culture of respect for the rule of law is a gargantuan task that will involve at minimum four overriding actions: l Restoring the FBI's integrity. .

240. GDA-9974 RESTORING THE FBI'S INTEGRITY The FBI was founded in 1908 to "tackle national crime and security issues"� when "there was hardly any systematic way of enforcing the law across this now broad landscape of America."�25 It best serves the American people when it dedicates its resources and energies to attacking violent crime,26 criminal organizations,27 child predators,28 cyber-crime, and other uniquely federal interests.29 Revelations regarding the FBI's role in the Russia hoax of 2016, Big Tech collusion, and suppression of Hunter Biden's laptop in 2020 strongly suggest that the FBI is completely out of control. .

241. GDA-10051 Mexico --- which is arguably functioning as a failed state run by drug cartels --- is the main point of transit for illegal drugs produced in Central and South America, fentanyl precursors from the Chinese Communist Party-led People's Republic of China,49 weapons, human smuggling and trafficking, and other contraband. .

242. GDA-10065 The DOJ's China Initiative under President Trump reflected the department's priority of combating Chinese threats to our national security.51 Because China was accountable for approximately 80 percent of all prosecutions for economic espionage and approximately 60 percent of all thefts of trade secrets, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions set key goals for the China Initiative that included development of an enforcement strategy concerning researchers in labs and universities who were being coopted into stealing critical U.S. .

243. GDA-10067 In February 2022, the Biden Administration terminated the department's China Initiative largely out of a concern for poor "optics."�52 While the Biden Administration correctly identified China as America's "only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it,"�53 it folded in the face of political correctness and sent the message that liberal sensitivities outweighed bringing justice to threats from China. .

244. GDA-10068 The next conservative Administration should therefore: l Restart the China Initiative. .

245. GDA-10069 l Pursue other programs to educate the American people about the real and dangerous threats to our national security and economic security that are posed by actors across the globe, most notably China and Iran. .

246. GDA-10075 Specific examples of department corruption, such as the Russia collusion hoax, will need to be tackled, exposed, and addressed head-on. .

247. GDA-10293 5. John Solomon, "FBI Email Chain May Provide Most Damning Evidence of FISA Abuses Yet,"� The Hill, December 5, 2018, https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/419901-fbi-email-chain-may-provide-most-damning-evidence-of-fisa- abuses-yet/ (accessed February 3, 2023); Post Editorial Board, "The FBI Knew RussiaGate Was a Lie --- But Hid That Truth,"� New York Post, June 11, 2022, https://nypost.com/2022/06/11/the-fbi-knew-russiagate-was-a-lie- but-hid-that-truth/ (accessed February 3, 2023). .

248. GDA-10294 6. John Solomon, "Collusion Bombshell: DNC Lawyers Met with FBI on Russia Allegations Before Surveillance Warrant,"� The Hill, October 3, 2018, https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/409817-russia-collusion-bombshell-dnc- lawyers-met-with-fbi-on-dossier-before/ (accessed February 3, 2023); Eric Tucker, "Ex-FBI Lawyer Admits to False Statement During Russia Probe,"� AP News, August 19, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/election-2020- b9b3c7ef398d00d5dfee9170d66cefec (accessed February 3, 2023). .

249. GDA-10334 24. Solomon, "FBI Email Chain May Provide Most Damning Evidence of FISA Abuses Yet"�; Post Editorial Board, "The FBI Knew RussiaGate Was a Lie --- But Hid That Truth"�; O'Neill, "FBI Pressured Twitter, Sent Trove of Docs Hours Before Post Broke Hunter Laptop Story."� 25. .

250. GDA-10400 Department of Justice, National Security Division, "Information About the Department of Justice's China Initiative and a Compilation of China-Related Prosecutions Since 2018,"� last updated November 19, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/archives/nsd/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and- compilation-china-related (accessed February 3, 2023). .

251. GDA-10401 52. Ronn Blitzer and Jake Gibson, "Biden DOJ Ending National Security Initiative Aimed at Countering China amid Complaints About Bias,"� Fox News, February 23, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/doj-ending-china- initiative-national-security-program-bias (accessed February 3, 2023). .

252. GDA-10959 l DOL should consider taking enforcement and/or regulatory action to subject investment in China to greater scrutiny under ERISA. .

253. GDA-10960 Many large retirement and pension plans remain invested in China despite its lack of compliance with U.S. .

254. GDA-10981 Under the Trump Administration, DOL ordered the FRTIB to cease investments in China. .

255. GDA-10982 However, under the Biden Administration, the TSP has made available a wide range of investments in China. .

256. GDA-10983 l DOL should exercise its oversight of the FRTIB to prohibit investments in China. .

257. GDA-10984 l Congress should enact legislation prohibiting investment of the TSP in China. .

258. GDA-11293 more dependent on China and other foreign countries that control the supply and processing of rare earth minerals that are needed for EV batteries. .

259. GDA-11359 carriers are not able to fly over Russian airspace, the U.S. .

260. GDA-11361 China has failed to put in place several of the policies to which it has already agreed; the U.S. .

261. GDA-11764 Section Four THE ECONOMY The next Administration must prioritize the economic prosperity of ordinary Americans. .

262. GDA-11765 For several decades, establishment "elites"� have failed the citizenry by refusing to secure the border, outsourcing manufacturing to China and elsewhere, spending recklessly, regulating constantly, and generally controlling the country from the top down rather than letting it flourish from the bottom up. .

263. GDA-11775 Rather, he writes, "Federal Reserve research shows"� that the Trump Administration's steel tariffs, and the retaliatory tariffs levied by other nations in response, "have cost about 75,000 manufacturing jobs while creating only about 1,000 jobs in the steel industry."� Furthermore, he writes that "protectionism and similar progressive policies tend to weaken American security."� Lassman maintains that "trade creates peace,"� and if China weren't so reliant upon trade with the U.S., it would be "much more unstable and dangerous."� He thinks American influence in China --- "Internet memes, fashion, movies"� --- can "play a vital role in helping to turn China from an authoritarian threat into a freer and less hostile power."� Ultimately, Lassman believes that we should lower or repeal tariffs --- including eliminating "the destructive Trump-Biden tariffs"� --- in order to make goods more affordable for Americans. .

264. GDA-11778 But two forces in particular "are pushing America in the opposite direction."� First, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) "most favored nation"� rules encourage our trade partners to adopt high tariffs, which lead to our "chronic"� trade deficits and make us "the globe's biggest trade loser and victim of unfair, unbalanced, and non-reciprocal trade."� For example, Navarro writes, tariffs on imported automobiles are 2.5 percent in the U.S., 10 percent in the European Union, and 15 percent in China. .

265. GDA-11779 Second, China's "economic aggression"� in the form of "tariffs, nontariff barriers, dumping, counterfeiting and piracy, and currency manipulation"� further weakens our "manufacturing and defense industrial base even as the fragility of globally dispersed supply chains has been brought into sharp relief by the COVID-19 pandemic."� In contrast to Lassman, Navarro thinks that "trade deficits matter a great deal."� He writes that "offshoring not only suppresses the real wages of American blue-collar workers and denies millions of Americans the opportunity to climb up the rungs of the ladder to the middle class,"� but it also "raises the specter of a manufacturing and defense industrial base that, unlike our experience in World Wars I and II, will not be able to provide the weapons and matériel that would be needed should America enter another major world war."� Also, China controls "much of the world's pharmaceutical production and supply chains."� It is therefore essential, he writes, that our trade policy be guided by "the principle of reciprocity,"� whereby we coax other countries into lowering their trade barriers if possible and raise ours as necessary. .

266. GDA-11780 Moreover, he says we should "decouple"� our economy from China's. .

267. GDA-11781 China's goal, Navarro says, is "to shift the world's manufacturing and supply chains"� to its soil, thereby strengthening its "defense industrial base and associated warfighting capabilities."� He writes, "Every year, more than 300,000 Communist Chinese nationals attend U.S. .

268. GDA-11783 national laboratories, innovation centers, incubators, and think tanks."� Huawei, "an instrument of Chinese military espionage,"� is now partnering with UC Berkeley on research with "important future military applications."� China is also engaged in what Warren Buffett calls "conquest by purchase,"� as it uses revenues from its trade surpluses "to buy American real estate, companies, and financial assets."� In sum, Navarro believes our current trade policy enriches our allies and adversaries while hurting us, weakens our industrial base while strengthening China's, and shortchanges "Main Street manufacturers and workers."� Such non-reciprocal "free"� trade is slowly undermining our capabilities and our freedom. .

269. GDA-11785 In support of the bank, Hazelton writes, "EXIM provides financing only when the private sector will not."� She says, "Export credit is a strategy weapon in China's whole-of-government approach to enhance its global power."� China provided an estimated "$500 billion in export credit"� in 2018, "approaching in that one year the total amount of financing EXIM has provided in its 90-year history."� Hazelton argues that when large American companies can get a loan from EXIM rather than having to meet the demands of export credit agencies in Europe or elsewhere, it helps American small businesses, too. .

270. GDA-11788 She writes that it also helps foreign companies, such as state-run China Air, that buy U.S. .

271. GDA-11797 trade policy"� --- should counter "the malign influence of China and other U.S. .

272. GDA-11811 The chapter also explains how the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), chaired by Treasury, should realign its priorities to meet the United States' current foreign policy threats, especially from China. .

273. GDA-11821 It possesses key tools to address decades of poor decision-making in Washington and is central to any plan to reverse the precipitous economic decline sparked by the Biden Administration and to counter Communist China. .

274. GDA-11857 There is a growing counterargument within the conservative movement contending that, in a world in which managed trade is the norm rather than the exception, and in which authoritarian governments, especially China, continually seek to undermine U.S. .

275. GDA-11862 In a conservative Administration, the ITA should operate with the following priorities: l Counter the malign influence of China and other U.S. .

276. GDA-11884 These proposals can be broken into three categories: process, policy, and addressing China. .

277. GDA-11885 Process l Re-establish and expand suspended in-person pandemic-related verifications, particularly regarding the People's Republic of China. .

278. GDA-11900 Addressing China l Revive the China-specific non-market economy unit. .

279. GDA-11902 l Develop a new methodology to determine normal values in Chinese anti- dumping cases because --- given China's size, economic might, and state intervention in the economy --- there is no comparable surrogate country to use as a proxy for production costs. .

280. GDA-11905 Without these functions, it is difficult to address massive subsidization, overcapacity, and dumping by China. .

281. GDA-11909 This analysis is needed for CFIUS to be an effective tool in preventing China and other adversaries from exploiting the U.S.'s open investment climate. .

282. GDA-11917 The resulting final report has thus been used to lobby for tariff reductions on thousands of imports from China without concern for any other factors. .

283. GDA-11921 Furthermore, permanent standing teams should be established and staffed by properly aligned political appointees and trusted career staff to analyze and spur action on the following priority policy issues: l Strategic decoupling from China; l Defense industrial base strength; l Critical supply chains (e.g., pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food); and l Emerging technologies (e.g., rare earth minerals, semiconductors, batteries, artificial intelligence, quantum computing). .

284. GDA-11930 CS resources should be distributed according to the following set of priorities: l Value in countering the malign influence of adversaries, particularly China; l Value in fostering U.S. .

285. GDA-11945 Examples include the People's Republic of China's dramatic leaps forward in semiconductor design and fabrication, battery energy storage, nuclear weapons capabilities, artificial intelligence, space and aerospace engineering, and hypersonic weapons deployment. .

286. GDA-11954 companies to shift production out of China and further diversify their supply chains to better advance U.S. .

287. GDA-11981 BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. .

288. GDA-11986 Government needs a new export control modernization effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). .

289. GDA-11988 Case in point: China's and Russia's stated civil-military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central government and the military. .

290. GDA-11993 Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the "specially designed"� licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent --- or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of "fundamental research"� to address exploitation of the open U.S. .

291. GDA-11996 stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. .

292. GDA-11997 Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). .

293. GDA-11999 There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce's Entity List, which regulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. .

294. GDA-12000 Given China's Civil-Military Fusion Strategy and Russia's massive war efforts facilitated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review "policy of denial"� that prohibits exports to these entities. .

295. GDA-12226 participation in standards-setting bodies and the exclusion of participants from adversaries like China. .

296. GDA-12293 The primary subject matter focus of the incoming Administration's Treasury Department should be: l Tax policy and tax administration; l Fiscal responsibility; l Improved financial regulation; l Addressing the economic and financial aspects of the geopolitical threat posed by China and other hostile countries; l Reform of the anti-money laundering and beneficial ownership reporting systems; l Reversal of the racist "equity"� agenda of the Biden Administration; and l Reversal of the economically destructive and ineffective climate-related financial-risk agenda of the Biden Administration. .

297. GDA-12324 The most crucial functions of the Office of International Affairs relate to managing the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue; representing U.S. .

298. GDA-12455 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The Treasury Department should withdraw from Senate consideration the Protocol Amending the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.48 The protocol will lead to substantially more transnational identity theft, crime, industrial espionage, financial fraud, and suppression of political opponents and religious or ethnic minorities by authoritarian and corrupt governments, including China, Colombia, Nigeria, and Russia. .

299. GDA-12491 CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. .

300. GDA-12492 The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States' current foreign policy threats, especially from China. .

301. GDA-12521 Firms fully owned by China's Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. .

302. GDA-12528 foreign direct investment in China. .

303. GDA-12530 to China, investments that enhance China's military capacity, and investments that pose risks to critical U.S. .

304. GDA-12531 supply chains by sourcing critical components or feedstocks in China. .

305. GDA-12586 Moreover, virtually all of the initiatives that the Biden Administration has adopted would, even if successful, have a de minimis impact on changing global weather patterns, in part because most nations --- notably China --- are not cooperating with climate summits and international agreements. .

306. GDA-12617 Other issues of concern include China, cybersecurity, digital assets, digital services taxes, international debt defaults, Iran, Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds and private sector pensions, sanctions policy, and treasury auction and debt issuance. .

307. GDA-12844 This reality is not altered by the argument that the Bank could be a weapon to fight China --- an argument that rests on a misguided understanding of what competitiveness is and how it is achieved and maintained. .

308. GDA-12914 l China by all accounts had a hyperactive ECA: It ranked first on the list in 2019. .

309. GDA-12915 ECA-backed exports in China represented 2.1 percent of exports backed by government financing. .

310. GDA-12916 Whatever one perceives as China's economic successes, it is hard to argue that the main driver of China's exports is its ECA. .

311. GDA-12924 For 23 of the 28 countries on this list (including both China and the U.S.), the share of exports backed by ECA financing is less than 2 percent. .

312. GDA-12934 While it claims that its operations will save taxpayers $14 billion over the next decade, the Congressional Budget Office has found that EXIM programs will actually cost taxpayers $2 billion.26 Numerous audits done by the Bank's internal inspector general also show that the Bank's risk analyses, default assumptions, internal reporting procedures, and financial reporting practices are not reliable enough to ensure the safe stewardship of taxpayer funds and responsible management of EXIM's vast portfolio.27 FAILING TO MEET THE CHINA CHALLENGE These days, to get whatever expansion of government one wants or to justify a new government activity, one has only to declare that more government intervention is needed to help fight China. .

313. GDA-12936 Today, President Biden argues that the Bank could be a powerful weapon in the government's geoeconomic arsenal against China. .

314. GDA-12937 The rationale is that this will prevent China from dominating the global market with its subsidies and will boost American jobs and manufacturing. .

315. GDA-12939 For instance, how can EXIM help us to fight China while state-owned Chinese companies like China Air have been some of the companies most subsidized by EXIM?28 Furthermore, it has now been four years since Congress instructed EXIM to focus on China, but there has been no fundamental change in the way EXIM operates or the companies to which it extends taxpayer-backed financing: Deals related to the aircraft industry still dominate the Bank's portfolio. .

316. GDA-12941 If the Bank were serious about competing against China, it would be targeting the low-income markets where China has been making its most important investments. .

317. GDA-12945 The failure to deliver on its congressionally imposed obligation --- however misguided that obligation may be --- is also noticeable in the fact that EXIM's China and Transformation Exports Program (CTEP) extended only $141.3 million in financing in FY 2022 --- a fraction of the $27 billion it is supposed to deliver by the end of 2026.30 The Bank's efforts have also included a misplaced focus on emerging technologies such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence, which do not need EXIM financing because their foreign sales attract commercial financing without government support. .

318. GDA-12946 The lack of demand for EXIM products could also be reflected in the Bank's authorization of $5.2 billion in loan guarantees and support in FY 2022,31 down from its FY 2012 peak of "over $35.7 billion"� during the Obama Administration.32 This lack of activity also extends to the semiconductor industry, which has been picked as a focal point for a governmentwide industrial policy effort to counter China's ambition to dominate that industry. .

319. GDA-12947 Ironically, at the same time that some want to become more like China to fight China, China's leaders are realizing that their heavy-handed semiconductor subsidies are weakening the Chinese economy. .

320. GDA-12950 The goal of using EXIM as a weapon against China was a bad idea in the first place. .

321. GDA-12954 Furthermore, any attempts to reorient the agency and make it a weapon with which to fight against China are going to fail. .

322. GDA-12962 Since Reagan's presidency, the global economic order has shifted dramatically, and a rising China has completely disrupted the export credit sector. .

323. GDA-12965 China, however, has morphed export credit financing into a weapon of national security. .

324. GDA-12966 l Where most nations have just one export credit agency (ECA), China has three, all targeted for specific stages of economic and industrial development. .

325. GDA-12967 The amount of money China has put behind these three instruments is staggering. .

326. GDA-12968 l It is estimated that in 2018, China provided more than $500 billion in export credit, approaching in that one year the total amount of financing EXIM has provided in its 90-year history. .

327. GDA-12969 l China's export credit activity is greater than that of the ECAs of the entire G7 combined. .

328. GDA-12970 Today, China is the world's largest official creditor, maintaining a portfolio more than twice the size of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund combined. .

329. GDA-12971 l China's highly aggressive Belt and Road Initiative, which has prompted international criticism for ensnaring the developing world in "debt-trap diplomacy,"� has created a sphere of economic and strategic influence that includes about 150 countries, rivaling the relationships of the United States and her allies. .

330. GDA-12972 Unlike America and the G7 economies, China does not subscribe to the rules- based order that has governed export credit financing for nearly a century. .

331. GDA-12973 As in so many other things, China plays by its own rules and is opaque in how it operates, weaponizing its export credit financing deals by offering developing nations terms that are often "too good to be true."� Once the project is underway, the Chinese have been known to change the terms, making a project unaffordable for the purchasing country. .

332. GDA-12974 These tactics have yielded China important strategic plunder like mines and critical minerals, satellites, and even ports like those in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, and Mombasa, Kenya. .

333. GDA-12975 Export credit is a strategic weapon in China's whole-of-government approach to enhance its global power, economic might, and national security. .

334. GDA-12976 The only country that has the economic heft to counter China's aggressions in export credit financing is the United States. .

335. GDA-12977 Not only do American companies risk losing out to Chinese competitors for international opportunities if EXIM is not there to offer support, but a United States without a functioning export credit agency also leaves an unchecked China with a wide-open field to claim jurisdiction over swaths of ocean and shipping lanes, expand its economic influence, and create major changes in the global balance of power. .

336. GDA-12988 China's tactics, as well as those of some of America's allies, have been successful in drawing manufacturing and the jobs associated with that production away from U.S. .

337. GDA-13011 China's aggressive actions in export finance bleed beyond economic advancement and are clearly an effort to expand both its national security and its global power. .

338. GDA-13012 The United States would be foolish to abandon this field of play, surrendering it to China and other nations, and to relinquish EXIM as a powerful tool in America's asymmetrical warfare toolbox. .

339. GDA-13081 33. Bloomberg News, "China Retreats on Going Toe-to-Toe with US on Critical Tech,"� The Sydney Morning Herald, January 4, 2023, https://www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/china-retreats-on-going-toe-to-toe-with- us-on-critical-tech-20230104-p5cae9.html (accessed February 23, 2023). .

340. GDA-13743 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission2 The United States of America is the world's dominant superpower and remains the world's arsenal of democracy. .

341. GDA-13757 However, Communist China's economic aggression also extends to an intricate set of industrial policies and technology transfer-forcing policies that have dramatically skewed the international trading arena. .

342. GDA-13758 Both the unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal trade institutionalized by the WTO and Communist China's economic aggression are weakening America's manufacturing and defense industrial base even as the fragility of globally dispersed supply chains has been brought into sharp relief by the COVID-19 pandemic with its associated lockdowns and other disruptions and by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. .

343. GDA-13759 Russian revanchism, in particular, has demonstrated once again how bad actors on the world stage can use trade policy (for example, export restraints on natural gas) as a weapon of war. .

344. GDA-13765 Note that the trade deficit in goods with Communist China is by far the largest: It accounts for fully one-third of that deficit and is more than twice the size of the deficit with the EU. .

345. GDA-13767 Such offshoring not only suppresses the real wages of American blue-collar workers and denies millions of Americans the opportunity to climb up the rungs of the ladder to the middle class, but also raises the specter of a manufacturing and defense industrial base that, unlike our experience in World Wars I and II, will not be able to provide the weapons and matériel that would be needed should America enter another major world war or seek to assist a major ally like Europe, Japan, or Taiwan. .

346. GDA-13773 TABLE 1America's Trade Defi cit in Goods and Services with Major Trading PartnersFY 2022 FIGURES FOR SELECTED AREAS, IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARSA heritage.orgCountryDefi citCommunist China - European Union - Mexico - Vietnam - Canada - Japan - Ireland - Taiwan - CountryDefi citSouth Korea- Thailand - India - Malaysia - Switzerland - Indonesia - Total- has a quality of its own."� In World War II in particular, it was not just the brave soldiers, sailors, and pilots who beat the Nazis and Imperial Japan. .

347. GDA-13775 In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, almost certainly spawned in a CCP biological weapons lab in Wuhan, China,5 global supply chains have been under significant pressures from lockdown policies, energy price shocks, and other disruptions, including labor market disruptions. .

348. GDA-13776 At the height of the pandemic, the rising geopolitical risk associated with globalized supply chains was underscored when Communist China, which controls much of the world's pharmaceutical production and supply chains, threatened to plunge America "into a mighty sea of coronavirus"� through pharmaceutical export controls6 if American politicians dared to investigate what happened at the Wuhan lab. .

349. GDA-13786 In contrast, the EU charges 10 percent, Communist China 15 percent, and Brazil 35 percent. .

350. GDA-13810 Separately, Communist China levies higher tariffs on 10 products for every one Chinese product that is subject to a U.S.-applied higher tariff.11 India's ratio is even higher at 13 to one. .

351. GDA-13811 Further, both Communist China and India also feature significant nontariff barriers. .

352. GDA-13812 Collectively, these higher nonreciprocal tariffs in Communist China and India block American exporters from selling goods at competitive prices to more than one-third of the world's population. .

353. GDA-13861 Figure 1 shows that the USRTA priority list would include the countries in red --- Communist China and India --- along with trading partners in the yellow zone. .

354. GDA-13862 This yellow zone includes the European Union, which features a very high deficit, along with Thailand, Taiwan, and Vietnam, which feature particularly high tariff differentials. .

355. GDA-13865 tariff rate under pressure from  India ThailandTaiwan VietnamMalaysiaJapanE.U. .

356. GDA-13866 ChinaBILATERAL TRADE DEFICIT  IN BILLIONS OF US DOLLARSAVERAGE MOST-FREE-NATION DIFFERENTIAL SIMPLE MEANA heritage.orgSOURCE: White House Oce of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, The United States Reciprocal Trade Act: Estimated Job & Trade Deficit Eects, May 2019, p. .

357. GDA-13870 Columns 2 and 4 in Table 4, when the USRTA is applied first to Communist China and then to the EU, show the largest absolute dollar reductions in bilateral trade deficits. .

358. GDA-13871 This results in bilateral deficit reductions in Scenario One of $18.5 billion for China and $8.0 billion for the EU. .

359. GDA-13872 In Scenario Two, the impacts for Communist China and the EU are substantially larger: $70.6 billion and $25.3 billion, respectively. .

360. GDA-13873 Note further that the largest relative dollar reductions in percent terms come from applying the USRTA first to India and then to Taiwan and Vietnam. .

361. GDA-13877 raised its tariffs to mirror India's levels, the result would be a far more dramatic 88 percent SCENARIO ONE PARTNER COUNTRIES MATCH US TARIFF RATESCENARIO TWO US MATCHES PARTNER TARIFF RATESCountryProjected Change in Bilateral Trade Balance( Billions) Bilateral Defi cit Reduction as Share of  Bilateral Defi citProjected Change in Bilateral Trade Balance( Billions) Bilateral Defi cit Reduction as Share of  Bilateral Defi citIndia Taiwan Vietnam Thailand Communist China European Union Total SOURCE: White House O ce of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, The United States Reciprocal Trade Act: Estimated Job & Trade Defi cit E ects, May 2029, p. .

362. GDA-13880 TABLE 4Trade Defi cit Reductions for Target CountriesA heritage.org Chinas Acts Policies and Practices of Economic AggressionProtect Chinas Home Market from Competition and ImportsExpand China's Share of Global MarketsSecure and Control Core Natural Resources GloballyDominate Traditional Manufacturing IndustriesAcquire Key Technologies and IP from Other Countries and the US Capture Emerging High-Tech Industries that Drive Future Growth and Advancements in Defense IndustryAdverse Administrative Approvals and Licensing Processes%%% Anti-monopoly Law Extortion%%%% Bid-Rig Foreign Government Procurement Contracts%%% "Brand Forcing"� --- Forced Use of Chinese Brands% Burdensome and Intrusive Testing%%% Chinese Communist Party Co- opts Corporate Governance%%% Chinese Nationals as Non-Traditional Information Collectors%%%% TABLE 5Communist China's Categories of Economic Aggression (Page 1 of 8) Chinas Acts Policies and Practices of Economic AggressionProtect Chinas Home Market from Competition and ImportsExpand China's Share of Global MarketsSecure and Control Core Natural Resources GloballyDominate Traditional Manufacturing IndustriesAcquire Key Technologies and IP from Other Countries and the US Capture Emerging High-Tech Industries that Drive Future Growth and Advancements in Defense IndustryClaim Sovereign Immunity on US Soil to Prevent Litigation% Consolidate State- Owned Enterprises into National Champions%%%%%% Counterfeiting and Piracy Steals Intellectual Property%%% Currency Manipulation and Undervaluation%%% Cyber-Enabled Espionage and Theft%%%% Data Localization Mandates%%% "Debt-Trap"� Financing to Developing Countries%% TABLE 5Communist China's Categories of Economic Aggression (Page 2 of 8) Chinas Acts Policies and Practices of Economic AggressionProtect Chinas Home Market from Competition and ImportsExpand China's Share of Global MarketsSecure and Control Core Natural Resources GloballyDominate Traditional Manufacturing IndustriesAcquire Key Technologies and IP from Other Countries and the US Capture Emerging High-Tech Industries that Drive Future Growth and Advancements in Defense IndustryDelays in Regulatory Approvals%%% Discriminatory Catalogues and Lists%%% Discriminatory Patent and Other IP Rights Restrictions%%%% Dumping Below Cost Into Foreign Markets%%% Evasion of US Export Control Laws%% Expert Review Panels Force Disclosure of Proprietary Information%%% Export Restraints Restrict Access to Raw Materials%%%%% TABLE 5Communist China's Categories of Economic Aggression (Page 3 of 8) Chinas Acts Policies and Practices of Economic AggressionProtect Chinas Home Market from Competition and ImportsExpand China's Share of Global MarketsSecure and Control Core Natural Resources GloballyDominate Traditional Manufacturing IndustriesAcquire Key Technologies and IP from Other Countries and the US Capture Emerging High-Tech Industries that Drive Future Growth and Advancements in Defense IndustryFinancial Support to Boost Exports and Promote Import Substitution%%%% Forced Research and Development ("R&D Localization"�) %% Foreign Ownership Restrictions Force Technology and IP Transfer%%% Government Procurement Restrictions% Indigenous Technology Standards%%% "Junk Patent"� Lawsuits% Lack of Transparency% TABLE 5Communist China's Categories of Economic Aggression (Page 4 of 8) Chinas Acts Policies and Practices of Economic AggressionProtect Chinas Home Market from Competition and ImportsExpand China's Share of Global MarketsSecure and Control Core Natural Resources GloballyDominate Traditional Manufacturing IndustriesAcquire Key Technologies and IP from Other Countries and the US Capture Emerging High-Tech Industries that Drive Future Growth and Advancements in Defense IndustryLax and Inconsistent Labor Laws%%% Monopsony Purchasing Power%% Move the Regulatory Goalposts%%% Open Source Collection of Science and Technology Information%% Overcapacity Drives Out Foreign Rivals%%% Physical Theft of Technologies and IP Through Economic Espionage%%%% Placement of Chinese Employees with Foreign Joint Ventures% Price Controls to Restrict Imports% TABLE 5Communist China's Categories of Economic Aggression (Page 5 of 8) Chinas Acts Policies and Practices of Economic AggressionProtect Chinas Home Market from Competition and ImportsExpand China's Share of Global MarketsSecure and Control Core Natural Resources GloballyDominate Traditional Manufacturing IndustriesAcquire Key Technologies and IP from Other Countries and the US Capture Emerging High-Tech Industries that Drive Future Growth and Advancements in Defense Industry"Product Hop"� and "Country Hop"� to Evade Antidumping and Countervailing Duties%% Promise Cooperation on Regional Security Issues as Bargaining Chip%%% Quotas and Tari -Rate Quotas% Recruitment of Science Technology Business and Finance Talent%%% Retaliation and Retaliatory Threats%%%% Reverse Engineering%% TABLE 5Communist China's Categories of Economic Aggression (Page 6 of 8) Chinas Acts Policies and Practices of Economic AggressionProtect Chinas Home Market from Competition and ImportsExpand China's Share of Global MarketsSecure and Control Core Natural Resources GloballyDominate Traditional Manufacturing IndustriesAcquire Key Technologies and IP from Other Countries and the US Capture Emerging High-Tech Industries that Drive Future Growth and Advancements in Defense IndustrySanitary and Phytosanitary Standards Raise Non- Tari Barriers%%% Secure and Controllable Technology Standards%%% Security Reviews Force Technology and IP Transfer%% Structuring Transactions to Avoid CFIUS Review of Chinese Investment in the US %% Subsidized Factor Inputs --- Capital Energy Utilities and Land%% Tari s% TABLE 5Communist China's Categories of Economic Aggression (Page 7 of 8) Chinas Acts Policies and Practices of Economic AggressionProtect Chinas Home Market from Competition and ImportsExpand China's Share of Global MarketsSecure and Control Core Natural Resources GloballyDominate Traditional Manufacturing IndustriesAcquire Key Technologies and IP from Other Countries and the US Capture Emerging High-Tech Industries that Drive Future Growth and Advancements in Defense IndustryTechnology-Seeking State-Directed Foreign Direct Investment%%% Traditional Spycraft%%% Transship to Evade Antidumping and Countervailing Duties% Value-Added Tax Adjustments and Rebates Subsidize Chinese Exports%% Weak and Laxly Enforced Environmental Laws%% TABLE 5Communist China's Categories of Economic Aggression (Page 8 of 8) SOURCE: White House O ce of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023).A heritage.org reduction in the U.S. .

363. GDA-13882 Similarly, if Taiwan were to reduce its tariffs to U.S. .

364. GDA-13884 bilateral trade deficit with Taiwan would fall by 6 percent. .

365. GDA-13886 imposed a mirror tariff, its bilateral trade deficit with Taiwan would fall by 59 percent. .

366. GDA-13905 CHALLENGE #2: COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION18 Among all of its bilateral trade relationships, America's relationship with Communist China is the most fraught with difficulty. .

367. GDA-13906 The problem is not just that the relentlessly mercantilist and protectionist trade policies that China has pursued ever since its accession to the WTO in 2001 have led to chronic, massive, and ever-expanding trade deficits. .

368. GDA-13907 Communist China's economic aggression in the traditional trade policy space is further facilitated by equally aggressive industrial policies and technology transfer-forcing policies that are designed to shift the world's manufacturing and supply chains to Communist Chinese soil. .

369. GDA-13908 The Chinese Communist Party's policy goal is to propel the Chinese economy, but its broader goal is to strengthen Communist China's defense industrial base and associated warfighting capabilities. .

370. GDA-13909 That China unabashedly seeks to supplant America as the world's dominant economic and military power is not in dispute. .

371. GDA-13911 Xi has promised that the deed will be done by 2049, the 100-year anniversary of the Communist takeover of the Mainland.19 In light of Communist China's broader geopolitical and military agenda, the American President who takes office in January 2025 must view the U.S.-China trade relationship and associated policy reforms within the context of the broader existential threat posed by Communist China. .

372. GDA-13912 The question is whether that next President should seek to decouple economically and financially from Communist China as America's first best response to China's unrelenting aggression or continue efforts to negotiate with an authoritarian country and brutal dictatorship with a well-established reputation for failing to abide by any agreements it enters. .

373. GDA-13915 Viewed as whole, the extent of Communist China's aggression is breathtaking. .

374. GDA-13916 At the trade policy level, Communist China relies heavily on a wide range of mercantilist and protectionist tools to protect its own markets and unfairly exploit foreign markets. .

375. GDA-13917 These instruments of Communist Chinese trade aggression include high tariffs and nontariff barriers, currency manipulation, a heavy reliance on sweatshop labor and pollution havens, the dumping of unfairly subsidized exports, and widespread counterfeiting and piracy: Communist China is the world's largest source of counterfeit and pirated products. .

376. GDA-13919 The resultant glut of Communist Chinese exports in turn depresses world prices and pushes foreign rivals out of the global market --- steel is a major example.20 Industrial policy tools that further reinforce Communist China's mercantilist and protectionist trade policies include numerous direct and indirect subsidies to boost exports and the consolidation of heavily subsidized state-owned enterprises into "national champions"� that can compete with foreign companies in both domestic and global markets. .

377. GDA-13920 Communist China also uses a predatory "debt trap"� model of economic development aid that proffers substantial financing to developing countries in exchange for their willingness to mortgage their natural resources and allow Communist China access to their markets. .

378. GDA-13921 The practical effect of this debt trap model is to give Communist China a competitive edge internationally that stems from its preferential access to relatively lower-cost commodities needed in the manufacturing process. .

379. GDA-13923 As a complement to this debt trap gambit and to exploit its commanding share of a wide range of critical raw materials that are essential to the global supply chain and production of high-technology and high-value-added products, Communist China strategically uses protectionist export restraints, including export quotas and export duties. .

380. GDA-13925 The result is to drive up world prices and thereby put pressure on American and other foreign downstream producers to move their operations, technologies, and jobs to Communist China. .

381. GDA-13926 American industries that have been affected by Communist China's export restraints range from steel, chemicals, and electric cars to wind turbines, lasers, semiconductors, and refrigerants. .

382. GDA-13928 Table 6, extracted from the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy's report on Communist China's economic aggression,21 provides a summary of the various policies the Chinese Communist Party uses to force the transfer of the West's technologies to Communist Chinese soil. .

383. GDA-13930 Communist China's looting of American technology is further enhanced by "information harvesting"� conducted by Communist Chinese nationals who infiltrate U.S. .

384. GDA-13934 "between $180 billion and $540 billion"� annually.23 Closely related to Communist China's espionage campaigns are its state-backed efforts to evade U.S. .

385. GDA-13938 When acquired by a strategic economic and military competitor like Communist China, however, such commercial items can quickly wind up propelling the aircraft of the People's Liberation Army. .

386. GDA-13939 As an example of Communist China's coercive and intrusive regulatory gambits to force the transfer of foreign technologies and IP to Chinese competitors, foreign companies often must enter into joint ventures or partnerships with minority stakes in exchange for access to the Chinese market. .

387. GDA-13942 Similarly, a relentlessly coercive Communist China has forced American patent and technology holders to accept below-market royalty rates in licensing and other forms of below-market compensation for their technologies --- and the American government has done little or nothing about it. .

388. GDA-13952 For example, Huawei, well-known within the American intelligence community as an instrument of Chinese military espionage, has partnered with the University of California-Berkeley on research that focuses on artificial intelligence and related areas such as deep learning, reinforcement learning, machine learning, natural language processing, and computer vision, all of which have important future military applications.28 In this way, UC-Berkeley, whether unwittingly or wittingly, helps to boost Communist China's capabilities and quest for military dominance. .

389. GDA-13954 Such American research has accelerated Communist China's development of hypersonic glide vehicles, which travel at speeds in excess of Mach 5 and are aimed at evading modern ballistic missile defense systems while they deliver their nuclear weapons. .

390. GDA-13961 Since 2012, CB Insights has catalogued more than 600 high-technology investments in the United States worth close to $20 billion --- with artificial intelligence, augmented and virtual reality, and robotics receiving a particular focus --- by Communist China-based investors.30 All of these behaviors raise the question of whether Communist Chinese nationals should be granted visas to penetrate our universities, think tanks, and research institutions and whether Communist Chinese capital should be allowed to invest in America's cutting-edge technology firms. .

391. GDA-13963 It should be clear from this review that Communist China's economic aggression is both widespread and systemic. .

392. GDA-13966 The question: How should the next American President address this aggression? Policy responses range from further attempts to negotiate with the CCP to strategically decoupling economically and financially from Communist China. .

393. GDA-13968 If the past is prologue, and as we learned during the Trump Administration, any further negotiations with Communist China are likely to be both fruitless and dangerous: fruitless because the CCP now has a very well-established reputation for bargaining in bad faith and dangerous because as long as the CCP's aggression continues, it will further weaken America's manufacturing and defense industrial base and global supply chains. .

394. GDA-13969 The record regarding Communist China's bad-faith negotiating is clear. .

395. GDA-13970 In September 2015, President Barack Obama stood with Xi Jinping in the White House Rose Garden where Xi solemnly promised not to militarize the South China Sea and agreed that Communist China would not conduct knowingly cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.31 Within a year, the first promise would be broken.32 As for Communist China's cyberattacks on American businesses, they have never stopped. .

396. GDA-13972 Instead, as a gesture of good faith, he sought to negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement with China that would have addressed many of the issues raised in this discussion. .

397. GDA-13975 These tariffs would lead Communist China's lead negotiator, Vice Premier Liu He, to agree tentatively in April of 2019 to what would have been the most comprehensive trade deal in global history.34 On May 3, 2019, however, Liu would renege on that 150-page deal and seek its drastic re-trading.35 Finally, on January 15, 2020, the U.S. .

398. GDA-13976 and Communist China signed a "Phase One"� deal that was a pale shadow of the original deal.36 This so-called Skinny Deal (as it was derisively and rightly called) combined proposed modest Communist Chinese reforms on issues related to forced technology transfer and intellectual property theft with promises of large-scale purchases of agricultural, manufacturing, and energy products. .

399. GDA-13977 To date, this deal has been a predictable bust: Communist China has failed to consummate a significant fraction of its promised purchases and has made little or no progress on reforming its mercantilist, protectionist, and technology transfer-forcing policies. .

400. GDA-13978 The clear lesson learned in both the Obama and Trump Administrations is that Communist China will never bargain in good faith with the U.S. .

401. GDA-13980 An equally clear lesson learned by President Trump, which he was ready to implement in a second term, was that the better policy option was to decouple both economically and financially from Communist China as further negotiations would indeed be both fruitless and dangerous. .

402. GDA-13981 SOURCE: White House O ce of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse. .

403. GDA-13982 archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). .

404. GDA-13983 TABLE 6Vectors of Communist China's Economic Aggression in the Technology and IP SpaceA heritage.org  Physical Theft and Cyber-Enabled Theft of Technologies and IP "� Physical Theft of Technologies and IP Through Economic Espionage "� Cyber-Enabled Espionage and Theft "� Evasion of US Export Control Laws "� Counterfeiting and Piracy "� Reverse Engineering  Coercive and Intrusive Regulatory Gambits "� Foreign Ownership Restrictions "� Adverse Administrative Approvals and Licensing Requirements "� Discriminatory Patent and Other IP Rights Restrictions "� Security Reviews Force Technology and IP Transfers "� Secure and Controllable Technology Standards "� Data Localization Mandates "� Burdensome and Intrusive Testing "� Discriminatory Catalogues and Lists "� Government Procurement Restrictions "� Indigenous Technology Standards that Deviate from International Norms "� Forced Research and Development "� Antimonopoly Law Extortion "� Expert Review Panels Force Disclosure of Proprietary Information "� Chinese Communist Party Co-opts Corporate Governance "� Placement of Chinese Employees with Foreign Joint Ventures  Economic Coercion "� Export Restraints Restrict Access to Raw Materials "� Monopsony Purchasing Power  Information Harvesting "� Open-Source Collection of Science and Technology Information "� Chinese Nationals in US as Non-Traditional Information Collectors "� Recruitment of Science Technology Business and Finance Talent  State-Sponsored Technology-Seeking Investment "� Chinese State Actors Involved in Technology-Seeking FDI "� Chinese Investment Vehicles Used to Acquire and Transfer US Technologies and IP - Mergers and Acquisitions - Greenfi eld Investments - Seed and Venture Funding The following policy options were on the drawing board or in discussion as preparations for a potential Trump second term were being made. .

405. GDA-13984 These options span the spectrum from purely trade-related like increasing tariffs to cutting off Communist China's access to American financial markets, research institutions, and consumers. .

406. GDA-13985 The next American President should strongly consider adopting all of them as a package: l Strategically expand tariffs to all Chinese products and increase tariff rates to levels that will block out "Made in China"� products, and execute this strategy in a manner and at a pace that will not expose the U.S. .

407. GDA-13987 l Provide significant financial and tax incentives to American companies that are seeking to onshore production from Communist China to U.S. .

408. GDA-13989 l Stop Communist China's abuse of the so-called de minimis exemption, which allows it to evade the tariffs for products valued at less than $800. .

409. GDA-14004 l Sanction any companies, including American companies like Apple, that facilitate Communist China's use of its Great Firewall surveillance and censorship capabilities. .

410. GDA-14012 President wishes to defend this country against the serious existential threat posed by Communist China, that President will adopt all of these proposals through the requisite presidential executive orders or memoranda. .

411. GDA-14020 Instead, America trades in a world where the WTO's MFN rules are stacked against us, scofflaws like Communist China run roughshod over what meager WTO rules there are, and the United States among all of the world's developed nations is the biggest victim of the free trade Ricardian orthodoxy. .

412. GDA-14033 These special-interest groups range from the hedge funds of Wall Street and tech entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley to big-box retailers that stuff their aisles particularly with cheap "Made in China"� goods. .

413. GDA-14047 companies offshore their production to chase cheap labor or manufacture in a "pollution haven"� country like Communist China or India with lax environmental regulations, the result is reduced nonresidential fixed investment --- and a GDP growth rate that is lower than it would be otherwise. .

414. GDA-14062 dollars is a rapidly militarizing strategic rival like Communist China that is intent on world hegemony. .

415. GDA-14063 By buying up America's companies, technologies, farmland, food producers, and key elements of the domestic supply chain, Communist China can thereby gain more and more control of the U.S. .

416. GDA-14065 In this scenario, might America thereby lose a broader war for America's freedom and prosperity, not by shots fired but by American cash registers ringing up "Made in China"� products? Might America even lose a broader hot war because it sent its defense industrial base abroad on the wings of a persistent trade deficit? It follows that for both economic and national security reasons, trade deficits do indeed matter. .

417. GDA-14069 During the Trump Administration, President Trump's key policy advisers and Cabinet officials clashed on the issues of international trade and combating Communist China's economic aggression. .

418. GDA-14070 As much as President Trump did on the trade front that was bold and innovative and as much as he achieved by challenging Communist China, too much of his trade policy was disrupted or derailed by key personnel who did not share the President's vision of fair, balanced, and reciprocal trade. .

419. GDA-14089 The stark lesson of this chapter is that America gets fleeced every day in the global marketplace both by a predatory Communist China and by an institutionally unfair and nonreciprocal WTO. .

420. GDA-14096 Do we place our trust in Washington elites to revive a declining country, or do we trust in America's tradition of entrepreneurs and everyday people blazing new trails? Do we follow China by copying its strong-arm trade policies, or do we lead China and the rest of the world by forging our own path? Our trade policy decisions will tell you what we Americans really think of ourselves. .

421. GDA-14127 China deserves special consideration, as does the World Trade Organization (WTO) along with its possible successors or alternatives. .

422. GDA-14129 It should be used to strengthen alliances to help counter China, Russia, and other threats while making economic and cultural inroads inside them. .

423. GDA-14197 l Work with Congress to restore the President's Trade Promotion Authority, which would expedite the negotiation of trade agreements with the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Taiwan, the European Union, and other allies, and keep trade-unrelated provisions out of trade agreements. .

424. GDA-14200 This would prevent authoritarian countries like China from abusing the organization for their own ends. .

425. GDA-14201 l Adopt a multi-pronged China strategy to convince the Chinese government to reform its illiberal human rights and trade policies. .

426. GDA-14229 The New York Federal Reserve estimated in 2019 that the Section 301 China tariffs cost the average household $831 per year,55 a figure that has likely increased with inflation. .

427. GDA-14257 Retaliatory tariffs by both China and American allies in response to the 2018 steel tariffs were targeted primarily at American agriculture. .

428. GDA-14367 In fact, Jones Act-compliant shipping is so expensive that it is often cheaper for East Coast ports to import oil from Vladimir Putin's Russia than it is to send it up the coast from Houston or New Orleans. .

429. GDA-14368 The national security (to say nothing of energy security) implications of reliance on Russia for oil and gas are obvious. .

430. GDA-14392 l Repeal the Jones Act to replace Russian energy imports with domestic production. .

431. GDA-14393 l Develop a multifaceted, long-term China policy that takes seriously America's biggest foreign policy threat and deals with it on several fronts. .

432. GDA-14400 investment and exports, for example, China's behavior would likely become increasingly less predictable and more dangerous. .

433. GDA-14404 A less constrained China would be poorer but much more unstable and dangerous to its neighbors and to America than it would be if it still had to engage regularly with the rest of the world. .

434. GDA-14446 When China joined the WTO in 2001, it was granted developing-nation status, which it continues to use to dodge rules that should apply to it. .

435. GDA-14453 In addition to being good for its own sake, liberalization would give them entry into a prestigious club that tilted toward America's orbit and away from China's. .

436. GDA-14462 EXIM has a long history of providing financing for authoritarian governments in China, Russia, and the Middle East that often oppose U.S. .

437. GDA-14487 Adopting a Multi-Pronged China Strategy. .

438. GDA-14488 An effective American policy toward China needs to take a realistic view of the country, its leaders, their strengths, and the serious challenges they face. .

439. GDA-14491 At the same time, recent revelations about China's official statistics overstating its GDP by 30 percent track well with other problems that were already known.77 These include one of the world's worst demographic aging curves thanks to China's one-child policy; a population that may already be declining; an unsustainable debt load that is already causing problems; countless failed boondoggles, from empty cities to its underwhelming Belt-and-Road Initiative, that are wasting significant resources; Xi Jinping's authoritarian turn; increasing state control of the economy; and a zero-COVID policy that has sabotaged the economy and driven away foreign investment.78 America has its problems, but it is in better shape than China on nearly every measure, especially in the long run. .

440. GDA-14492 While the facts on the ground should inoculate the next Administration against the most strident China fearmongering circulating in the media and in Washington, that does not mean that the government in Beijing is no threat to American interests. .

441. GDA-14493 The question is: What should we do about it? A serious China policy will require American policymakers to integrate doctrines, institutional prerogatives, expertise, and realistic objectives. .

442. GDA-14497 An effective China policy must also allow for adaptation because the CCP will not sit idly by. .

443. GDA-14499 Trade isolationism is inherently inflexible because it reduces the number of contact points with China. .

444. GDA-14501 Trade and engagement with China are necessary if we are to contain the threats that China poses to its neighbors and to the U.S. .

445. GDA-14502 The next Administration should: l End China's developing-nation status in the WTO and other international organizations. .

446. GDA-14503 China is an advanced manufacturing economy and should be treated as such, even if its political and legal institutions remain those of a developing nation, to prevent it from exploiting its status to gain special privileges. .

447. GDA-14510 The TPP was already negotiated and would have strengthened an alliance against China, including most of its biggest trading partners in East Asia and the Americas. .

448. GDA-14512 and its allies from the goal at hand: countering China. .

449. GDA-14514 Rejoining this alliance should be a top priority in the next conservative Administration's China policy. .

450. GDA-14521 IPEF is similar to the TPP, but its member countries are mostly China's neighbors in Asia. .

451. GDA-14522 Like the TPP, it seeks to create an alliance to push China toward the rule of law, but the Biden Administration so far has left trade entirely out of the agreement. .

452. GDA-14524 IPEF has the potential to be a powerful diplomatic tool that helps to bring countries into America's orbit and away from China's. .

453. GDA-14525 Beijing's chauvinistic approach to foreign policy has alienated most of China's neighbors and allies. .

454. GDA-14527 IPEF and the TPP could offer them a way out and make it easier for China's smaller neighbors to stand up for themselves in a united front as they move toward American- style institutions that protect civil, political, and economic liberties. .

455. GDA-14530 The next Administration can give China's neighbors a better choice by refocusing IPEF on trade, dropping most of its non-trade issues, and turning it into a forum to promote democracy and strengthen alliances while pressuring Beijing to make needed reforms. .

456. GDA-14538 Such informal bottom-up processes will also play a vital role in helping to turn China from an authoritarian threat into a freer and less hostile power. .

457. GDA-14541 China's leaders are set in their ways, especially with Xi Jinping presumably now in power for life, but the younger generation is more open than their parents were --- more individualistic and open to change. .

458. GDA-14546 Each of these many components, from tariffs to trade agreements to culture, is a small part of a larger China policy. .

459. GDA-14549 China's own demographic and debt problems, along with aging leadership and growing discontent over the zero-COVID policy, might even cause an internal collapse. .

460. GDA-14553 However, recent departures from those principles have hurt America's economy and weakened alliances that are necessary to contain threats from Russia and China. .

461. GDA-14565 2. 2017 Annual Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 115th Congress, 1st Session, November 2017, p. .

462. GDA-14569 Government Accountability Office, "China Trade: WTO Membership and Most-Favored-Nation Status,"� Testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. .

463. GDA-14582 6. Barmini Chakraborty, "China Hints at Denying Americans Life-Saving Coronavirus Drugs,"� Fox News, March 13, 2020, https://www.foxnews.com/world/chinese-deny-americans-coronavirus-drugs (accessed February 25, 2023). .

464. GDA-14588 pdf?mod=article_inline (accessed February 26, 2023); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Trade Analysis Information System,"� https://databank.worldbank.org/source/unctad-%5E-trade-analysis- information-system-(trains) (accessed February 26, 2023); Trefor Moss, "China to Cut Import Tariff on Autos to 15% from 25%,"� The Wall Street Journal, updated May 22, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ china-to-cut-import-tariff-on-autos-to-15-from-25-1526980760 (accessed February 26, 2023); U.S. .

465. GDA-14600 18. This section draws on analyses in White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology- Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). .

466. GDA-14602 20. Executive Office of the President, United States Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance, January 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20WTO%20Report.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). .

467. GDA-14603 21. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World. .

468. GDA-14604 22. The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development Plan (2006-2020): An Outline, The State Council, The People's Republic of China, p. .

469. GDA-14605 [55], https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/ Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). .

470. GDA-14611 25. Ministry of Education, People's Republic of China, "Statistics on Studying in China in 2018,"� http://www.moe. .

471. GDA-14612 gov.cn/was5/web/search?searchword=Statistics+on+Studying+in+China+in+2018&channelid=254028&page=1 (accessed March 21, 2023). .

472. GDA-14613 26. Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, "China's Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. .

473. GDA-14615 com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). .

474. GDA-14617 27. Brown and Singh, "China's Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. .

475. GDA-14621 29. Press release, "President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address China's Unfair Trade,"� Office of the United States Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/ press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong (accessed February 25, 2023). .

476. GDA-14622 30. "From China with Love: AI, Robotics, AR/VR Are Hot Areas for Chinese Investment In US,"� CB Insights, August 1, 2017, https://www.cbinsights.com/research/chinese-investment-us-tech-expert-research/ (accessed February 25, 2023). .

477. GDA-14623 31. "Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People's Republic of China in Joint Press Conference,"� The White House, September 25, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- pressffice/2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint (accessed February 25, 2023). .

478. GDA-14626 34. Yen Nee Lee, "'New Consensus' Reached on US-China Trade, Says Chinese Vice Premier Liu He,"� CNBC, updated April 5, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/05/us-china-trade-new-consensus-reached-says- chinas-liu-he.html (accessed February 25, 2023). .

479. GDA-14627 35. Reuters, "China Backtracked on Nearly All Aspects of US Trade Deal: Sources,"� CNBC, May 8, 2019, https:// www.cnbc.com/2019/05/08/china-backtracked-on-nearly-all-aspects-of-us-trade-deal-sources.html (accessed February 25, 2023). .

480. GDA-14628 36. Fact Sheet, "Economic and Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China,"� Office of the United States Trade Representative, January 15, 2020, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/US_China_Agreement_Fact_Sheet.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). .

481. GDA-14689 Weinstein, "New China Tariffs Increase Costs to U.S. .

482. GDA-14691 newyorkfed.org/2019/05/new-china-tariffs-increase-costs-to-us-households/ (accessed February 21, 2023). .

483. GDA-14741 Lardy, The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Reform in China? (Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2019); Elizabeth C. .

484. GDA-14743 Section Five INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES In addition to the executive departments and agencies discussed previously, a number of independent commissions exist that are loosely affiliated with the executive branch. .

485. GDA-14754 entities from directly or indirectly contributing to China's malign AI goals ."� Former Federal Election Commissioner Hans von Spakovsky writes in Chapter 29 that while "the authority of the President over the actions of"� the Federal Election Commission "is extremely limited,"� the President "must ensure that the [Justice Department], just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear violations"� of the Federal Election Campaign Act. .

486. GDA-15145 The FCC revoked or denied the licenses of carriers like China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom, which presented unacceptable national security risks. .

487. GDA-15159 As noted above, China Telecom and similar entities have been banned from operating in the U.S. .

488. GDA-15163 China Telecom, for instance, continues to provide services to data centers by offering the services on a private or "unregulated"� basis. .

489. GDA-15168 To this end, the FCC should compile and publish a list of all entities that hold FCC authorizations, licenses, or other grants of authority with more than 10 percent ownership by foreign adversarial governments, including the governments of China, Russia, Iran, Syria, or North Korea. .

490. GDA-15188 entities from directly or indirectly contributing to China's malign AI goals. .

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Save Metrics with analysis run Project-2025_MFL_FULL-SpecialCharFix.txt 07/14/024 11:51:49 Appended Metrics File

Total Lines: 15842 Blank Lines: Non Blank Lines: 15842 Imperatives: 2799 Shalls: 31 Wills: 519 IsReq:

Message: These metrics are what allow you to compare different documents and different analysis runs. Consider moving the numbers into a spreadsheet for visualization. Counts of Shalls, Wills, IsReq, and Imperatives are hardcoded into the tool. You have the ability to enter a Norm value, which can be surfaced after multiple analysis sessions.

Item	Risk	Count	Children	% lines	% imperative	% shall	% will	% isreq	% Norm
China s18s		405		2.55	14.46		78.03
Civil Service s18s
Climate Change s18s
Communist s18s
Eliminate Repeal s18s
Marxist s18s
NATO s18s		14		0.08	0.5	45.16	2.69
NAZI Fascist s18s
President s18s
Privatize s18s
Promise s24s		4		0.02	0.14	12.9	0.77
Revolution s18s
Russia s18s		98		0.61	3.5		18.88
Section Titles s24s		5		0.03	0.17	16.12	0.96
Socialist s18s
Sustainability s18s
Ukraine s18s		27		0.17	0.96	87.09	5.2
Unions s18s
Woke Labeling s18s
z Mined Objects		490		3.09	17.5		94.41

Rules Total 20
Rules Triggered 7
Rules Not Triggered 13
Percent of Rules Triggered 35%

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Accessed Unique Syllables:
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Polysyllabic Count: 0
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Government Changes:

. . . 1. China No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: China Color: PURPLE Access Object: China|Taiwan Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 2. Civil Service No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Civil Service Color: GREEN Access Object: Civil Service Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 3. Climate Change No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Climate Change Color: ORANGE Access Object: Climate Change|Carbon|Solar|Global Warming|wind and solar|solar and wind|wind energy|wind turbines|offshore Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 4. Communist No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Communist Color: NAVY Access Object: Communis\w+ Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 5. Eliminate Repeal No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Eliminate Repeal Color: RED Access Object: Eliminate\w*|Repeal\w*|abolish\w* Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 6. Marxist No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Marxist Color: MAROON Access Object: Marx\w+ Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 7. NATO No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: NATO Color: BLUE Case Sensitive : CHECKED Access Object: NATO Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 8. NAZI Fascist No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: NAZI Fascist Color: FUCHSIA Access Object: Fascis\w+ Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 9. President No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: President Color: PURPLE Access Object: President Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 10. Privatize No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Privatize Color: BLUE Access Object: Privatize\w* Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 11. Revolution No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Revolution Color: ORANGE Access Object: Revolution\w* Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 12. Russia No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Russia Color: RED Access Object: Russi\w+ Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 13. Socialist No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Socialist Color: OLIVE Access Object: Socialist|Socialism Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 14. Sustainability No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Sustainability Color: BROWN Access Object: Sustainab\w+|unsustainab\w+ Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 15. Ukraine No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Ukraine Color: GREEN Access Object: Ukrain\w+ Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 16. Unions No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Unions Color: MAROON Access Object: deunionize\w*|union\w*|worker\w* Reject Object: soviet|european|\.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 17. Woke Labeling No Comment Text in this rule.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Woke Labeling Color: NAVY Case Sensitive : CHECKED Access Object: \b[wW]oke\w*\b|Left[^\s]|[fF]eckless\w*|[Aa]nti.[aA]merican|[Bb]iased|[Pp]olitically [Bb]iased|unbiased Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

Sections:

. . . 1. Promise Must use parse option to capture the sections. A different search rule is needed for non-parse option.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Promise Color: BLACK Case Sensitive : CHECKED Access Object: PROMISE \#\d+ Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED

. . . 2. Section Titles Must use parse option to capture the sections. A different search rule is needed for non-parse option.
. . . . . . Rule Summary Name: Section Titles Color: BLACK Case Sensitive : CHECKED Access Object: Section \w+ TAKING THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT|Section \w+ THE COMMON DEFENSE|Section \w+ THE GENERAL WELFARE|Section \w+ THE ECONOMY|Section \w+ INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES Reject Object: \.\.\. Count Accessed Patterns: CHECKED